Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers developments in:
- Mozambique
- Nigeria
- South Sudan
Mozambique
The intensification of Jihadist operations in northern Mozambique, with recent attacks reported in both Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, represents an intensification and geographical expansion of the conflict and the likelihood of accompanying mass atrocities. In Niassa the group conducted at least three raids between April and May making it the biggest push into the province since 2021.One of the latest attacks took place in the Niassa Special Reserve, on the provincial border with Cabo Delgado, expanding the conflict to one of the country’s key conservation areas. Violence is also spreading deeper into central and southern parts of Cabo Delgado, particularly in Ancuabe and Balama districts.
The Jihadist Islamic State in Mozambique (ISM) has conducted attacks against Mozambican security forces and Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) present in the country. These developments come just months after Rwanda deployed a new military contingent to the effort to respond to a resurgence in violence. Rwandan troops have been present in northern Mozambique since 2021.
In parallel, the country continues to grapple with the aftermath of the contentious October 2024 general elections. FRELIMO, which has governed since independence in 1975, declared Daniel Chapo the winner of the presidential contest, but opposition figures, notably Venâncio Mondlane of the PODEMOS party, accused them of fraud. This triggered nationwide protests and unrest marked by violent clashes between demonstrators and security forces in which over 350 people were killed. In response, Political Commitment for an Inclusive National Dialogue was passed into law in April 2025, based on an agreement between Chapo and political parties in March. Under the agreement, the parties aim to revise the constitution, limit presidential powers, and pardon peaceful protesters convicted for their involvement in the protests. A technical commission consisting of 21 members: 18 representatives from the nine signatory political parties and 3 representatives from civil society will be responsible for proposing working groups to develop recommendations on the implementation of key agreement priorities. However civil society has raised concerns that the selection of representatives was not transparent and others have complained that it acts essentially as an expensive subsidy to political parties with little popular base. No credible investigations into the wave of political killings following the October 2024 elections have taken place. Human Rights Watch documented the killing of at least 10 key opposition party officials, many involved in organising the protests. The investigations that have been launched have neither identified suspects nor provided arrests or public updates on their progress.
Nigeria
Nigerians continue to suffer multiple crises. According to the civil society movement Nigeria Mourns, marking a national day of mourning for victims of violence nationwide: “at least 6,549 Nigerians [were] killed, and 3,804 [were] abducted across the country since the last commemoration of the National Day of Mourning on May 28, 2024.”
The killings in 2025, have been fueled in part by a major offensive of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which overran the Nigerian military and exposed systemic flaws in Nigeria’s counterterrorism approach. This was its most successful campaign since 2019. They targeted key military bases, gaining control of assets including weapons and vehicles, and conducted at least fifteen targeted attacks on military outposts. The increase in the group’s capacity is believed to be coming from increased support from the Islamic State, with some analysts suggesting direct deployments on the ground.
ISWAP has restructured into three main provinces: Buhaira, Faruq, and Krenowa. This reorganisation has strengthened its operational capacity and enabled the group to expand its attacks. It now covers key areas across northeastern Nigeria and has the capacity to conduct attacks anywhere in the state, including the garrison towns safe havens, and has become the strongest branch of the Islamic State.
The key military advances not only point to external support and increased funding but also to new military tactics, including the use of drones packed with explosives. It has proven able to conduct simultaneous attacks and they have begun conducting more night attacks, which suggest better equipment.
The current situation is worrying, Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum has noted that ISWAP has gained complete control over several l areas of the state. Although the group’s territorial control is strongest in Borno State they are also present in areas surrounding Damboa as well as the Lake Chad basin, and the Alagarno and Sambisa forests. In the Lake Chad basin area, regional military cooperation has decreased significantly. Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in March 2025 and the deterioration of bilateral relations since Niger’s 2023 coup have disrupted intelligence sharing and joint military operations across the borders, reducing security and creating an opening for extremists Civilians continue to be targeted by the Islamic groups. In January 2024, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu vowed to address the security situation in the country and although there was a period of relative calm, recent attacks indicate a new escalation.
In addition, the possibility of Boko Haram fighters joining ISWAP after a decrease in fighting between the two groups could facilitate the group’s expansion into southern Nigeria, the country’s economic hub filled with densely populated urban centers. ISWAP’s prominence within the broader IS network positions it to further the strategic goals of the Islamic State. Simultaneously, a number of other jihadist groups are operating in the northwestern part of the country. The Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)– associated with the Lakurawa group, which originated in Mali and Niger and drew the attention of the Nigerian government in December 2024– is rising and the al-Qaeda-linked Jamaat Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) has increased attacks across southern Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo, Benin and western Nigeria. This growth sheds light on the cross-border dynamics of jihadist groups in the area and shows how terrorist networks are taking advantage of shared frustrations, weak government presence, and security gaps in the region. (For more information on the Lakurawa please see our December 2024 monitor).
