Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in preventing mass atrocities in Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including but not limited to early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, the use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may occur and to track ongoing atrocities to understand where they may worsen or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers:
- Ethiopia: a return to full scale war seems imminent
- Niger: insurgent pressure and divisions within the military
- Nigeria: amid increasing insecurity the government strikes a truce with Boko Haram
Ethiopia: a return to full scale war seems imminent
Summary: Fighting between federal and Tigrayan forces has escalated dramatically since early August, fighting has continued and in late September fighting shut down three airports in Tigray. In addition, Tigrayan forces have joined forces with six other rebel groups threatening a wider war. The 2020-2022 war in Tigray was accompanied by numerous credible reports of mass atrocity, and there is reason for serious concern that similar atrocities might occur in the context of a new war. Even more worrying, this war is accompanied by increasing regional tensions, with Sudan enmeshed in a devastating war and its armed forces accusing Ethiopia of supporting the Rapid Support Forces.
On 23 September, fighting in Tigray closed down airports in the Tigrayan cities of Mekelle, Axum and Shire. This fighting followed the announcement of a new alliance of rebel groups. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) announced alignment with the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), the former chief rival of the TPLF; the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM), and the Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM).
These developments escalated a pattern of fighting that had continued through August. Clashes reported in Western Tigray on 1 August were not an isolated incident with clashes following throughout the month (for more information please see our August Monitor). Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF) and Tigrayan forces subsequently clashed around Kobo and Alamata, about 115 km south of Mekele and in Afar around mid-August. This represents the first sustained period of sustained fighting between the federal government and Tigrayan forces since the Pretoria Agreement ended the 2020–2022 war.
Federal drone operations also took place. Since mid-August, the ENDF has reportedly carried out repeated drone strikes across Tigray, including in and around Mekelle and in eastern, northwestern and southern parts of the region. Some strikes have reportedly affected civilian infrastructure homes, schools, farms and other areas.
The language used by both sides is also increasingly hostile. Ethiopian state media has described the TPLF as the aggressor and an illegal authority. The TPLF has accused the federal government of “genocidal” actions and of using war to remain in power. During the 2020–2022 war, hate speech and identity-based language was widespread and accompanied serious violence against civilians. Similar rhetoric today could increase tensions and make dialogue more difficult.
The escalation of violence in Ethiopia coincides with an increasingly complex situation in the Horn of Africa. Critical Threats Project reported that Ethiopia accused Eritrea of supporting the TPLF and of using it as a proxy, a reversal of Eritrea’s support for the federal government in the first Tigray war. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have also reportedly been involved, facilitating meetings since late 2025 between Eritrea and Ethiopian anti-government groups to discuss cooperation against the federal government. This comes amid already strained Ethiopia–Sudan relations linked to the Sudanese war, with the Ethiopian government and the SAF accusing each other of supporting each other’s opponents.
The current dynamics have not yet reached the geographical scale or sustained intensity of the 2020–2022 war, at least for the time being. However, continued clashes, drone strikes, military mobilisation and the involvement of neighbouring countries are putting the Pretoria peace agreement under its greatest pressure since it was signed. The unresolved dispute over Western Tigray and divisions between Tigray’s political leaders make it even harder to prevent further escalation.
Ethiopia’s National Dialogue, which brought together around 4,000 participants, concluded on 22 August. The process reportedly recommended changes to Ethiopia’s political system, including a stronger presidency, although the exact model remains unclear. Supporters argue that a president elected nationally could help reduce ethnic and regional divisions, on the other hand, opposition parties and major armed groups did not take part in the Dialogue, raising concerns about how much support these recommendations really have. (For more information on the National Dialogue please see our August Monitor).
Any constitutional reform would also take place in the context of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party’s large parliamentary win in June (For more information on the National Dialogue please see our August Monitor). The parliament may have the legal power to approve such constitutional changes, it remains unclear if these changes would have broad public support. Voting did not take place in several conflict-affected areas during the June elections, while opposition parties reported restrictions and repression. This has raised concerns that major changes to Ethiopia’s political system could be legally approved without representing the views of large parts of the population. At a time when conflicts continue in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, further concentration of political power without broader agreement could deepen existing divisions.
