Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers:
- Burkina Faso: new report highlights levels of ongoing atrocity crimes
- Ethiopia: a step closer to war
- Mali: unprecedented coordinated attacks by Islamist militants and their allies
- South Sudan: reduction of UNMISS amid increased violence
Burkina Faso: new report highlights levels of ongoing atrocity crimes
Summary: Burkina Faso is facing several crises at once, and together they are increasing the risk of further atrocities. The security situation is worsening, while political tensions and repression are also rising.
The Al-Qaeda-linked group present across the sahel Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) controls large parts of the country and continues to attack security forces, kill civilians, and loot property, forcing many people to flee. At the same time, the military government has continued to carry out counterinsurgency operations, which also catch up civilians. Serious abuses are being committed by all sides. A report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in April found that both government forces, including their auxiliaries, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), and JNIM are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Their findings demonstrate that killings and other grave abuses against civilians have been committed by all parties to the conflict. The scale and systematic nature of the violence is concerning: between January 2023 and August 2025, HRW found that 1,840 civilians were killed across 57 documented incidents in 11 regions. For example, in February 2024, Burkinabé forces summarily executed 223 civilians, including at least 56 children, in Nondin and Soro villages, accusing them of collaborating with JNIM, while in August 2024, JNIM killed at least 133 civilians, including dozens of children, in Barsalogho in apparent retaliation against a community it accused of supporting government-backed militias. These incidents illustrate the scale of the violence and are likely to represent only a fraction of the overall toll.
More than two million people have been internally displaced by the conflict, highlighting the scale of the humanitarian crisis.
The HRW report also shed light on growing signs of ethnic targeting. Fulani communities have been particularly affected, with government forces and VDPs accused of killing and displacing them on suspicion that they support JNIM. Since the 2022 coup, hate speech and incitement against Fulani have increased, including discourse of “zero Fulanis” circulating among pro-junta influencers. This adds a dangerous dimension to the violence and increases the risk of further atrocities.
On the political front, the government is seeking to tighten its control. In April, authorities dissolved 118 NGOs and associations and introduced measures increasing financial control over civil society, including requiring organisations to transfer funds to a state-controlled bank, raising concerns about surveillance and arbitrary restrictions. This comes alongside a broader crackdown on dissent, including the arrest of opposition figures such as Idrissa Barry after criticising abuses by government forces, as well as the continued targeting of journalists.
These developments build on an already restrictive political environment. In January 2026, all political parties were dissolved after three years of suspension, reflecting a wider pattern of repression and attempts of the junta to consolidate power.
The combination of a highly restrictive political environment, alongside targeting of opposition leaders and civil society, leaves civilians more vulnerable to government abuses. Opposition groups, journalists, and civil society actors play a key role in monitoring violations and calling them out, and their suppression removes important checks on government conduct. This is particularly concerning in a context where insecurity is worsening and all parties to the conflict (including the government and its allies) are systematically committing abuses against civilians. Accountability for such abuses remains absent, further contributing to the cycle of impunity.
Ethiopia: a step closer to war
Summary: Tigray’s political crisis escalated. The TPLF rejected the federal extension of the interim administration and moved to reinstate the pre-war government, undermining the Pretoria Agreement and increasing the risk of renewed conflict.
Political tensions in Tigray escalated sharply in April, raising concerns about the stability of governance arrangements and the durability of the 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). On 8 April, the federal government extended the mandate of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) by one year, a move intended to avoid a governance vacuum. The decision was strongly contested by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which said that it had not been consulted and that the decision was therefore illegitimate.
The dispute stems from the deepening internal fragmentation between the TPLF, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, and the TIA, backed by the federal government and established by the CoHA.
The TPLF reportedly pressured TIA president Tadesse Werede to reject the extension, which he refused to do. The TPLF allegedly wished to dissolve the TIA altogether and reinstate the pre-war regional government elected in 2020 and dominated by the TPLF. However, the federal government considered that election unconstitutional at the time and it was further nullified under the 2022 Agreement.
The situation worsened on 19 April, when the TPLF announced the reconstitution of the pre-war regional government, creating parallel authorities. “This development and the ongoing tension between the TPLF and the federal government represent a familiar pattern of cyclical escalation that preceded the previous outbreak of the northern Ethiopia conflict in November 2020” says ACLED analyst Dr. Jalale Getachew Birru. Renewed confrontation between federal authorities and the TPLF, and with it atrocities such as those that accompanied the last war, appears increasingly likely.
