Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to detect increasing tendencies or opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers:
- Ethiopia
- Ghana
- Nigeria
- South Sudan
- Sudan
Ethiopia
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is currently experiencing significant internal leadership challenges that threaten the stability and recovery of Tigray. One faction is led by Debretsion Gebremichael, chairperson of the party, and the other by Getachew Reda, president of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA). Divisions within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) emerged over the re-registration of the TPLF as a political party and the planned replacement of local officials by the TIA among others. If not managed effectively, the ongoing power struggles could further delay Tigray’s recovery and reignite conflict, and a worsening humanitarian crisis.
These disagreements heightened tensions among party members. The 14th congress of the TPLF was held by Gebremichael in August with Reda and his supporters boycotting the event. National and local electoral bodies deemed the congress invalid. Meanwhile, an alternative conference organised by Reda’s faction took place with the theme of saving the TPLF. On 16 September Gebremichael ousted 16 members and senior leaders including Reda from the party. In response, Reda accused his rivals of attempting a “coup.” Both sides have resorted to leaks and accusations, claiming the other is betraying their cause and collaborating with perceived enemies.
Both factions have been engaged in a contentious struggle for control over the armed forces. On 24 September, Gebremichael rejected the authority of the Tigray interim administration, which had previously tried to command the armed forces saying that it is limited to administrative functions and accused it of attempting to sow division. Days prior the interim administration had indicated the forces would continue to function as a part of the interim administration. So far, the Tigray Security Forces have remained neutral, however, their leaders remain part of the TIRA.
The establishment of the TIA, began after the signing of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement. Gebrehiwot Hailemariam from Mekelle University explained how although initially supported by Tigrayans and led by Getachew Reda, the TIA soon faced challenges as it struggled to replace the TPLF bureaucracy, encountering significant opposition from within the group, particularly from Gebremichael and Alem Gebrewahid, who viewed Reda as a threat. As tensions intensified, the TIA was unable to gain legitimacy or effectively operate at the grassroots level, ultimately being perceived as an extension of Abiy Ahmed’s government.
Some analysts and the people of Tigray view these internal divisions as a recurring aspect of the party’s history but are nonetheless concerned about the potential ramification Mehari Girmay (PhD), a senior member of the Tigray Independence Party, expressed similar concerns and noted that “external backers have significantly intensified the TPLF’s internal conflicts, with both factions receiving support from either the federal government or the state of Eritrea.”
Over 18 months after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, the first groups of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have successfully returned. At least 8,700 IDPs have returned to Tselemti district of the North Western Zone of Tigray and 14,000 to Alamata in Southern Tigray in recent months. However, Omna Tigray reported that Amhara militias have tried to prevent IDPs from returning, creating unsafe conditions. Thousands of Tigrayan refugees who had fled to Sudan are now being compelled by violence in Sudan to return despite worrisome conditions. By August over 11,000 refugees had crossed back into Ethiopia, among them, residents from Western Tigray.
The slow pace of implementation of the Pretoria Agreement increases the risk of a return to war, as do the TPLF’s internal divisions. The unresolved dispute between Amhara and Tigray over the status of Western Tigray and other territories are also potential sparks for renewed conflict. Provisions in the agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops also remain unimplemented, Eritrean soldiers remain in parts of Tigray. In Gulomakeda district, Eritrean forces have been accused of abductions, which residents link to the lack of implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
In Amhara, confrontations between the Ethiopian federal government and the Amhara Fano militias continue. Violence targeting civilians peaked in August with about 637 reported fatalities the highest since the conflict started in April 2023. Fano militias targeted individuals associated with the government, while government forces were accused of attacking civilians believed to be Fano supporters. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission blames the increase in attacks on the collapse of security and governance systems.
At the start of September, public outrage over declining security peaked following the kidnapping and subsequent death of a 2-year-old in Gondar (Amhara). Protests and clashes with Amhara state police and kebele militias erupted, resulting in the fatal shooting of at least four protesters.
