Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to detect increasing tendencies or opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers developments in:
- Central African Republic
- Ethiopia
- South Sudan
Central African Republic
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) released their latest report on the situation in the country in March. The report indicated that armed groups in CAR, including one linked to the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), carried out serious human rights abuses which could amount to war crimes in the southeastern region, primarily targeting Muslim communities and Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers in the Haut-Oubangui region.
In 2024, clashes between the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG), an armed group primarily composed of ethnic Azande, and the Union for Peace in CAR (UPC), a predominantly Fulani armed group, escalated in Haut-Mbomou. Since then, hundreds of AAKG fighters have been incorporated into the army and are now carrying out joint operations with FACA under the name of Wagner Ti Azande (WTA). The report focuses on two waves of attacks by WTA, sometimes alongside the AAKG, in the Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures, in October 2024 and in January 2025 . Violations committed during these attacks included summary and extrajudicial executions, cases of sexual and gender based violence, torture, and forced labour.
These events took place in a worsening security situation and in the absence of state authorities. The sparse presence of state security forces has allowed groups like WTA and AAKG to operate in an environment of impunity. The findings of this report should serve as a reminder that the government and the international community must work collectively to address the situation. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk called for clarification of the connections between the WTA and the FACA and for complete transparency regarding the group’s actions and their legality or its disarmament.
The conflict in Sudan complicates the situation in the country as it has caused tensions between local communities and Sudanese refugees. Armed groups have infiltrated refugee camps, engaging in forced recruitment, using child soldiers, and carrying out attacks motivated by religious and ethnic factors.
Sexual and gender based violence is surging, especially trafficking and forced marriages in displacement camps and areas controlled by armed groups. For example, the Korsi refugee camp in Birao, located in northern CAR, shelters around 18,000 refugees and returnees, many of whom have fled from Sudan amid the ongoing war, and other Centralafrican internally displaced persons (IDPs). The vast majority of those suffering from these abuses are women and girls, with nearly a quarter being children and teenagers.
Elections are expected in December 2025. Voter registration agents and centres are being targeted by armed groups, disrupting the electoral process. In February, MINUSCA reported that security concerns continued to be a major issue, with 58 registration centers remaining closed.
Ethiopia
Tensions in Tigray continue between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leader Debretsion Gebremichael and his former deputy, Getachew Reda, who heads the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), sparked fears of renewed conflict. These tensions come from discussions surrounding the implementation of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, primarily the control of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF). Debretsion argues that the TDF is not under the TIA’s authority, while Getachew maintains that the TDF is neutral but managed by the TIA as part of the demobilisation arrangements. Debretsion’s faction accuses Getachew’s interim administration of betraying Tigray’s interests and failing to implement the peace deal, which promised the return of displaced people, withdrawal of foreign forces, and new elections, none of which have happened.
After months of tensions, Getachew accused Debretsion and his supporters of an attempted coup after Debretsion’s faction, accompanied by armed soldiers, took control of Mekelle FM radio station, mayor’s offices in Mekelle and Adi-Gudem mid-March. In response, Getachew suspended three TDF generals and requested support from the federal government. Tigray’s vice-president has warned that fighting could reignite “at any moment” and the region risked “becoming a battlefield” again.
Disputes between Debretsion and Getachew are not new. In August 2024, Debretsion was reelected as TPLF leader. Several key members, including Getachew, were suspended and later expelled from the party. Getachew argued that the TIA’s attempt to govern impartially was viewed by some as anti-TPLF. Since then, the Debretsion faction has been appointing parallel local administrators and demanding that TIA-appointed leaders step down.
The situation is worsening throughout the region, and sporadic clashes took place in the second half of March, and at least four people were killed. Queues formed outside banks with civilians attempting to access cash, and flights sold out with people trying to flee. Armed men patrolled the streets of Mekelle at night, checking people’s IDs.
To make matters more complex, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also suffered, with major implications on the situation in Tigray. The signing of the Pretoria agreement in November 2022 caused a setback in the historically strained Ethiopian-Eritrean relationship. Eritrea, which was working alongside Abiy, expressed dissatisfaction with the peace agreement, accusing Ethiopia of betrayal. As a result, Eritrea has hindered the truce’s implementation by refusing to withdraw its troops from Tigray. This has sparked fears that Eritrean President Afwerki might intervene in Tigray’s ongoing factional struggle. Eritrea is also believed to be providing financial and logistical support to Amhara rebel groups, who have been in conflict with the Ethiopian government since August 2023 over the integration of Amhara forces into the national military.
