On July 29, the US will convene the first major diplomatic effort to end the war in Sudan in more than a year, but the only centered African participant will be Egypt. The African Union is reportedly trying to get a representative in the door, but it is unclear whether they will be able to, and are at any rate sidelined. The structure raises important question about the viability of any agreement that it might create, but it also raises important questions about the role of African institutions in resolving crises on the continent.
The July 29 meeting will bring together the “Quad” (the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) to discuss peace in Sudan. After more than two years of war in Sudan, Sudanese are exhausted and any prospect of advancing peace is welcome. However, they have also expressed concern that as currently configured, the initiative is unlikely to succeed. Some see the participants as ill-suited to promote peace as they include the same foreign backers who are seen as funding the war. The UAE is widely accused of supporting the RSF, whereas Egypt is widely seen as backing the SAF, a perception only intensified by Egypt’sinsistence on including the SAF in the upcoming meeting. Sudanese are understandably wary about the possibility of such actors to now promote peace. Others have suggested that current configuration is more likely to secure a quick-fix solution focused on wealth and power sharing and not a broader, more comprehensive agreement that addresses root causes.
An obvious response to these gaps is to broaden the framework. While engagement of the states most directly engaged in supporting the parties is critical for ensuring the necessary leverage to bring the parties to the table, balancing this with other actors is critical for ensuring a comprehensive peace. Some have suggestedthat the best way forward is to merge the existing Quad mechanism with the Jeddah platform, initiated by the US and Saudi Arabia at the outset of the war. Doing so would not only ensure that the new mechanism builds effectively on the negotiations and agreements secured under it, but it would also engage the African Union and IGAD – who were engaged as supporters in Jeddah.
Although it was flawed in its own ways, the CPA was the most successful of the series of failed Sudanese peace agreements. Although the US was pivotal in agreeing that accord, negotiations were led by IGAD and its main mediator was General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, also Kenyan Special Envoy to Sudan. He had the full support of then-Kenyan President Moi. This kind of high-level regional engagement was critical to getting to an agreement. And yet, more than two years into a new war that is equally if not more devastating, we are not seeing the same type of high-level African engagement. This has to change if a successful mediation is to be launched.
Indeed, AU engagement will also be useful in addressing the concerns about ensuring that the deal is comprehensive. The AU has been engaged in pulling together Sudanese political and civil society leaders to discuss peace. These initiatives are critical to developing a strong civilian voices in negotiations. In addition, Sudanese political parties support greater AU engagement. These factors suggest that the AU has a unique opportunity to ensure the success of any upcoming process.
It is time for AU leaders to step up and both insist on a role in process and to show that they are committed to a securing a comprehensive and durable outcome.