In Oromia, fighting between the Ethiopian government and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA and also known as the Oromo Liberation Front, OLF-Shane) occurred. Government forces were accused of forcibly recruiting residents of Oromia Kellem Wollega to fight OLA. Kidnappings and insecurity have become a major concern in recent years, in July approximately 167 students from Debark University were kidnapped, though the Oromia regional government managed to secure release160 only days later. Many families were forced to pay ransom. Civilians in the Amhara and Oromia regions remain at risk.
Tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring Somalia have been ongoing since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland in January 2024. Ongoing mediation efforts led by Turkiye have yet to yield results. In August, Somalia formed a new alliance with Egypt to strengthen security cooperation, with Egypt pledging military aid as the African Union mission in Somalia (ATMIS) comes to an end.
Crisis Group analysts note a convergence of interests between Somalia and Egypt, given both countries’ historical rivalry with Ethiopia, which has intensified due to disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Somalia announced that Ethiopian troops, currently under the auspices of ATMIS and a bilateral agreement, will no longer be present after the end of the year, however, the prospect of Egyptian troops replacing Ethiopian ones could exacerbate tensions, especially if stationed near the Somali-Ethiopian border. Egypt’s involvement is seen as an escalation, adding complexity to both the Somalia-Somaliland and Somalia-Ethiopia disputes stemming from the MoU.
International response:
U.S. Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, Ambassador Mike Hammer, has tried to mediate the ongoing conflict within the TPLF and met with Reda on 12 September to discuss obstacles hindering the Pretoria agreement’s progress. However, no concrete results emerged.
The AU held the second Strategic Reflection Meeting on the CoHA, in July where the federal government and TPLF addressed the return of displaced persons and the gradual implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process.
Ghana
As Ghana gears up for its ninth general election on 7 December 2024, the use of hate speech, economic hardship, unresolved tensions and growing mistrust in state institutions cast a shadow over the process, threatening the smooth conduct of the polls and the country’s democratic stability.
Mistrust in Ghana’s electoral process grew following the alleged theft of biometric voter registration kits from Electoral Commission (EC) custody in May 2024. Although the EC claimed only seven laptops were missing, concerns over the potential for illegal voter registration arose, compounded by errors and changes in the tabulation of the 2020 election results. The EC’s decision to limit first-time voter registration to fewer than 2,000 centres due to logistical constraints raised concerns about accessibility and potential disenfranchisement, further deepening doubts about the integrity of the electoral roll. The 2024 elections are being held in an atmosphere of heightened suspicion, largely fueled by ongoing mistrust of the EC and lingering fallout from the 2020 election results, which the NDC previously rejected.
Protests led by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) took place in September in regional capitals across the country demanding an independent audit to rid the register of errors, claiming that the electoral commission unlawfully transferred voters to different polling stations without their knowledge, compromising the integrity of the voter register. They are now urging the international community to step in and address the issue. The EC has dismissed calls for an audit as misguided and unnecessary, while the opposition cautions that persistent errors could lead to the disenfranchisement of thousands of registered voters.
Tensions are rising ahead of the upcoming general elections as the NDC declined to endorse this year’s agreements. Traditionally, political parties enter into a peace pact with the National Peace Council (NPC) to pledge non-violence during elections. However, NDC’s refusal to sign raises concerns about the potential for heightened electoral violence. Ghana has a history of electoral violence, with eight deaths reported during the 2020 general elections. The NDC blames the ruling party for the incidents and has pledged to seek justice for those who lost their lives during the polls.
NDC accused the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) of planning to rig the upcoming elections, with both parties disputing the neutrality of the EC, the judiciary, and the security services. This tension raises concerns about potential violence and instability. The NDC frequently criticises the judiciary, citing high-profile rulings they say favour the NPP, while also questioning the neutrality of law enforcement and security institutions. Both parties have a history of forming vigilante groups, and the NDC has expressed distrust in the judiciary’s ability to fairly adjudicate disputed election outcomes.