In addition, Plateau State in central Nigeria has seen a surge in inter-communal violence with over 100 people having been killed in March and April. The area struggles with longstanding tensions between herders and farmers over land access, exacerbated by climate change, illegal mining, and land grabs, however, motives behind the most recent attacks are still unclear.
The military is overstretched and under-resourced, struggling to address multiple security threats. Security is increasingly delegated to local militias and criminal groups, increasing the vulnerability of civilians, who can face attack from all sides, up to and including mass atrocities. Addressing the root causes that drive these conflicts including poor governance, poverty, and environmental degradation remain necessary to reduce the risk of atrocity crimes. Strengthening reintegration programs and rural services can curb armed group recruitment. A unified strategy combining security, political, and social and economic reforms is urgently needed.
South Sudan
South Sudan is on the precipice of renewed armed conflict. Given the history of atrocities committed in the context of the prior war, there is a high risk that such an escalation would be accompanied by atrocity crimes. In March, violent clashes erupted in Nasir, Upper Nile State, between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the White Army, a Nuer youth militia with loose links to Vice President and leader of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), Riek Machar. During the civil war, White Army forces were largely opposed to Kiir’s government, but independent analysts do not believe Machar exercises full control over the group.
The White Army captured Nasir in early April, prompting government airstrikes and counterattacks, with heavy casualties reported on both sides. The SSPDF recaptured Nasir on 19 April. President Salva Kiir launched attacks on positions held by SPLM-IO allies across the country. Human Rights Watch reported that government forces used improvised incendiary weapons in at least four attacks in Upper Nile State, killing at least 58 people, violence was also reported in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Western Equatoria, Unity, and Jonglei.
Some civilians have highlighted ongoing ethnic tensions, indicating that the government is targeting civilians solely because they are Nuer, the ethnic group from which both the White Army and Machar primarily draw support, and indicated that “everyone is targeted, not just members of the White Army.” Ethnically based violence was a prominent feature of the previous civil war.
The escalating violence in Upper Nile brought South Sudan’s persistently fractured politics to a critical point. In March, Vice President Riek Machar was placed under house arrest without evidence, accused of backing the White Army. In the wake of his arrest, high-ranking SPLM-IO members sought refuge in neighbouring countries or went into hiding. Releasing Machar and other SPLM-IO leaders could relieve tension, but the impact remains to be seen, an analyst from Juba University suggests that that would just leave Machar fearing for his life while Kiir fearing a coup against him.
In addition to confrontations between the government and SPLM-IO, splits within the SPLM-IO have deepened. Nathaniel Oyet, the acting chairperson, suspended members of the political bureau over an alleged plot to replace Machar. In response, Oyet was accused of lacking the authority to make such decisions. On 9 April, the party named Par Koul, the recently suspended minister for peacebuilding, head of the party. These efforts to remove Machar from his role without internal consensus have raised concerns about destabilising the peace process.
Over 600 soldiers from the SPLA-IO have defected and joined the SSPDF, with one citing dissatisfaction with SPLA-IO leadership as the primary reason. Analysts suggest these defections may undermine the SPLA-IO’s strength while bolstering Kiir’s.
The Ugandan military has backed the SSPDF in its fight against the White Army. In response, Machar criticised the deployment and accused Uganda of violating the UN arms embargo on the country.
Over 165,000 people have fled the violence since February, over 100,000 individuals sought refuge in neighbouring countries and there are 65,000 internally displaced persons in Upper Nile alone. It has also worsened an existing cholera outbreak, and severely hindered humanitarian efforts
The conflict in neighbouring Sudan has already played a role in stoking the crisis by precipitating a financial crisis by blocking export of South Sudanese oil through Sudan’s pipeline. The worsening economic crisis has led the president to dismiss key figures within his own party as well as targeting the opposition, which may signal the effective collapse of the peace agreement. The conflict could also intensify tensions, by encouraging cross border alliances.
International response:
President Kiir has rejected mediation efforts by African partners and has restricted external actors from engaging directly with Machar. Between March and April, the AU Commission Chairperson held direct talks with President Kiir and announced the deployment of a high-level delegation from the Panel of the Wise to Juba. The panel held conversations with Kiir but were unable to access Machar. The Chairperson later visited Juba and IGAD special envoy Raila Odinga also visited the country, both were able to speak with President Kirr but they were unable to meet the SPLM-IO leader.
On 16 April, the UN Security Council convened an open briefing on the situation in South Sudan. Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative and Head of UNMISS, highlighted the country’s rapidly worsening security conditions and that if not mitigated, the violence could escalate into a more complex conflict involving peace agreement signatories and external actors.
On 30 May, the Council adopted Resolution 2781, extending the sanctions on South Sudan which included the arms embargo, travel bans, and asset freezes, until 31 May 2026.
The international community has expressed deep concern over the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation, however, a stronger response is needed to prevent the catastrophe of a return to full-scale civil war and securing direct conversations between Kiir and Machar could assist in calming the situation.
