Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to detect increasing tendencies or opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter includes a special focus on children in armed conflict and covers developments in:
- The Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Mali
- Zimbabwe
Democratic Republic of the Congo
An open-ended ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda was declared on 30 July under the auspices of Angolan mediation and will be monitored by an ad-hoc verification mechanism that will oversee its implementation and ensure compliance by both parties. This follows a two-week humanitarian truce, mediated by the United States, which began on 5 July, later extended until 3 August, to facilitate the delivery of aid to conflict zones. Unfortunately it wasn’t respected and violence continued in Masisi, bombings took place just 15km outside of Goma where four civilians were killed.
The situation on the ground remains unstable. Both the DRC and Rwanda have accused each other of violating the ceasefire and fighting has persisted throughout August. M23 rebels captured a town on the Ugandan border the day the ceasefire was supposed to begin, and the DRC armed forces have continuously reported facing attacks from M23. Rwanda, on the other hand, has accused the DRC and the international community for refusing to see the FDLR as the main issue driving the war. On 20 August, both countries agreed to continue negotiations through the Luanda process; talks are scheduled to resume on 9 and 10 September.
While there is optimism that these agreements may de-escalate tensions, their durability remains uncertain. Observers note that, given the history of previous truces rarely lasting more than a few weeks, clashes are likely to persist. Some civilians have reported that the humanitarian situation did not improve during the initial six weeks following the humanitarian truce and believe this may be a strategic manoeuvre by the rebels to reorganise and strengthen their positions.
The fact that these ceasefires were negotiated between the DRC and Rwanda and not M23 are an indicator that mediators believe Rwanda has strong ties with the group. However, analysts indicate that as M23 is not a party to the agreement, this creates uncertainty as to how they will respond. Moreover, the conflict involves several armed groups beyond M23, and the ceasefire does not specifically address any of these other factions. Additionally, the ceasefire does not tackle the root causes of the conflict, such as ethnic tensions, governance issues, and resource competition. It is crucial for the international community to continue pushing for a comprehensive, long-term solution and to keep a close watch on the situation.
M23 is not the only faction contributing to the instability in eastern DRC. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) were active in Ituri where they perpetrated multiple attacks targeting civilians including looting and burning homes, killing and kidnapping civilians. The group is presumed to have killed 40 civilians in North Kivu in June. The group conducts ongoing attacks against civilians, with at least 241 people reported killed since the beginning of the year in Mambasa territory (Ituri), an area severely affected by ADF violence. According to the Assembly for the Respect of Human Rights (CRDH), this situation is partly attributable to the insufficient intervention by the Congolese Army.
Key developments are unfolding in peacekeeping efforts. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional force is expected to achieve full operational capability by mid-July. Meanwhile, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) completed the first phase of its withdrawal on 25 June. The next phase will be considered only when conditions allow. The UN Security Council authorised MONUSCO to enhance its support for the SADC Mission (SAMIDRC) by improving coordination and sharing information between MONUSCO and SAMIDRC, offering technical expertise, and providing logistical and military support.
On 13 July, a devastating attack by the Mobondo militia on the village of Kinsele, just 100 km from Kinshasa, resulted in the deaths of at least 70 people. This area has been at the centre of a conflict between the Teke and Yaka communities who have been fighting over land rights and customary taxes since June 2022. The Mobondo militia defends the Yaka community, and despite reaching a ceasefire in April 2024, fighting has continued. This incident highlights a troubling escalation of violence in areas of the DRC that were previously regarded as relatively stable compared to the conflict-prone eastern regions.
International response:
The UN Security Council held a briefing during which the Coordinator of the Group of Experts provided an overview of the findings and recommendations contained in the final report. Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO, expressed serious concern over the rapid expansion of M23 in North and South Kivu and how the expansion risks provoking a regional conflict.
The US played a key role in securing the initial two-week truce and reaffirmed their support for ongoing regional diplomatic efforts.
The EU welcomed the humanitarian truce but emphasised the need to address the root causes of the crisis and expressed their support to ongoing peace efforts in the region.