The high political stakes and fierce competition between the NDC and NPP have reignited the issue of vigilantism, as campaign activities further polarise the political climate. A survey by the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Cape Coast (UCC), with support from Elva Community Engagement, identified 20 politically affiliated vigilante groups—10 linked to the ruling party and 10 to the opposition. Despite the passage of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019 (Act 999), which aimed to disband these groups, many have merely rebranded. For instance, during the 2020 elections, the ruling NPP integrated many members of affiliated vigilante groups into state security forces, while the opposition NDC incorporated them into party structures as youth wings, actively involved in campaigning.
These politically aligned vigilante groups may increase the risk of electoral violence, preparing and planning for acts of violence or retaliation. According to the study, “Political Party Youth “Vigilante” Groups in Ghana,” one vigilante group leader stated that “this year’s elections will not be peaceful…” explaining that the pressure to get a turn in power could lead the NDC to take extreme actions.
The economic inequality and hardships faced by many young people in Ghana have led to many to believe that their only chance to escape poverty is through their political party or candidate. The “winner takes all system” is a key factor driving these groups to commit crimes in the name of their party, as they understand that political victory determines “who gets what” and “how much.”
The political landscape in Ghana is becoming increasingly volatile. According to the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) hate speech and inappropriate language by politicians and others is a troubling trend, with 62 violations recorded during the month of July. The most common forms of inappropriate language were insulting and offensive comments, which accounted for 63% (39 instances) primarily during discussions on sensitive issues like elections, corruption, and development projects. Unsubstantiated allegations made up 27% (17 instances), such claims risk spreading misinformation and manipulating public opinion.
Tribal slurs and provocative remarks, amplified on social media platforms and incitement to violence were noted. In a multicultural society like Ghana, these can deepen ethnic tensions.
Ahead of elections, Freedom House has identified the key digital interference issues including information manipulation, harassment and intimidation, and arrests for online expression. Journalists, activists, and marginalised groups, particularly LGBT+ individuals, frequently face online harassment, with some having experienced physical violence due to their political commentary. Journalists and internet users have been detained in the past on charges of false publication for posts criticising President Akufo-Addo and other government officials. Activist Oliver Barker-Vormawor, who accused a government minister of attempted bribery on Facebook, is currently facing defamation charges in an ongoing legal battle. The fear of arrest or legal repercussions may deter people from expressing critical opinions about candidates, parties, or political figures online ahead of the election.
As the elections approach, civil society organisations have called for urgent national dialogue to address perceptions and concerns about Ghana’s EC to build confidence in the electoral process
13 approved candidates are vying for the presidency in the general elections. However, analysts predict the race will primarily be a contest between Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia of the ruling party New Patriotic Party (NPP) and former President John Dramani Mahama of the main opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC).
International response:
The United States has implemented a visa restriction policy targeting individuals found responsible for actions that undermine democracy in Ghana. This policy comes ahead of Ghana’s presidential and parliamentary elections set for December 7, 2024. The policy is according to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and allows the Department of State to implement visa restrictions for individuals believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining democracy in Ghana, including through the manipulation or rigging of the electoral process; the use of violence to intimidate, coerce or prevent people from exercising their rights to freedoms of association and peaceful assembly; the use of measures designed to intimidate, coerce or prevent political party representatives, voters, or members of civil society or the media from voicing or disseminating their views; or engaging in any other activity designed to improperly influence the conduct or outcome of an election. Certain family members of such persons may also be subject to these restrictions. Persons who undermine democracy in Ghana — including in the lead-up to, during, and following Ghana’s 2024 elections may be found to be ineligible for visas under this policy.
As Ghana prepares for its upcoming elections, a delegation from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has engaged with key stakeholders and influential voices in the electoral process to assess the country’s readiness. The regional body aims to draft a comprehensive report to guide its intervention strategy ahead of the December 7 polls. ECOWAS also plans to deploy long-term observer missions starting in October, followed by short-term observers, to help ensure the elections are inclusive, transparent, and credible across the subregion.
