Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in preventing mass atrocities in Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers:
- Democratic Republic of the Congo: Armed group expansion and continued threat to civilians
- Ethiopia: Political fragmentation in Tigray deepens as conflicts continue across multiple regions
- Nigeria: expanding Jihadist insurgency leaves civilians exposed to further harm from all sides
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Armed group expansion and continued threat to civilians
Summary: ongoing attacks against civilians by armed groups, the expansion of violence into areas that were previously relatively stable threaten a new wave of atrocity crimes, even as new evidence of widespread and systematic abuses that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity emerges. While diplomatic efforts and ceasefire negotiations involving the DRC, Rwanda and M23 made some progress on paper, fighting continued in parts of eastern DRC and tensions remained high.
In Ituri province, civilians continued to bear the brunt of intercommunal and armed group violence. On 28 April, fighters affiliated with the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO), associated with the Lendu community, attacked villages near Pimbo in Djugu territory, killing at least 69 people, most of them civilians. The attack occurred amid clashes involving the newly formed Convention for the Popular Revolution (CRP), a militia claiming to defend the Hema community. Tensions between Hema and Lendu have repeatedly fuelled mass killings and displacement. The emergence of additional armed actors in the province and renewed attacks against civilians increase the risk of further ethnic violence.
Concerns also grew over the geographic expansion of violence by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). During April and May, the group carried out attacks in Haut-Uele province about 50km north of the Ituri border, near the Durba gold mining zone. This was the group’s first known action in the area in the last 15 years. The expansion of ADF activity into the more stable province is worrying evidence of robust operational capacity and capacity to expand. Both the Congolese and Ugandan forces are present in the region, but the extent to which they are willing and able to protect civilians is unclear.
An Amnesty International report released during the month also highlighted ADF violations, including deliberate attacks against civilians, abductions, forced labour, child recruitment, sexual slavery, forced marriage, and forced pregnancy. The organisation concluded that these acts amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Civilians remain the ADF’s primary targets rather than occasional victims. The group continued to target civilians, and at least six were killed in Beni on 31 May. Civilians in the city took to the streets protesting the persistent insecurity.
The M23 insurrection remained a central driver of instability. While reports indicated that M23 withdrew from some towns and localities around Uvira in May amid increased pressure from Washington, the group continues to control significant territory across eastern DRC. However humanitarian concerns persisted with displacement, insecurity and limited access to assistance leaving civilians vulnerable. Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts, the situation on the ground remains tense, with sporadic clashes and airstrikes taking place between M23 and the government and its allies the Wazalendo.
A Human Rights Watch report released in May documented serious abuses committed by M23 and Rwandan forces during their occupation of Uvira between December 2025 and January 2026, including summary executions, unlawful killings, sexual violence, abductions, and forced recruitment. The report found evidence of systematic house-to-house searches targeting men and boys suspected of being affiliated with the Wazalendo. Although the abuses occurred several months ago, the report provides further evidence of patterns of conduct by M23 and allied forces that could be replicated in areas under their control.
The above is occurring in a context in which political tensions and restrictions on civic space are deepening at the national level. Human Rights Watch reported increasing harassment, arbitrary detention and intimidation of journalists, activists, opposition members and civil society actors. This has occurred amid debate over possible constitutional changes that could allow President Félix Tshisekedi to extend his time in office beyond the two-term limit.
The situation in eastern Congo remains of concern and the risk of further atrocity crimes remains acute. Civilians continue to face threats from armed groups and the multiplicity of groups active in the region makes it hard for potentially protective forces to effectively address the situation. Stalled political progress with the M23 and contestation at the national level risk expanding violence.
International response:
Diplomatic efforts to address the M23 conflict continue. In March, the United States imposed sanctions on senior Rwanda Defence Force officials and other actors for their alleged support to M23, after the United States, Rwanda and the DRC jointly endorsed measures aimed at reducing tensions. In April, the parties agreed on the implementation of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. Although these initiatives represent important efforts to de-escalate the conflict, fighting continued highlighting the gap between diplomatic progress and realities on the ground.
The UN Security Council is scheduled to receive a briefing on the situation in the DRC in June. The Head of MONUSCO, James Swan, is expected to brief, and Council members are expected to vote on a resolution renewing the mandates of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee and its Group of Experts.
Ethiopia: Political fragmentation in Tigray deepens as conflicts continue across
multiple regions
Summary: Tigray’s political crisis deepened as the TPLF moved ahead with restoring pre-war governing structures, further undermining the Pretoria Agreement. Violence continued to intensify in Amhara and Oromia, reinforcing concerns that Ethiopia’s multiple overlapping conflicts could trigger wider instability and renewed atrocity risks.
Political tensions in Tigray continued to escalate following the developments reported last month. In early May, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) formally reasserted control over the region’s pre-war political structures, restoring the legislative council that existed prior to the war and electing TPLF chair Debretsion Gebremichael as regional president. The move follows the federal government’s decision in April to extend the mandate of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), a decision the TPLF rejected. By restoring the institutions that were dissolved under the Pretoria Agreement, the TPLF continues to challenge the authority of the interim administration and increase tensions between them and Addis Ababa (for more information please read our May Monitor).
In Amhara, fighting between the Amhara Fano National Movement and federal forces continued across large parts of the region, with civilians continuing to bear the brunt of the violence, including drone strikes, armed confrontations, arrests, and displacement.
