Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers developments in:
- The Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Mali
- Sudan
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has attracted significant mediation efforts in recent weeks, offering hope that ongoing atrocities in the DRC can be reduced or perhaps ended. In late June, a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda, brokered by the United States (US), marked a diplomatic milestone. Weeks later, in a Qatari-led effort, a declaration of principles was signed between the Congo River Alliance/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) and the DRC government. Optimists see these as important steps towards peace, while pessimists point out that the agreements focus on resources to the exclusion of other key issues fueling the violence.
The Rwanda-DRC agreement includes a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from DRC territory (although no immediate timeline for its implementation), and the neutralisation of the Forces Democratiques de Liberation de Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group formed by members of Rwanda’s former genocidal government and a key security concern for Rwanda. While it does not explicitly mention the M23, which Rwanda is widely accused of supporting, it requires both parties to “take all possible measures to ensure that all armed groups within the conflict area cease engaging in hostilities” and to facilitate humanitarian access. Enforcement is entrusted to a joint DRC-Rwanda security coordination mechanism, however, no concrete provisions have been made to ensure its implementation.
Economically, the deal paves the way for the US access to critical minerals through a supply chain routed via Rwanda. This could represent a US effort to curb Chinese influence in the sector, but it has drawn criticism in the DRC, where citizens are concerned about foreign control over their resources.
On the other hand, the DRC-M23 declaration indicates the parties intention to establish a ceasefire and resolve the situation through peaceful means. The declaration sets a framework for negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement within the next month, however, it sparked controversy just hours after signing with Kinshasa claiming it had secured a commitment for the rebels to withdraw from the occupied zones while AFC/M23 accused the government of acting in bad faith and indicated they would not retreat.
Experts remain skeptical of the agreement’s potential, doubting whether there is political will for implementation and criticised the lack of clear enforcement mechanisms. There is no certainty that the fighting will stop, and indeed news outlets reported new clashes in Masisi, with M23 capturing new positions and clashes between the group and the Wazalendo reported around Walikale (North Kivu) in just the first days following the Doha declaration. Prior to signing the declaration, M23 was pushing towards Uvira, the last big city in the Kivu’s under government control, just miles away from Burundi.
For these deals to succeed, sustained diplomatic pressure from the US, Qatar, and the African Union will be necessary to ensure implementation of the agreements. Key next steps include ensuring Rwanda withdraws its troops, restoring order and developing clear, enforceable timelines. Without these, the agreements risk becoming yet another failed attempt at lasting peace in the Great Lakes region.
Beyond the implementation of these agreements, a broader engagement to address the root causes of the conflict, including contestation over citizenship and access to land. Indeed, the focus on a partial deal is a reflection of a recent trend towards limited to ceasefires or statements of intent that are celebrated as progress but fail to address the root causes of conflict, rather than comprehensive agreements. While the recently signed agreements appear to have calmed immediate violence, their language remains vague and fails to address the deeper grievances. In order to increase the chances for sustainable peace, these agreements must be the starting point for a broader, inclusive political process that addresses structural issues and ensures local ownership. The development and implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement to be signed in August will be key to ensure its continuation.
Since M23 began its offensive in December 2024 other armed groups, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been able to act more freely, with Congolese forces and their allies focused on halting M23’s advances. This shift has led to an escalation of attacks on civilians. ACLED reported a 68% rise in civilian fatalities in the first quarter of 2025, the second-deadliest period recorded since they started recording the group’s movements in 1997. In response, Uganda deployed an additional 1,000 troops to eastern DRC in February, bringing its total presence to around 5,000. However, without sustained joint military pressure, the ADF is likely to continue exploiting the security vacuum. Another issue to keep an eye out for is a new alliance formed in March between the ADF and the Lendu-led CODECO militia. This was the first major alliance for the ADF since 2007 which could mark a shift in regional militant dynamics. The group has rejected any collaboration with M23.
Mali
Mali has experienced an increase in actions by Islamist armed groups who have been associated with atrocities in the past few months. The government of Mali has in parallel introduced a range of authoritarian measures, further increasing the risk of atrocity.
Political parties were banned in May 2025 and in July the country’s transitional parliament voted in a bill that allows military leader Goita to remain in the presidency for a subsequent five-year term, renewable as necessary. This follows similar developments in Niger and Burkina Faso. In Mali, however, they have been met with open defiance.
Diplomatic relations between Mali and Algeria have deteriorated. Tensions had already been mounting in 2024, when Mali officially annulled the Algeria-brokered 2015 peace agreement, accusing Algeria of “hostile acts” and supporting Tuareg separatists in northern Mali. Tensions peaked in March and April 2025, after the Algerian army shot down a Malian drone near the border, claiming it had violated Algerian airspace. The incident prompted both countries to close their airspace, complicating regional movements. In response, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso recalled their ambassadors from Algiers. These dynamics have affected civilians, protests took place in April across parts of Mali, and online rhetoric in support of one side or the other intensified. If tensions persist, the possibility of military confrontation cannot be dismissed.
In June, Wagner Group mercenaries formally withdrew and were replaced by the Africa Corps. Unlike the Wagner Group, which operated as a private entity though strongly linked to Russian state interests, the Africa Corps works under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defense. This was followed by signing of agreements to bolster bilateral trade and economic ties, including cooperation on nuclear energy between both countries.