Nigeria
At least 128 villagers were killed on 1 September in Mafa, Yobe State, during an attack by suspected Boko Haram militants making this the deadliest attack by the group in recent years. Approximately 150 armed insurgents stormed the village with rifles and grenades, while also planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the roads leading into Mafa. The bodies discovered included a note allegedly from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a Boko Haram splinter group, accusing the villagers of collaborating with government forces and killing their members. A police spokesman in Yobe State indicated that the attack was retaliation for local vigilantes’ killing of two suspected militant fighters. Yobe State is one of three key regions most affected by the insurgency.
In addition, banditry represents a significant and escalating problem in Nigeria. A recently published ACLED and GITOC report explores the dynamics of armed banditry in the North West region and the ecosystems in which they operate. The research findings show that armed bandit groups exhibit a complex hierarchical structure that allows for flexibility and adaptation, enhancing their resilience. Despite the multiplicity of armed groups, they often share strong ethnic ties and grievances, fostering cooperation that boosts their capacity for violence. As traditional revenue sources like cattle rustling and kidnapping decline, bandits are increasingly engaging in farming and artisanal gold mining operations. Their interactions with illicit economies vary, involving tactics from attacks and extortion to full supply chain control, which complicates response strategies. The level of violence they perpetrate against communities correlates with their influence in the area, being more intense when their power is weaker. Although primarily motivated by profit, bandits do adopt some practices of governance.
In August, widespread anti-government protests erupted across the country, driven by grassroots youth activists using hashtags like #RevolutionNow and #EndBadGovernanceInNigeria. These demonstrations addressed issues such as poor governance, rising living costs, and fuel prices. ACLED reported a 55% increase in protest activities compared to the previous month, with nearly 70 events taking place on 1 August alone. A third of the protests turned violent and security forces responded with arrests, tear gas, and live ammunition. Unidentified armed groups and counter-demonstrators contributed to the violence, leading to a total of 20 reported fatalities throughout the month, making August the deadliest month for protests since the #EndSARS movement in October 2020. At least 124 people were arrested and authorities charged 10 protesters with conspiracy to commit treason, for attempting to destabilise the government, and inciting mutiny, among other reasons. On 11 September the protesters were granted bail, however, the crime of treason could result in the death penalty. In recent months, there has been a crackdown on critics and journalists, including numerous cases of abduction, unlawful arrest, and detention.
Critical issues like the economy and security demand urgent attention, however Human Rights Watch analysts argue the current administration is instead focusing on undermining human rights. This crackdown on dissent is not only a clear violation to the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly but it is also further eroding public trust in the government. A second round of protests took place on 1 October, protesters were met with unnecessary and excessive use of tear gas and arbitrary arrests and activists have indicated that they will continue to mobilise until their demands are met. Unless the government permits civilians to express their dissent and grants freedom of speech and the right to protest, it is likely that demonstrators will continue to endure violence. The protests follow similar trends to those that took place in Kenya and Uganda in recent months.
South Sudan
South Sudan has officially delayed its highly anticipated elections, which were set for December 2024, by two years to December 2026. The government announced this decision on 14 September 2024, citing a lack of preparedness. The country was behind on voter registration, which was mandated to begin in June, but it remained pending due to a lack of funds. This is the second delay of elections since the country gained independence in 2011 and prolongs the transitional period that started in February 2020.
The government faced harsh criticism for this decision as elections had already been postponed in 2022 for this same reason. Some academics and professionals claimed that extending the transitional period is unconstitutional and lacks legal basis as it is not supported by the provisions of the Revitalised Agreement (Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan).
South Sudan’s political leaders have been slow to prepare for the upcoming vote, leading to accusations that the delays are merely plays to hold on to power. President Salva Kiir’s office argues that crucial tasks, such as drafting a new constitution, must be completed before elections can occur. Officials have also pointed to logistical and security challenges that they claim cannot be resolved by the end of the year. However, these are the same leaders who led the country into a five-year civil war. The situation in South Sudan poses a significant risk for grave human rights violations and atrocity crimes largely due to ongoing political instability, which cultivates a climate of impunity and public frustration. Weak institutional frameworks and the questionable legality of extending the transitional period may undermine the rule of law.