Tensions further increased with Ethiopia’s attempts to regain access to the Red Sea through Eritrea’s Assab port. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy has stressed that sea access is “existential” for Ethiopia and called losing Eritrea’s coastline a “historical mistake.” Eritrea called up reservists under 60 and increased security along its southern border in February. There have been rumors that Tigray military commanders met Afwerki in January and Debretsion has been accused of colluding with Eritrean intelligence.
Ethiopia’s former prime minister, Mulatu Teshome Wirtu, accused Afwerki of working to reignite conflict in Northern Ethiopia by backing Amhara fighters and exploiting TPLF divisions. Eritrea has denied the accusation. Ethiopia has since deployed tanks and troops to the border and state media have been showing support for Ethiopia’s claims over Assab. Abiy has also deployed troops to neighbouring Afar, a region in northern Ethiopia which borders both Tigray and Eritrea. Any conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea risks involving Tigray, due to its ongoing tensions and polarisation and its longstanding history with Eritrea with whom they share a 1,000-kilometre border.
South Sudan
South Sudan is on the brink of relapsing into civil war, with President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar at the center of the ongoing dispute. There is growing fear that the 2018 Revitalized Agreement, which had been holding things in place, has collapsed.
Power struggles are ongoing and manifested through a cabinet reshuffle that began in October 2024 and intensified in February when Kiir removed several officials from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) without prior consultation. This included two of the five vice presidents and the intelligence chief, who were replaced by Kiir’s close allies. Kiir’s frequent cabinet reshuffles are widely viewed as a tactic to strengthen his control and weaken Machar.
In mid-February, fighting erupted in Nasir County, Upper Nile State, a Machar stronghold between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), loyal to President Kiir and local Nuer youth, known as the White Army aligned with Machar. Since then, sporadic clashes have taken place. On 4 March, the White Army took control of an SSPDF base in Nasir. Thousands of civilians were displaced. Tensions continued to rise after the government sent additional forces to the region, including fighters from the Agwelek and Abushok militias. While the SSPDF claimed the deployment was a routine troop rotation, Riek Machar argued that it violated the 2018 Revitalised Agreement.
Following the clashes, the South Sudanese government placed Riek Machar under house arrest and arrested at least 22 political and military figures associated with Machar, including General Duop Lam, the SPLM-IO’s acting chief of staff. While some of the detainees were released after a few days, Machar continues to be held incommunicado.
The government claims the opposition orchestrated the White Army attacks as part of a wider destabilisation effort. However, researcher Jan Pospisil suggests this overlooks the fact that White Army has historically acted independently, suggesting that the arrests are an opportunistic move to weaken the opposition rather than a real response. In order to avoid an escalation of violence Pospisil believes community leaders, especially those with influence over White Army factions, should be involved in negotiations.
Uganda sent troops to Juba in support of Kiir which led Machar’s SPLM-IO to indicate it was partially pulling out of the security arrangements of the 2018 peace deal. On 16 March, an airstrike, blamed on the SSPDF and Uganda defense forces, hit Nasir killing over 20 civilians and causing damage to civilian property. Violence has also been reported in Western Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria states.
Both leaders have been reluctant to implement the 2018 Agreement opting instead to hold on to their power. The agreement stipulated for the inclusion of various political parties’ armies into the unified armed forces, but this never materialised leaving these armed groups with changing loyalties and grievances to continue to clash with each other and government forces. Political and armed factions feeling excluded have defected, split, or resorted to violence.
Ongoing regional tensions such as those between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the ongoing war in Sudan, can further exacerbate the situation. The ongoing war in Sudan has had a devastating impact in South Sudan’s economy, particularly due to the disruption of its oil pipeline, which prevents the country from exporting oil – as covered in our July 2024 newsletter. These underlying economic challenges have contributed to growing fractures in political and security alliances.
International response:
The international community has largely responded by condemning the violence in Nasir, but concrete action has been limited. The AU Peace and Security (AU PSC) was briefed by the UN Mission to South Sudan’s head, Nicholas Haysom, who emphasised the need to prevent a return to war and fully implement the Revitalised Agreement. He warned against the spread of misinformation and increasing hate speech, which risks the conflict assuming an ethnic dimension. The AU Commission Chairperson called for an end to violence.
The UN Security Council condemned attacks by the White Army on two UN helicopters, targeting UNMISS humanitarian workers and called for a refrain of violence. The Council held closed consultations on 18 March.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) leaders agreed to constitute a Ministerial-level sub-committee on South Sudan which will visit Juba to assess options for initiating an inclusive dialogue on the R-ARCSS and the Kenya-led Tumaini initiative.