Fighting in Amhara also remains linked to tensions surrounding the status of Western Tigray, where unresolved territorial disputes and competing claims continue to fuel instability. In late April, the TPLF and allied forces clashed with Ethiopian and Amhara forces in Wag Hamra; the woreda had experienced relative calm since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement. This is the second clash in Western Tigray in 2026, signaling a broader deterioration of security conditions in the region.
The conflict in Oromia also continued. A recent report by Amnesty International further highlighted the severe impact of the conflict on women and girls, documenting cases of gang rape, sexual slavery, forced displacement and killings in areas under control of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Despite previous attempts at dialogue and partial peace initiatives, insecurity continues. Ethiopia’s instability is not confined to a single conflict but instead reflects multiple unresolved crises occurring simultaneously.
These developments came in the run up to polls on 1 June, although voting did not take place in Tigray and parts of Amhara due to ongoing instability. With violence continuing on multiple fronts, the structural drivers that contributed to past atrocities remain present. Rather than moving toward stabilisation, recent developments suggest an increasingly fragmented security and political environment in which escalation is likely.
Nigeria: expanding Jihadist insurgency leaves civilians exposed to further harm from all sides
Summary: Violence continued to escalate across several regions as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) expanded operations in the northeast. Civilians continue to bear the brunt during both insurgent attacks and military operations. Violence intensified in Plateau State.
Insurgent violence in northeastern Nigeria is intensifying with growing concerns about the resurgence of Boko Haram and the expansion of ISWAP. ISWAP has strengthened its control over parts of the Timbuktu Triangle in Borno and Yobe states, and has increasingly become a hub for insurgent activity. Rather than relying solely on attacks and raids, the group has reportedly sought to consolidate its presence by imposing forms of governance over local communities, including taxation, punishments, and restrictions on civilian life. Residents reportedly face whippings, executions, and other coercive measures for violating rules imposed by the group. These practices suggest a growing capacity to exercise authority over civilians rather than just conducting attacks. The ability to control territory, regulate civilian behaviour, and enforce punishment systems may also enhance the group’s capacity to commit abuses against populations living under its control.
These developments come amid a broader increase in attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP, there has been a 25% rise in attacks during the first quarter of 2026 according to ADF magazine, turning it into one of the deadliest periods since 2015. The resurgence of insurgent activity has included attacks on civilian communities, military positions, and schools, including the reported abduction of more than 50 children in Borno State in May.
At the same time, concerns have intensified regarding civilian protection and harm from state responses to the insurgent groups. In April, a military airstrike reportedly struck a village market in Jilli, killing more than 200 civilians. This is not an isolated incident and forms part of a broader pattern of civilian casualties linked to military operations in recent years. Separately, Chadian forces that reportedly killed more than 100 civilians in areas affected by Boko Haram activity.
Civilians face threats from both armed groups and security forces. The incidents reflect a broader challenge facing Nigeria’s counterinsurgency efforts. While authorities continue to pursue military solutions, repeated allegations of civilian casualties risk fuelling grievances among affected communities and undermining confidence in the state’s ability to provide protection. In areas already affected by insurgent activity, this dynamic may create opportunities for armed groups to exploit local frustrations and expand their influence.
Violence also increased in Plateau State. In April, suspected Fulani pastoralists attacked a village in Bokkos Local Government Area, killing at least 20 people, security forces reportedly did not respond. The attack occurred amid a broader rise in violence in the state, where civilians accounted for a significant proportion of those affected by political violence. According to ACLED, attacks against civilians represented 60% of violent incidents in April, and political violence incidents were the highest since 1997. Violence in the state has been steadily increasing, in 2025 political violence rose over 70% compared to the previous year.
While Plateau State has long experienced violence linked to tensions between farming and pastoralist communities, analysts suggest that insecurity is increasingly intertwined with banditry, competition over land and natural resources, and struggles over access to the state’s significant mineral wealth. Security analyst Nicholas Rogers says that violence in Plateau can no longer be understood solely through the traditional farmer-herder framework, but instead reflects a more complex conflict environment involving criminal networks, armed groups, and economic interests. The rise in insecurity has led to the recruitment of more than 1,400 fighters of self-defence militias. Some members of Fulani communities have expressed concern that the expansion of such forces could contribute to ethnic profiling and increase the risk of retaliatory violence against civilians suspected of collaborating with armed groups. These developments suggest that violence in the State reflects a broader and increasingly complex conflict environment.
These developments come as the country approaches the 2027 presidential election. While campaigning has already begun, analysts have raised concerns regarding the broader political environment and the crackdown on democratic institutions. Combined with worsening insecurity and ongoing economic pressures, these dynamics risk further increasing tensions in an already fragile security context.
President Bola Tinubu was formally nominated as the candidate of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) in May. While the election remains more than a year away, analyst Udo Judo Ilo raised concerns regarding the lack competitiveness of the political environment and the broader health of democratic institutions. The ongoing insecurity crisis, economic hardship, and the persistence of violence across the country, risk contributing to heightened political tensions and instability in the lead-up to the vote.
International response:
Following the market attack in Jilli, international bodies condemned the attacks and called for investigations. The African Commission described the incident as part of a broader pattern of deadly airstrikes in Nigeria and said it constituted a grave violation of rights protected under the African Charter. It further called on Nigerian authorities to conduct an independent investigation into the incident and ensure accountability for those responsible.The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights similarly called for independent investigations and reiterated that counterterrorism operations must comply with international humanitarian and human rights law.