A controversial bill amending the 2015 National Security Service (NSS) became law even though the president has not signed it, as over 30 days had gone by since it was presented to President Salva Kiir on July 12. The bill allowed the NSS to retain the authority to conduct arrests, further empowering the NSS’ abusive powers and deviating from its originally intended role as a classical intelligence agency. Allowing the NSS to retain the power to conduct arrests risks strengthening its abusive practices and repressing dissent. Additionally, the ongoing economic crisis creates dire humanitarian conditions that can lead to social unrest. With the war in Sudan having disrupted oil exports, civil servants have gone unpaid for almost one year. In South Sudan, about 80% of the 12 million population lives below the absolute poverty line and about 90% of the approximately 6.5 million children under 18 are raised in households facing severe multidimensional poverty. 7.1 million people suffer from acute hunger. These factors create a volatile environment where conflicts can escalate, further endangering human rights.
International response:
The international community including the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the European Union, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, criticised the postponement as a failure to uphold the 2018 peace agreement and emphasised the importance of elections for achieving peace in South Sudan and called on leaders to take urgent action to establish the necessary conditions for the electoral process.
The Troika—comprising the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway—expressed “deep concern” over the delay and called the extension a “failure,” highlighting the leaders’ ongoing inability to establish conditions for credible and peaceful elections, which they attributed to a lack of political will among all parties involved.
Nicholas Haysom, head of the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), noted that the postponement was to some extent a recognition of the risk of renewed conflict that could come from inadequately prepared elections and offered the opportunity to engage in nation building. He called for addressing these issues with renewed urgency.
The Chairperson of the African Union Commission called for concrete steps to fully implement the Revitalised Agreement and urged all stakeholders to work towards transparent and credible elections
Sudan
Sudanese civilians continue to bear the brunt as fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensified in Khartoum in late September as the Sudanese army launched a major offensive aimed at regaining control of the capital.
A Resistance Committee group in Wad Medani, Gezira state, has reported that at least 124 people were killed and another 100 injured last week, marking one of the deadliest incidents in the country’s 18-month civil war. The committee says that the RSF are committing extensive massacres in one village after another. Mass suicide has also been reported after several women took their lives after being raped by RSF militias following the attacks in Gezira state.
The conflict continues to inflict immeasurable death and suffering both directly from the violence and from severe humanitarian crises. Over ten million people have been displaced since April 2023, with an estimated eight million of them remaining within Sudan’s borders, Sudan is now the world’s largest hunger crisis. Famine conditions have been confirmed in parts of Sudan, including the localities of Al Lait, At Tawisha, and Um Kadadah in North Darfur and the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee declared famine conditions in Zamzam camp. The threat of famine is looming over much of the rest of the country, half of Sudan’s population is now suffering from acute hunger and five million children and pregnant and breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished.
Severely restricted humanitarian access is one of the main drivers of the famine conditions. According to a Reuters analysis of satellite imagery, hundreds of people are estimated to be dying from starvation and hunger-related diseases each day and international aid remains out of reach as Sudan’s military and its paramilitary rival have limited aid from entering the country.
As the humanitarian crisis worsens, sexual violence continues to terrorize women and girls, with justice remaining elusive. The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) documented a rise in forced prostitution in Nyala City, South Darfur, particularly among women and girls aged 17 to 25. They report that several facilities for this purpose operate under the protection of RSF officers. In addition to forced prostitution, women in desperate situations are also pushed to engage in prostitution to survive.
A new surge of intense fighting between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) erupted in El Fasher, Darfur, on 12 September, further endangering an already vulnerable population, including internally displaced persons in nearby camps. Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) confirmed the escalation of unprecedented large-scale combat operations in El Fasher, marking a “new stage” in the ongoing conflict.
