By Elena Kweli. Elena is a mass atrocity researcher covering Africa
Why Tanzania Matters Now
Tanzania’s 2025 general election marked a profound rupture with the country’s post-independence political trajectory. What unfolded went far beyond procedural irregularities or routine electoral repression. The pre- and post-election period was characterized by systematic and state-sanctioned violence that included targeted and indiscriminate killings, mass arrests, torture, and enforced disappearances affecting opposition figures, civic actors, and ordinary civilians alike. Reports estimate that between 3,000 and 10,000 people were killed or went missing, while at least 1,200 were detained.
These abuses were not random but reflected a coordinated strategy to suppress opposition, intimidate communities, and pre-empt collective mobilisation before, during, and after the polls. Security responses were anticipatory rather than reactive, aimed at preventing dissent rather than responding to disorder. This was especially evident on the nights of 29–31 October, when state agents reportedly carried out killings in homes and neighbourhoods across the country to instilfear and quell mass demonstrations. The scale, organisation and intent of these actions signal a departure from conventional electoral coercion and place Tanzania at a critical inflection point.
Tanzania’s significance extends beyond its borders. Long regarded as stable, cohesive, and insulated from ethnic polarization, the country defies many assumptions that underpin atrocity-risk analysis. Yet the 2025 elections demonstrate that serious atrocity risks can emerge even in the absence of ethnic conflict or civil war. How this moment is interpreted will shape responses not only in Tanzania, but across the region and the treatment of recently concluded elections in Uganda and upcoming ones in South Sudan.
Violence that was seen, but not fully accounted for
Despite severe abuses, the risk of atrocity was not widely recognised in Tanzania. One reason lies in persistent interpretive frames that associate mass atrocities with spectacular violence, extremely high body counts, or overt ethnic targeting. Tanzania’s election violence did not initially produce a single defining massacre that could anchor international attention.
This framing obscures what actually occurred. The electoral period saw widespread arbitrary detention, credible reports of torture, enforced disappearances, and both targeted and indiscriminate killings. Victims were often taken from homes or public spaces by security forces or unidentified death squads, with families left without information or recourse. Violence was geographically dispersed but nationally coordinated.
From an atrocity-prevention perspective, these are not marginal abuses. They are precursor crimes—serious violations that signal intent, capacity, and trajectory where the cumulative patterns matter more than any single incident. Repression focused on dismantling opposition networks, silencing journalists and lawyers, and instilling fear across communities. Similar early-stage dynamics were observed in Burundi prior to 2015 and Ethiopia following the 2005 elections.
A week-long internet blackout further enabled repression while limiting documentation and coverage. Officially justified as a measure against disinformation, the shutdown functioned in practice to conceal abuses and delay international scrutiny.
The architecture of coercion
Violence surrounding the election was reinforced, not restrained, by law. Amendments to electoral and public order legislation, expanded surveillance powers framed as cybercrime prevention, restrictions on assembly, and prolonged pre-trial detention without charge provided formal cover for coercive practices. Changes to national security laws expanded intelligence powers, reduced oversight, and granted immunity to security personnel. Repression was thus bureaucratised and legalised, blurring the line between governance and abuse.
Tanzania’s strong national identity further complicates detection. The absence of overt ethnic targeting has contributed to assumptions of low atrocity risk. Domestically, violence is framed as political discipline; internationally, it is treated as episodic enforcement. Victims are dispersed across regions and social groups, preventing the emergence of a single protected-class narrative that might galvanize attention.
The continued analytical separation of Zanzibar from the mainland also matters. Severe abuses in Zanzibar have often preceded or accompanied similar, though more administratively obscured, practices on the mainland. This compartmentalisation allows coercive tactics to be tested and normalised without triggering wider alarm.
The atrocity–risk blind spot
Contemporary early-warning systems remain heavily oriented toward overt civil violence, sudden mass-casualty events, and armed conflict. Tanzania’s 2025 election exposes the limits of this approach. The violence was systematic but dispersed, severe but incremental and intentional yet legally rationalised.
By institutional criteria, Tanzania meets key atrocity-risk thresholds: large-scale killings and disappearances, coordination between security and administrative authorities, targeted repression of identifiable political and social groups, and direct state involvement. What differs is not substance, but form. This is best understood as a “slow-burn” atrocity risk—one in which harm accumulates progressively over time. Because no single moment triggers alarm, international responses lag while coercion becomes normalised.
What an atrocity–risk lens requires
Adopting an atrocity-risk lens requires recognising that these crimes are not spontaneous or isolated incidents; rather, they are complex processes with distinct histories, precursors, and triggering factors. By applying the United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, observers can move beyond viewing state behaviour as a series of disconnected events and instead identify a systematic trajectory toward escalating harm.
A critical part of this analysis is identifying early signals of risk. Situations of political instability, autocratic consolidation, and social unrest create an environment conducive to violence. Patterns of anticipatory repression—targeting opposition leaders, journalists, and civic organizers—combined with impunity for perpetrators, signal that the state is willing and able to use force to maintain control. These behaviours, especially when normalised and legally rationalised, create conditions in which selective violence can expand with minimal resistance.
The lens also highlights the targeting of specific groups and the use of dehumanising rhetoric, even in the absence of open conflict. Framing critics or activists as threats to national unity, restricting information, and facilitating violence against marginalised populations are indicators of intent and a systematic approach to controlling society. Together, these factors allow analysts to infer that repression is coordinated and preventive, not incidental offering a critical opportunity for early preventive action before abuses escalate into widespread or systematic atrocities.
Options Going Forward
Nationally, limited accountability initiatives such as the Chande Commission, appointed by Samia Suhulu Hassan and headed by former Chief Justice Chande Othman risk functioning as containment rather than accountability. A credible response would require a broader truth-seeking and accountability framework, with meaningful participation by victims, civil society, religious leaders, and independent observers. Protection for witnesses, journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders is essential, alongside continuous monitoring focused on patterns of repression, not just individual cases.
Regionally, Tanzania’s crisis merits preventive measures by the East African Community, SADC, and the African Union. Election observation missions have already found that the polls failed to meet regional standards and have referenced the existence of a regressive rights environment. Preventive diplomacy tools such as the AU Panel of the Wise, and the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities should be activated to assess risks, facilitate dialogue, and signal that further abuses will be met with accountability.
Internationally, sustained engagement through UN human rights mechanisms and international justice processes including the ICC remains critical. While criminal accountability is slow, its preventive value lies in signalling that impunity is not assured. At the same time, quiet but sustained diplomatic engagement should press for de-escalation, cooperation with independent investigations, and concrete reforms.
Tanzania’s 2025 election should be understood not as a closed episode, but as a warning. Counting what comes next requires shifting attention from dramatic endpoints to dangerous trajectories and acting before repression hardens into something far more difficult to reverse.