International response:
The African Union has increased its diplomatic engagement through the AU High Representative Olusegun Obasanjo who met TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael in Mekelle on 24 August. However, Tigrayan authorities said the engagement produced no new proposals or concrete tangible progress toward direct talks with the federal government.
At the international level, the European Union (EU) alongside Canada and the UK expressed support for the AU-led mediation and called to implement the Pretoria Agreement. At the UN Human Rights Council, the EU and 41 countries called for immediate de-escalation, protection of civilians, respect for international humanitarian law and accountability.
Despite renewed diplomatic engagement, there has been little concrete progress toward de-escalating the current situation. As explained by Human Rights Watch, this is an important test for the AU to see whether their engagement and the AU-led framework established through the Pretoria Agreement can prevent renewed large-scale conflict.
Niger: insurgent pressure and divisions within the military
Summary: Niger is facing growing pressure from armed Islamist groups at the same time as serious divisions have emerged within the military. JNIM and ISSP have intensified operations which increasingly threaten areas close to Niamey. An attempted coup in August exposed tensions within the armed forces and the military government’s growing reliance on Russian security support.
The security situation in western Niger continues to deteriorate as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) broaden and intensify their operations, including in areas close to the capital, Niamey. For example, in June, ISSP attacked military bases in Tillabéri. Three days later, on 18 June, JNIM attacked International Airport which is also home to the military Air Base 101 and Africa Corps in Niamey, showing that they have the capacity to reach key military facilities in the capital.
Tillabéri is an important battleground between the two groups. ISSP is particularly active in northern Tillabéri, while JNIM is stronger in the south and currently battling over control of the central region around Niamey. The security situation has also worsened in neighbouring Dosso, where the two groups have already carried out more attacks in 2026 than in any previous year with ISSP close to tripling reported attacks. Analysts suggest that the timing of recent attacks may reflect efforts by JNIM and ISSP to outbid one another for influence, recruits and resources.
At the same time, divisions have emerged within Niger’s military. On 29 August, a group of soldiers led by young officers, including members of special forces units, attempted to overthrow General Abdourahamane Tiani, who came to power in the 2023 military coup. The soldiers attacked Air Base 101, the presidential palace and the national broadcaster. Gunfire and explosions were reported in parts of Niamey before the government regained control.
The attempted coup was reportedly linked in part to frustration among soldiers over worsening security and growing military losses in the fight against JNIM and ISSP. Some military officials also reportedly refused to take sides during the attempted coup, which could signal wider tensions within the armed forces. This comes at a time when Niger’s armed forces are already under growing pressure from armed groups in the west of the country.
Russia’s Africa Corps helped government forces avoid the military coup, exposing the military government’s growing reliance on Russian forces, not only in the fight against Islamist groups but also for its own security. Algeria also supported. However, Niger’s partners in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali and Burkina Faso, did not take military action during the crisis, making it unclear if they have the capacity to do so or what role the alliance can play when one of its members faces this type of internal crisis.
The authorities have responded by arresting suspected supporters of the attempted coup and making changes to the military leadership. On 11 September, Brigadier General Mamane Sani Kiaou was appointed the new chief of staff.
Attacks by jihadist groups continued after the attempted coup. On 2 and 3 September, JNIM conducted a series of coordinated attacks in the Tillabéri region. On 2 September, JNIM also attacked a gendarmerie post in Komba, around ten kilometres from Niamey.
The government is dealing with two problems at the same time: continued attacks by insurgent groups and tensions within its own military and the attempted coup adds another source of instability to an already worsening security situation. Such instability creates an environment more conducive to increased violence and mass atrocities.
International response:
The Nigerien government accused France of encouraging the coup as well as supporters of former President Mohamed Bazoum and several foreign governments.