Mali
Fighting took place in northeastern Mali between the Malian armed forces (FAMA) and Tuareg separatist rebels, along with al-Qaeda affiliates, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) separatist groups. FAMA were supported by Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group) fighters. This came after the military’s announcement that it had reclaimed control of several districts. FAMA and Africa Corps suffered significant losses. While exact numbers have not been confirmed Tuareg rebels claimed responsibility for the deaths of 84 Africa Corps personnel and 47 FAMA soldiers over three days of fighting. Some soldiers were captured, weapons were seized, and a helicopter was downed. BBC reported that Africa Corps requested further assistance from Russia’s defence ministry, but it is unclear what will happen given the recent developments in the Russian-Ukrainian war. An attack of this magnitude may shed light on the difficulties the junta may be facing in securing the country, which was a key reason cited for the military takeover.
The degree of coordination between the separatists and JNIM remains uncertain. However, it’s worth noting that these groups were allied in 2012 when they took control of northern Mali. Separatists later signed a peace deal with the government in 2015, but hostilities resurfaced when angered by the departure of UN peacekeepers. The situation deteriorated further when the junta ended the agreement with the Tuareg citing “hostile acts” by Algeria, which had acted as primary mediator, and the failure of other parties to meet their obligations.
The junta lifted the suspension on political party activities that had been imposed in April to maintain public order before the Inter-Malian Dialogue for Peace and National Reconciliation (IMD). At that time, the parties were protesting the colonels’ decision to remain in power beyond the March 2024 deadline for returning to civilian rule. However, with the focus now shifting to implementing the recommendations from the peace dialogue, the government decided to allow political parties to resume their activities.
The suspension had led most of Mali’s political parties to boycott the IMD, which included about 3,000 participants and resulted in 300 recommendations. Key recommendations included extending the transition period from military to civilian rule by three to five years, allowing the junta to remain in power for longer. Amending Article 9 of the transition charter to enable President Goïta to run in the next presidential election was also discussed. The IMD also recommended initiating a dialogue with the country’s armed movements, including jihadist groups. Although this concept was previously suggested in the 2017 National Accord Conference and the 2019 Inclusive National Dialogue, it was not pursued earlier due to opposition from Mali’s former ally, France.
ISS analysts Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné and Fodé Maciré Dramé emphasised that in order for Mali’s transition to succeed, achieving broad political consensus is essential. This includes addressing the concerns of those who did not participate in the IMD to ensure a more inclusive process.
International response:
The attack against the Africa Corp had significant repercussions. On 29 July, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s security service, Andriy Yusov, stated that “the rebels received necessary information, which enabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminals.” Although Yusov’s comments did not directly confirm Kiev’s involvement, Mali accused Ukraine of infringing on its sovereignty and declared that it was severing relations with the country. On 5 August, Ukraine publicly denied any involvement in the attack. Political analyst Olayinka Ajala argues that Ukraine’s recent involvement in the situation in Sudan, coupled with the latest accusations, highlights the potential for the conflict to evolve into a proxy war. This would risk further exacerbating an already complex security environment.
Russia accused Ukraine of opening an “African front” in their war and of supporting terrorist groups. Niger cut off diplomatic ties with Ukraine after the accusations, while Senegal summoned the Ukrainian ambassador. ECOWAS also condemned Ukraine’s actions.
On 6 July 2024, only two days before ECOWAS held its 65th summit, the leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger convened their first summit in Niamey, where they announced the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) Confederation, reaffirming their decision to leave the block despite its attempts at reconciliation.
Zimbabwe
The 44th Southern African Development Community (SADC) Heads of State and Government Summit took place in Harare in August 2024 where Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa assumed the chairmanship of SADC, taking over from Angola’s President João Lourenço. In the lead-up to the summit, there were significant crackdowns on opposition figures and human rights activists. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that at least 160 individuals were detained in the weeks leading up to the Summit, with some accounts indicating instances of torture and ill treatment.
The situation escalated on 16 June, when 78 members of the opposition group Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), including interim party leader Jameson Timba, were arrested during a private meeting at Timba’s home. They were later charged with “gathering with intent to promote public violence and disorderly conduct.” Over a week later, Zimbabwean police broke up a meeting and detained 44 students of the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) for allegedly chanting anti-government statements over the CCC detentions. These actions highlight a troubling trend of violations against freedom of expression and assembly. On 31 July, rights activist Namatai Kwekweza, teachers’ union leader Robson Chere, and Harare councillor Samuel Gwenzi were forcibly removed from a departing flight at Harare airport by unidentified individuals. They were later charged with “disorderly conduct” due to their prior alleged participation in a demonstration calling for the release of the opposition politicians. The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) indicated the three were forcefully disappeared and reportedly subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including waterboarding, in clear violation of international human rights law. These were part of a broader wave of detentions across the country targeting opposition politicians, government critics, activists, and religious leaders, with most arrests linked to protests or support for opposition parties. These ongoing arrests and crackdowns on political opposition and human rights advocates clearly show that the charges are being used as a pretext to target those advocating for democracy, human rights, and accountability in Zimbabwe.