El Fasher was once a vital humanitarian hub meaning that the fighting is disrupting humanitarian and trade corridors. Artillery shells are ripping through displacement camps and residential homes, while food and medical supplies are dangerously scarce. UN officials have described the situation as “Hell on Earth.” El Fasher is the last Darfur capital still held by the Sudanese army. Hostilities have led to a division within the Darfur Joint Protection Forces (JPF), an organisation of former Darfur rebel groups, with certain members opting for neutrality, while others aligned themselves with either warring party. Among those that sided with SAF, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) are actively fighting RSF, which led to retaliation.
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) recorded 460 incidents of political violence, resulting in over 1,810 fatalities between September 7 and October 4, 2024. Khartoum and North Darfur states experienced the highest levels of violence, with Khartoum reporting 259 incidents and 345 fatalities, while North Darfur recorded 71 incidents and 1,061 fatalities during this period.
The violence has also severely impacted healthcare facilities in North Darfur, forcing many out of service and worsening the already critical humanitarian situation. The Sudan Doctors’ Union estimates that at least 4,000 people may have died in El Fasher alone due to violence, disease, and starvation.
Residents report that the RSF continues to target the city due to its strategic importance as the location of the SAF’s 6th Infantry Division headquarters and the last SAF stronghold in Darfur. The RSF’s repeated assaults on El Fasher and the ongoing blockade of supplies into the city are in direct violation of international humanitarian law as confirmed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2736, which in June called for an end to the siege and urged de-escalation of the conflict.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has faced repeated accusations of supplying weapons and support to the RSF militia, credible evidence of which has been cited by a UN report. However, the UAE has consistently denied these allegations.
A report by the UN Fact-Finding Mission in Sudan, based on 182 interviews with survivors, family members, and witnesses conducted between January and August 2024, revealed that both the SAF and RSF were implicated in attacks on civilians including rape, other forms of sexual violence, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture and ill-treatment.
In addition, the ongoing fighting has increasingly taken on an ethnic character. Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee, warns of a “dangerous ethnic dimension” to the conflict, threatening to destabilise the entire region. Akyaa Pobee called on the warring parties to uphold their obligations under international law, pursue a ceasefire and urged all Member States to respect the arms embargo on Darfur. She also appealed to the Security Council to use its collective influence to protect civilians trapped in the conflict.
International response:
On 4 June 2024, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights adopted a resolution establishing a Joint Fact-Finding Mission, in collaboration with the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, to investigate human rights violations and breaches of humanitarian law, including on gender dimensions that could constitute international crimes.
As fighting continues to engulf the city of El Fasher, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan called for an “independent and impartial force” and a widening of the arms embargo to protect civilians. On 11 September 2024, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend the arms embargo imposed on Darfur in 2004 for another year, until 12 September 2025.
Despite efforts and attempts to end the conflict, a sustainable peace agreement remains elusive. On 14 August, peace talks convened in Switzerland by the United States of America, Switzerland, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the African Union, and the United Nations, failed to secure a national cessation of hostilities but managed to improve humanitarian access. Following the peace talks, the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS) successfully secured agreements to open aid routes, including the Adré crossing at the Chad border and the Dabbah Road leading from Port Sudan. According to a digital press briefing by the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello, these routes are now operational, with dozens of trucks crossing and nearly six million pounds of food and emergency relief reaching the affected areas.
During the Geneva talks, SAF leader Lt-Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan agreed to a three-month opening of the Adré border crossing; however, no agreement has been reached to extend this timeframe. In a recent UN Security Council meeting, members concurred on several targeted measures to address Sudan’s escalating crisis. They urged all parties to open accessible cross-border and cross-line routes, including the removal of arbitrary restrictions and time limits at the Adré crossing.
At the 79th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session in New York, a Ministerial Meeting on Sudan, convened by Germany, France, the United States, and the European Union highlighted support for the Sudanese people and their aspirations for a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic future. Participants voiced deep concern over the catastrophic and rapidly worsening situation in Sudan and reaffirmed their commitments to the Declaration of Principles adopted in Paris on 15 April 2024, marking one year since the conflict began.
The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, has been actively engaging with the warring parties to cease hostilities and safeguard civilians throughout Sudan. The UN Security Council’s resolution 2736 (2024) called for additional recommendations on civilian protection, which were presented in late October.