Their deployment marked a sharp escalation in violence on multiple fronts. Joint Africa Corps/Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) operations included a series of airstrikes and ground offensives targeting Islamic State factions, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), as well as the Tuareg separatist group, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), in northern and central regions of Mali. The duo has been accused of committing mass atrocities in Kidal, where they executed civilians, burned them alive, and disposed of bodies in wells during operations in late June.
A recent report by Human Rights Watch highlights ongoing attacks against the Fulani community, with the military and the Wagner Group targeting civilians during counter-terrorism operations for allegedly collaborating with JNIM. The report documents the execution of at least 12 Fulani men and the enforced disappearance of at least 81 others since January 2025 in clear violation of international humanitarian law and criminal law. These attacks reinforce perceptions of collective punishment and ethnic profiling, deepening the mistrust between the Fulani community and the state and creating a ground fertile for extremist recruitment.
JNIM has also been sustaining a strong counteroffensive against FAMa and Africa Corps. In June, the group killed over 150 soldiers in large-scale attacks across the country, including attacks only 200km from Bamako showing the group’s expanding reach. The group also began referring to the Africa Corps as “the Russian Legion,” showcasing them as foreign occupation.
Analysts highlighted these new trends of increased targeting of military camps with Islamist groups becoming more daring and becoming more sophisticated in their approach. Olayinka Ajala, an Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at Leeds Beckett University, explains militants are sending the message that the army is incapable of protecting civilians. He highlighted four main reasons why these groups are gaining traction: the loss of US drones in Niger, which has significantly hampered surveillance; a rise in human rights abuses during counter-terrorism operations, which aids militant recruitment; the weakening of cross-border coordination structures aimed at combating terrorism; and finally, the increased use of military technology and evolving tactics by Islamic groups.
The Tuareg insurgency continues in the north, and in June the FLA carried out operations against FAMa and Africa Corps around Kidal and accused them of targeting civilians, further increasing the tensions and divide.
Sudan
In recent months, heavy fighting has continued in El Fasher as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues to besiege the last bastion of government control in Darfur. Fighting has also increased in Kordofan, as the RSF seeks to control vital supply lines and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) seeks to consolidate its control over central and eastern Sudan. These battles have already been characterised by atrocities, and there is concern that intensified fighting will increase vulnerability to further atrocities.
In Darfur, the RSF took control of the tri-border area between Libya, Egypt, and Sudan in June, along with other parts of Sudan’s Northern State, securing a corridor linking Darfur to routes leading into the neighbouring countries.
A recent report by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), covering patterns of abuse and targeting between May 2024 and May 2025, highlights how the RSF has been targeting non-Arab communities, particularly the Zaghawa, who form the backbone of the Joint Forces currently allied with the SAF in the defense of El Fasher. Alarming hate speech calling out to “clean el Fasher” of non-Arab populations underscores the growing risk of genocide, a charge that is all the more worrying because charges of genocide related to the RSF’s takeover of El Geneina in 2023 are currently under investigation by the International Criminal Court.
In Kordofan, the SAF and RSF are battling over control for key territories such as Babanusa and El Obeid. Babanusa is strategically located on the Khartoum–Darfur supply route, if captured by RSF it would allow them to strengthen control over West Kordofan and stop SAF’s advance toward Darfur.
El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan and home to over 500,000 people, has become a new battleground. Since June, RSF has steadily encircled the city, imposing a devastating siege that cuts off access to food, shelter, and medicine. After losing Omdurman in Sudan’s tri-partite capital, the RSF shifted operations to North Kordofan, escalating looting and conducting attacks on civilians. The group killed approximately 300 people in various villages in the state in mid-July, including children and pregnant women, displacing thousands. The force targeted villages without any military objectives and in clear violation of international humanitarian law.
The UN Fact Finding Mission reported that the fighting is intensifying. There has been an increasing use of heavy weapons in densely populated areas and in sexual and gender-based violence, humanitarian aid is being manipulated as a weapon of war and driving famine especially in Darfur. Hospitals and medical centers are under siege. Both parties to the conflict have been accused of retaliatory violence, among those targeted include human rights defenders, medical workers, and aid personnel.
International response:
US President Trump’s Africa advisor, Massad Boulos, met with the “Quad” (US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and indicated that the conflict would be the administration’s next focus.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) briefed the UN Security Council on the situation in Darfur highlighting its progress in the first half of 2025. The Office of the Prosecutor drew attention to the targeting of civilian infrastructure, the lack of humanitarian aid, and the past and ongoing commission of war crimes. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to pursuing justice for the people of Darfur and requested the Council’s support.
Some Sudanese lawyers and human rights defenders criticised the report calling the ICC out for not delivering justice to the victims in Darfur in over two decades.
The UNSC remains divided on the issue, with non-parties to the Rome Statute Algeria, China, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, and the United States expressing skepticism or outright criticism of the Court.
The FFM presented its findings to the UN Human Rights Council, urging the international community to impose an arms embargo and ensure accountability for mass atrocities. Echoing the demands of exiled civil society groups, the FFM emphasised the critical need to preserve evidence to support future accountability efforts.