President Mnangagwa had warned that any protests ahead of the Summit would not be tolerated. And despite the multiple condemnations, Zimbabwe’s Home Affairs Minister Kazembe Kazembe defended the government’s actions by stating that “Attempts to make Zimbabwe ungovernable will be met with appropriate responses. Those trying to create a climate of despair among peace-loving citizens should be warned that such behaviour will not be tolerated.”
The ongoing crackdown exacerbates existing tensions and polarisation in the country. The government must respect basic human rights and fulfil its international obligations, including protecting the rights to protest and free expression. According to a June 2024 report by the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) on freedom in SADC countries, Zimbabwe is highlighted as one of the nations most likely to prevent or disrupt peaceful assembly, reflecting a troubling pattern. This repression contributes to establishing a cycle where violence and aggression become normalised, fostering a culture of impunity, making it harder to achieve justice and democratic progress.
International response:
By 31 August the SADC had not publicly condemned the ongoing violations. DW correspondent Thuso Khumalo said there is a widespread belief that the SADC has done little to address human rights violations within its member states and that the bloc often protects regimes despite allegations of abuses. The African Union has so far remained silent on the issue.
Special feature: Children in armed conflict
The 2024 annual report of the United Nations Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, published in June 2024, highlights a worrying increase in suffering, grave violations against children have risen by 21%, killings and maimings have increased by 35% and other serious violations remained high throughout 2023. Africa continues to be the continent with the highest number of children living in conflict zones with 183 million children affected. In Africa, the highest numbers of verified cases of grave violations against children took place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burkina Faso, Somalia, Nigeria, and Sudan.
Armed conflict has devastating consequences for both individuals and communities. Among those most severely impacted are children, who face both direct and indirect repercussions of conflict. They are exposed to threats of violence and actual violence, lack access to basic necessities, are coerced into participating in combat, and are sometimes even held captive by armed factions. In many cases, boys are pushed into roles such as frontline fighters, messengers, spies, or even suicide missions, while girls are often subjected to sexual exploitation and slavery. This recruitment and use by both state and non-state actors persists despite worldwide condemnation. Since 2016, over 21,000 children in West and Central Africa have been verified by the United Nations (UN) as being recruited and used by armed forces and non-state armed groups, with more than 2,200 children subjected to sexual violence. More than 3,500 children were abducted, and over 1,500 attacks on schools and hospitals were recorded.
Children make up 40% of the world’s displaced people, but in West and Central Africa, they represent about 58%. The central Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—have faced years of conflict, economic struggles, and instability. Over the past five years, escalating violence has increased the number of displaced children fivefold. Despite more than a decade since the crisis began in Mali in 2012, the situation continues to worsen, with violent attacks and recruitment continuing. In Niger’s Tillaberi region, over 800 schools remain closed due to insecurity, according to government data. In Burkina Faso, children are traumatised by the violence between Islamic extremists and security forces. The violence has led to the closure of schools depriving almost 850,000 access to education and leaving 3.6 million without access to health care.
In Nigeria’s northeast, insecurity remains a significant challenge, with armed groups such as Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Bakura continuing to pose a serious threat. These groups have carried out numerous attacks against civilians, including children, humanitarian workers, and the Nigerian Security Forces. These attacks have led to mass displacements and increased the risk of grave violations against children. The ongoing violence has disrupted livelihoods, forcing children into dangerous activities like collecting scrap metal, which has sometimes turned out to be improvised explosive devices, causing injury or death. A total of 2,519 grave violations were recorded against 1,250 children (502 boys, 743 girls, and 5 of unknown gender) in Nigeria between January 2022 and December 2023. This marks a significant increase in grave violations from 524 verified violations in 2022 to 1,995 in 2023.
In Sudan, the ongoing war has severely disrupted the lives of children, 14 million are in need of humanitarian support and four million are displaced. Nineteen million children are out of school, putting their futures at risk. As conflict persists, about 3.7 million children under the age of five are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition this year, with 730,000 projected to suffer from life-threatening severe acute malnutrition.
