Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in preventing mass atrocities in Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers:
- Mali: JNIM continues to expand its operations exposing state limitations
- South Sudan: election uncertainty increases risk of further instability
- Sudan: Increased risk of mass atrocities in el-Obeid
Mali: JNIM continues to expand its operations, exposing state limitations
Summary: JNIM has expanded its operations across the country, intensifying attacks, disrupting critical supply routes, and increasing pressure on the capital. The absence of an effective response leaves civilians increasingly exposed to violence and atrocity risks.
Following Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s (JNIM’s) coordinated nationwide offensive in late April and its subsequent blockade of Bamako, security in Mali has continued to deteriorate. In May, JNIM shifted part of its focus to central Mali, launching a deadly offensive against Dozo militias in the Mopti and Ségou regions. The violence appears linked to growing tensions in areas where local communities entered into agreements with JNIM but subsequently came under pressure from the Dozo self defense militia Dan Na Ambassagou who attempted to challenge these arrangements. JNIM responded by targeting both militia positions and villages affiliated with the militias.
JNIM-linked fighters have simultaneously increased pressure on the main transport corridors connecting Bamako with Senegal, continuing the blockade that began last April, with reports of major highways obstructed, slowing commercial traffic into the capital as well as leaving hundreds of people stranded and disrupting access to food and water. These disruptions threaten the supply of petrol, refined goods, cement and food and affect the livelihoods of civilians. The continued blockade demonstrates the group’s ability to use economic disruption as a strategic tool against the state. The growing pressure on the Senegal–Mali corridor also raises concerns that similar tactics could expand to other regional trade routes, with wider implications for civilian populations and regional stability.
Tuareg separatist forces from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA/MNLA) who worked with JNIM in April’s attacks consolidated control over Kidal and surrounding towns, following the reported withdrawal of Malian and Russian forces (for more information please check out our May monitor). The loss of state presence in these areas creates additional space for armed groups to operate.
The continued expansion of jihadist influence has also prompted renewed debate over the government’s strategy. Some analysts argue that negotiations with JNIM may ultimately become necessary given the group’s growing territorial reach and operational capacity, however, the Malian authorities have continued to reject this option. The recent attacks have increased concerns that military stalemate could result in further civilian casualties and continued deterioration of the situation.
The recent developments suggest that the deterioration following the April offensive is continuing rather than stabilising. The group has managed to sustain pressure across multiple fronts through a combination of tactics. If the Malian authorities are unable to contain the insurgency militarily, negotiations may become a necessary option to reduce violence. If the situation is not addressed, the conflict is likely to become further entrenched, exposing civilians to harm and increasing instability.
International response:
France advised its nationals to leave Mali due to the worsening security situation.
Following the April offensive, Burkina Faso and Niger (Mali’s partners within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)) were slow to respond. Although the AES Force reportedly conducted drone strikes in the Gao, Ménaka and Kidal regions, analysts suggest the delayed response exposed the limitations within the alliance and brought up questions regarding the force’s capacity.
South Sudan: Election uncertainty increases risk of further instability
Summary: South Sudan set December 2026 as the date for the long-delayed elections , but it remains unclear if this will be feasible. Another postponement or contested process could further destabilise the country and heighten the risk of renewed violence and mass atrocities.
South Sudan’s National Elections Commission announced that the country’s first general elections since independence will take place on 22 December 2026, after years of repeated delays and sustained international pressure. However, this does not reduce concerns over the credibility or feasibility of the electoral process, as the Commission itself has openly acknowledged that it continues to face significant funding shortages, legal gaps, and technical constraints, urging the government to provide necessary resources and legislative reforms. These structural shortcomings are compounded by the practical challenges of holding nationwide elections during the rainy season, raising persistent doubts over whether the timeline can realistically be met. Moreover, it remains unclear if opposition leader Riek Machar (who remains under house arrest and is facing criminal charges) will be able to take part in the election. Machar’s SPLM-IO appears to be rejecting the proposed polls, with its spokesperson indicating that any electoral officials entering territories under its control would be treated as prisoners of war.
The electoral process is unfolding in an increasingly fragile political and security environment. South Sudan continues to experience conflict across Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei states. The humanitarian situation in these states is increasingly concerning. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced and humanitarian aid continues to be targeted. Simultaneously, implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement remains incomplete and political divisions between President Salva Kiir and the opposition remain unresolved (for more information please check out our May monitor).
Setting the election date has not solved the deeper drivers of instability. Elections are closely tied to political power struggles between Kiir and Machar, armed activity, and local violence. The waning political will to implement the 2018 Agreement, ongoing insecurity and grave economic problems have created an environment ripe for atrocities. If elections are postponed again, it would likely increase tensions between groups and raise the risk of more violence. Along with weak government control, active armed groups, lack of accountability, and ongoing ethnic violence, these factors continue to create conditions that could quickly grow into wider mass atrocities. For more information please check out our 2026 watchlist)
International response:
Amid increasing instability three parallel initiatives are currently working to prevent a return to large-scale conflict. The Elections Dialogue Committee, established by President Salva Kiir in January 2026, seeks to build consensus among signatories to the 2018 peace agreement and other stakeholders on the electoral process. The revived Tumaini Initiative aims to negotiate a national consensus around civilian protection, humanitarian access, elections, and an end to hostilities. The African Union C5+ process is centred on the implementation of the 2018 peace agreement, calling for an immediate ceasefire, renewed political dialogue between Kiir and Riek Machar, and regional mediation.