At the same time, key issues in the last war remain unaddressed. Many, including territorial disputes in Western Tigray, the continued displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, and the absence of accountability for past atrocities were left unaddressed in the 2022 agreement. These unresolved grievances further compound these shifting political alliances and fragmentation. (For more information please check out April 2026 Monitor).
Meanwhile tensions continue in western Tigray, a territory claimed by both Amhara and Tigrayan regional authorities. A recent report by Human Rights watch indicates that Amhara authorities and security forces in Western Tigray continue to arbitrarily detain ethnic Tigrayans and impose severe restrictions on their movement, livelihoods and access to basic services. These practices echo patterns documented during the 2020–2022 war, when Tigrayan populations in the area were subjected to acts that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Hundreds of thousands of those forcibly displaced remain unable to return to their homes. Simultaneously, the unresolved status of Western Tigray continues to fuel tensions among the federal government, the Amhara regional government and the TPLF.
At the same time, ongoing violence in Amhara and Oromia reflects a broader pattern of instability across the country, where civilians continue to face killings, displacement and other abuses. The persistence of multiple, overlapping conflicts means that escalation in one area could trigger instability in another, raising the risk of a broader national conflict or potentially engaging neighbouring conflicts. These risks are further compounded by rising tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the broader regional dynamics linked to the war in Sudan, where both countries are increasingly aligned with opposing actors. As tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Ethiopian government grow, the conflict risks further feeding into local dynamics and the wider Horn of Africa. Any intensification of fighting would expose already vulnerable populations to renewed atrocity crimes. (For more information please check out April 2026 Monitor).
Mali: unprecedented coordinated attacks by Islamist militants and their allies
Summary: Attacks on 25 April 2026 by JNIM and allied groups were unprecedented in their scale and geographic reach, with areas previously considered relatively secure now increasingly contested.
An unprecedented series of coordinated attacks took place at the end of April across multiple regions of the country. The attacks spanned across approximately 1,500 kilometers hitting various areas of Bamako and its surroundings as well as key locations in central Mali, including the Mopti region, and northern cities such as Gao and Kidal. The attacks were intended to disrupt leadership and the decision-making structures, and the breadth of the assaults beyond Bamako spread already strained government security forces thin, allowing rebels to make key territorial gains.
Since the attacks, Bamako has reportedly been held under siege, with civilians being allowed to leave the city but not enter it. Analysts suggest the towns on river Niger are likely JNIM’s next target, FLA may focus on Timbuktu.
The Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed the attacks reportedly in coordination with the Tuareg separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Alex Vines, Africa director at the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests that the coordination between JNIM and the FLA highlights the fluidity of alliances in the Sahel, where Islamist and ethno-nationalist groups cooperate tactically despite differing long-term objectives. These recent developments have also sparked concern that other rebel groups may take advantage that FaMa’s energy is placed on containing the situation, to strike, creating a wider contagion.
The scale of the attacks mark a significant shift in conflict dynamics showing JNIM’s increased capacity and underscore a rapidly deteriorating security environment. Civilians and military personnel, including senior figures such as Defence Minister Sadio Camara, were killed in the violence. In the north, separatist forces claimed control of Kidal and parts of Gao. Russian-linked Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) troops who are working alongside the Malian Armed Forces (FaMa) withdrew from Kidal. Malian authorities have stated that the situation is under control and that operations are ongoing.
On 28 April, a JNIM spokesperson declared the beginning of a siege of Bamako and warned civilians against positioning themselves between them and FaMa. Civilians in the country have formed self-defence groups in response to previous attacks. JNIM militants had already established checkpoints in the outskirts of the capital days earlier.
It remains unclear what will happen in the coming weeks, but negotiations seem unlikely. There is continued public support for the authorities in Bamako and limited appetite for negotiations with JNIM around the capital. However in other areas, particularly in central Mali, some communities have engaged in dialogue with the group as a means to reduce violence.
The attacks at the end of April follow a pattern of intensified JNIM attacks westward and toward the capital over the past year, demonstrating growing reach and increasing tactical sophistication. The group is increasingly targeting infrastructure and key transport routes. It has managed to sustain a fuel blockade on Bamako, demonstrating its capacity to disrupt supply lines and pressure the capital. The group has undertaken more direct and coordinated attacks across the country, including convoy ambushes, kidnappings, and the forced closure of businesses and schools, with significant humanitarian and economic consequences (For more information, please read our November 2025 Monitor).
Civilians face heightened risks due to the expansion of hostilities into populated areas, the use of siege tactics, and explicit warnings from armed groups that individuals may be targeted if caught between opposing forces. Violations against civilians continue to be reported by all parties to the conflict. In April, FIDH and PALU began proceedings before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights concerning alleged serious violations committed against civilians in 2022 by FaMa and Wagner Group (now replaced by Africa Corps).