Sudanese children are also being recruited on a massive scale by the main belligerents and their allies. A joint investigation by Sudan Human Rights Hub (SHRB), Ayin, Sudanese Defenders Center for Legal Aid, West Darfur Activist Group, and Free Aqlam Network for Human Rights has documented the presence of numerous children on the battlefield. Local leaders have also been accused of playing a significant role in recruiting children, either in exchange for protection for their community or financial gain. Many of these children are forcibly taken away from their families and exposed to killings and suffer injuries or death.
Despite the 25 years since the UN Security Council adopted the first of its kind resolution 1261 in 1999, which condemned the targeting of children in armed conflict including the recruitment and use of child soldiers, parties have failed to fulfil their obligations under international law. The 2024 Secretary-General’s Report, verified 32,990 grave violations, with 30,705 committed in 2023 and 2,285 committed earlier but confirmed in 2023. These violations affected 22,557 children (15,847 boys, 6,252 girls, 458 gender unknown) across 25 global situations. The report further highlighted a significant increase in the number of children killed and maimed, which reached 11,649, followed by the recruitment and use of, 8,655 children with 5,205 verified incidents of the denial of humanitarian access and the abduction of 4,356 children and 2,491 children were detained for actual or alleged association with armed groups including those identified as terrorists by the UN. The remaining violations were attributed to government forces and unidentified perpetrators like landmines and improvised explosive devices. Armed groups were primarily responsible for child abduction, recruitment and use, and sexual violence. In contrast, government forces were the main culprits in killings, attacks on schools and hospitals, and obstructing humanitarian access to children.
Efforts to mitigate the impact of armed conflict on children are crucial in safeguarding their rights and well-being. International humanitarian organisations play a vital role in providing protection, assistance, and support to children affected by conflict. By advocating for the enforcement of international laws and conventions aimed at safeguarding children’s rights during armed conflicts, steps can be taken to ensure a safer and more secure environment for the most vulnerable members of society.
Numerous legal frameworks have been put in place to protect the rights of the child. Despite 196 countries having ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 172 having ratified the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of the Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), children’s rights continue to be in jeopardy.
The adoption of the ACRWC in July 1990 represents an important step on the part of Africa to protect children against all forms of abuse, discrimination, neglect, and exploitation. Article 22 refers to the rights of children in armed conflicts, emphasising the need for states to refrain from recruiting children and to ensure their protection and care. The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) in collaboration with the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) developed a Model Law on Children in Conflict Situations in Africa in May 2014. It is an advocacy tool to assist policymakers and legislative drafters in addressing all the relevant areas in need of legislative reform without usurping the authority of national legislatures to determine the content, extent, style and form of their national laws.
The African Union (AU) adopted two key policies focused on safeguarding and enhancing the well-being of children affected by armed conflict in Afric, the Policy on Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations and the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), in May 2022.
Despite the escalating crisis, the UN has reported a glimmer of hope following sustained engagement with parties to the conflict. Throughout 2023, more than 10,600 children formerly associated with armed groups/forces received protection or reintegration support. In countries like Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen, the UN’s sustained engagements led to the adoption of measures aimed at providing better protection for children affected by armed conflict. Through both unilateral and bilateral dialogues and the implementation of action plans, the UN noted a decrease in violations against children in areas such as Mozambique, the Philippines, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. In 2023, over 10,600 children previously associated with armed forces or groups received protection and reintegration support.
In South Sudan, the government has maintained its cooperation with the United Nations, providing ongoing access to barracks for age screening. This collaboration, along with the efforts of the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission, led to the release of 49 boys.
In Somalia, under the framework of its 2012 action plan and the 2019 implementation roadmap, the Federal Government has introduced age assessment guidelines, a standardised checklist, and juvenile justice and child rights bills, all of which have been approved by the Federal Cabinet.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, under its 2012 action plan, the government established a National Reparation Fund for Victims of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and other crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Additionally, there has been progress in prosecuting perpetrators of grave violations, including sexual violence. The Government also continues to screen and separate children from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congolese National Police during recruitment processes.
International organisations have also played a critical role bringing attention to violations against children in armed conflict. However, children continue to suffer severe human rights violations.
The toll of armed conflict on children is profound and long-lasting, the trauma experienced during conflict can have severe psychological effects on victims and disrupting their access to education and healthcare, hampering their future prospects and opportunities for growth and development. Governments need to make robust efforts in safeguarding the rights of children including psychosocial support for children traumatised by armed conflict and promote collaboration among international organisations, and non-governmental and local communities to ensure the protection of children from grave violations during armed conflict.