Although differing in scope, the Institute for Security Studies analysts warn that all three initiatives prioritise moving toward elections over implementation of the 2018 peace agreement. Advancing elections without resolving these structural issues risks reinforcing, rather than reducing, the conditions that continue to drive instability and atrocity risk.
Sudan: Concerns about the risk of mass atrocities amid dire humanitarian situation in el-Obeid
Summary: Since the fall of El Fasher in October 2025, fighting sustained by foreign support to both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has intensified in the Kordofans. As a de facto territorial division takes root, renewed offensives, growing use of drones, and persistent attacks against civilians continue to expose civilians to a dire situation.
North Kordofan has become one of the conflict’s main epicenters, with El Obeid at the centre. Following weeks of concern over an imminent RSF assault on the city, SAF launched a major counteroffensive, recapturing several towns along the Al-Sadarat Highway and restoring connection between Khartoum and El Obeid. While this partially broke the siege against the city, RSF forces reportedly remained active in surrounding areas.
These developments come after observers warned of an increasing risk of mass atrocities in El Obeid, where the city had remained under prolonged siege and has faced repeated drone strikes killing at least 30 civilians in June and targeting residential neighbourhoods and civilian infrastructure. The humanitarian situation in the city is dire and threatens civilians. The renewed access by SAF may help improve the situation if the road stays accessible but f the city were to fall to the RSF, serious abuses against those perceived to align with the SAF could ensue.
The city is home to an estimated 500,000 people, including more than 100,000 internally displaced people, and serves as the SAF’s operational headquarters for central Sudan as well as the main humanitarian distribution hub for Greater Kordofan. If RSF manages to capture the city, it would connect RSF-held territory across Darfur and Kordofan giving them a more defensible position in the West by limiting SAF’s access and increasing the capacity of the RSF to engage in renewed attacks against Sudan’s center.
Its strategic importance, combined with the pattern of siege, encirclement and escalating attacks, has prompted growing concern that El Obeid could fall victim to atrocities similar to those which occurred in El Fasher, as international actors warned. The RSF’s takeover of El Fasher was followed by widespread atrocities that the UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded amounted to genocide against the Fur, Zaghawa and other non-Arab communities.
The increasing use of drones across the country has become a defining feature of the conflict. Both parties continue to rely on them. SAF has maintained sustained campaigns against RSF positions and supply routes, while the RSF has increasingly used targeted drone strikes against military installations, critical infrastructure and urban centres under SAF control. Civilians are also being targeted. Between January and May 2026, the UN documented more than 1,000 civilians killed by drone strikes, and they continue to damage civilian infrastructure, humanitarian convoys and essential services, generating further displacement and increasing humanitarian needs.
Tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia increased following RSF drone strikes in June, when the SAF aligned government accused Ethiopia of facilitating these attacks. Ethiopia denied these accusations and counter-accused Sudan of supporting armed groups operating inside Ethiopia. Although the risk of direct conflict between both countries remains low, this shows how Sudan’s war continues to generate instability beyond its borders. The war is also placing additional pressure on already fragile neighbours, including Chad and South Sudan (for more information please visit our April Monitor).
Patterns of violence against civilians also remain deeply concerning. A new UN report found that conflict-related sexual violence continues to be used systematically to terrorise civilians. The findings reinforce previous reporting that sexual and gender-based violence is not confined to active frontlines but accompanies territorial expansion and displacement, leaving women and girls particularly exposed.
At the same time, efforts to expand accountability continue. In June, two civil society organisations filed a case before Kenyan authorities under the principle of universal jurisdiction, accusing members of the RSF of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The case marks the first attempt in Kenya to prosecute international crimes committed outside its borders and reflects growing efforts to pursue accountability amid the ongoing conflict.
International response:
The growing risk of atrocities in El Obeid has been widely acknowledged. Although the feared RSF offensive has not yet materialised, the possibility is enough to demand preventive action. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned that an imminent RSF offensive could lead to serious international crimes, as happened in El Fasher. A coalition of 29 states echoed these concerns before the Human Rights Council calling for greater protection of civilians and unhindered humanitarian access. The UN Secretary-General also expressed alarm and called for action by saying “Far too many times in this conflict, clear warnings have failed to trigger concerted action by the international community.”
At the same time, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the African Union, IGAD, the League of Arab States and the United Nations reaffirmed their support for a Sudanese-led political process through the Quintet (AU, IGAD, LAS, EU, and UN). They proposed a dialogue to bring together civilian actors from across Sudan and establish a pathway towards an independent civilian-led government. Despite these renewed diplomatic efforts, fighting continues due to external support. Unless the role of external backers is addressed, diplomatic initiatives are unlikely to significantly reduce the intensity of the conflict.