The JNIM are part of a range of Islamic groups operating throughout the continent. According to a report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups across Africa reached nearly 24,000 in 2025, a 24% increase over the previous year. The Sahel remains the epicenter of this violence, with JNIM responsible for almost 80% of fatalities in the region. Mali’s neighbours are also struggling with the same insurgency, weak state presence in the peripheries and limited capacity to address the situation and protect civilians.
The ability of JNIM and allied groups to carry out near-simultaneous attacks across vast distances and entering areas previously considered safe signals a growing operational capacity. Following this attack, the group may seek to sustain momentum, and follow-up attacks cannot be discounted. There is a clear need to limit this trend before it further escalates, a stronger, coordinated response is needed. Without meaningful changes in the security or political landscape, it is likely that such events will continue, leaving civilians exposed to violence and at elevated risk of atrocity crimes, particularly those living in contested areas or locations of strategic importance.
International response:
The international community condemned the attacks and called to protect civilians and called for support. UN’s Secretary General Antonio Guterres called for coordinated international support to address the situation in the Sahel.
On a regional level, the African Union Peace and Security Council called on the Sahel states to reconsider their position towards ECOWAS and work together alongside the AU Commission. ECOWAS condemned the attacks. ECOWAS member states have in recent months offered support to address the growing jihadist threat through the proposed deployment of a new regional force, presenting a potential alternative that Mali could consider.
Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the President of Burkina Faso, representing the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) condemned the attacks and framed them as an effort to destabilise the AES confederation as a whole.
Russia is allegedly concerned about the increasingly plausible fall of Mali’s junta leader Goïta which could trigger the collapse of those in Burkina Faso and Niger.
South Sudan: reduction of UNMISS amid increased violence
Summary: The reduction of troop levels in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan amid escalating violence raises concerns about weakened civilian protection and re-emergence of atrocity crimes.
Clashes between forces aligned with President Salva Kiir Mayardit and First Vice President Riek Machar intensified in April, particularly in Jonglei State. Fighting in Akobo County there has involved repeated territorial exchanges, sustained violence, and significant civilian harm, including displacement and casualties.
Hostilities are escalating, increasing civilian exposure to violence, and lack of clarity over the full extent of the violence. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan recently reported that in the past year there have been widespread and systematic attacks against civilians from government forces, including unlawful killings and the bombardment of civilian homes and medical facilities. The report also found bodies in Jonglei, warning that the true scale of recent violence may be far greater than currently understood.
These incidents are unfolding within an already deteriorating context marked by political fragmentation and the steady erosion of the 2018 peace agreement. Unilateral actions by Kiir, including dismissals of officials without consultation, alongside the continued marginalisation and fragmentation of opposition groups, have deepened divisions and contributed to renewed military mobilisation. The uncertain outlook for the December 2026 elections further reflects the lack of political will to implement core provisions of the agreement, including security sector unification. Across the country, violence persists not only between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces and opposition groups but also through intercommunal clashes and cross-border raids. The situation is compounded by economic strain, climate shocks, and spillover from the conflict in neighboring Sudan, all of which are intensifying instability and humanitarian pressures.
Escalating clashes, evidence of potentially underreported killings, and the continued use of tactics that harm civilians suggest that violence is not only persisting but deepening in intensity and scope. UNMISS reported a 40% increase in civilians targeted between 2024 and 2025. This is occurring in a context where the peace agreement is weakened and there is increased militarisation, all occurring in a context in which mass atrocities have occurred in the recent past, raising the likelihood of their recurrence.
International response:
The United Nations Security Council was briefed on the situation in South Sudan and renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) while reducing its troop ceiling from 17,000 to 12,000. This reduction comes at a time when violence is escalating across multiple regions and when civilian protection needs are increasing. A smaller force may face constraints making their protective presence felt, responding to emerging threats, and deterring armed actors across highly volatile areas, leaving the country at a higher risk of mass atrocities.
On the sidelines of the AU Summit in February the AU C5-Plus committee called for an immediate ceasefire, urged elections to proceed by December 2026, and called for the release of political detainees, including Riek Machar. It also called for the appointment of an AU High Representative/Special Envoy for South Sudan. A month later, president Kiir visited South Africa and met with South African President Ramaphosa as part of ongoing diplomatic engagement.
The AU Commission appointed Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete as the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea in March. He has since conducted regional visits to South Africa and Uganda (which has troops in the country supporting Kiir’s forces). He also visited Juba where he engaged with Kiir and officials aligned with Machar.