The AES expressed solidarity with Niger condemning the incident and praising loyalist forces for preventing it from going through. Algeria also condemned the incident and expressed its “full solidarity and firm support” for Niger. Türkiye called for restraint and a rapid return to calm, while Nigeria also expressed concern over the developments and called for a return to the constitutional order.
Nigeria: Amid increasing insecurity the government strikes a truce with Boko Haram
Summary: There have been reports of a ceasefire reached between the government and a Boko Haram faction. Meanwhile, ISWAP remains active and banditry and mass kidnappings continue to spread across northern and central Nigeria, leaving civilians exposed to growing insecurity.
Reports of a possible ceasefire between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram’s Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) faction have raised questions over whether the conflict could be entering a new phase. The reported arrangement began in June following negotiations that secured the release of 360 civilians abducted from Ngoshe. Although the agreement was said to last three months it has reportedly been extended.
The effects of the ceasefire are unclear. Violence involving the group has remained low, however, the decline in violence began before the reported ceasefire, after attacks peaked in April, making it difficult to determine how much of the reduction can be attributed to the agreement itself.
There is considerable uncertainty over the potential agreement. The Nigerian government has not publicly confirmed it, and on 16 September a Boko Haram representative denied that the group’s leadership had agreed to a ceasefire, although he said reconciliation remained possible. Some analysts suggest that a smaller Boko Haram faction may have reached an arrangement without approval from the group’s wider leadership.
This is not the first agreement that the government has reached, with the previous ones having collapsed. Others believe that Boko Haram could be using a temporary reduction in fighting to strengthen its position. Nevertheless, the fact that the government is considering dialogue is significant after years in which they had opposed it and opted for an only military approach and may indicate growing realisation of the need for a political approach alongside security operations.
The agreement was reached with Boko Haram only and violence continues throughout the country. ISWAP, one of the strongest armed groups in the northeast, is not included and continues to fight government forces and Boko Haram. The rivalry between the two groups also continues to expose communities to violence.
Armed banditry has expanded across northern and central Nigeria, alongside the spread of insurgent violence in areas such as Sokoto State, where more than 900 fatalities were reported between June 2025 and June 2026, more than double the previous 12 months. Mass kidnappings have also continued to increase. For example, around 600 worshippers were kidnapped from communities around Dekera village in Niger State in August. And the number of kidnapping victims and ransom payments has risen substantially over the past year. More broadly, ACLED recorded a 30% increase in the targeting of civilians by insurgents and bandit groups, with the second quarter of 2026 the most violent period recorded in the country since ACLED began collecting data.
The reported talks with Boko Haram offer a possible opening for reducing one part of Nigeria’s long-running insurgency, but they come as other forms of insecurity are becoming more widespread and affecting different parts of the country. Simultaneously, this is all taking place ahead of the January 2027 presidential election, with security being a major campaign issue. President Bola Tinubu is campaigning for re-election but receiving criticism about the ongoing violence. Opposition candidates are making security a central part of their campaigns. Tinubu instead has backed legislation that would allow states to establish their own police forces and has tasked a security committee with developing a five-year defence operations plan.
The reported talks with Boko Haram therefore come at a politically sensitive moment, as the government faces growing pressure to demonstrate progress on insecurity. While a sustained reduction in JAS violence could represent an important development it is far from addressing the ongoing security issues across the country. Continued ISWAP activity, expanding banditry and mass kidnappings mean that insecurity remains widespread as the country enters the electoral period.
International response:
The US and Nigeria met for the second session of the joint working group to discuss the protection of christians, ensuring accountability by strengthening Nigeria’s institutions and military cooperation. Among the key challenges they discussed the ongoing violence against civilians. The US has begun collaborating with Nigerian forces since the end of 2025, earlier this year the US sent about 200 military personnel to Nigeria to assist with the ongoing counterterrorism operations, however, it has recently reported much of the forces had since withdrawn.
