Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to detect increasing tendencies or opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers:
- Somalia
- South Sudan
Somalia
The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is set to exit the country by the end of 2024 raising significant security concerns about the potential vacuum left behind. As part of the plan, ATMIS was expected to withdraw 4,000 troops by June 2024. However, due to security concerns, the Somali government requested that only 2,000 troops withdraw by the end of June, allowing the remaining 2,000 to stay until September. As the ATMIS drawdown proceeds with its departure and Somalia remains engaged in its ongoing struggle against insurgency, concerns persist regarding the readiness of Somali security forces to effectively address the escalating situation. There is apprehension that the withdrawal of ATMIS could leave a security void, potentially exploited by armed groups operating in the region. Regarding the future presence of the AU post-ATMIS, while there is consensus on the necessity of preventing a security vacuum, it remains uncertain with ongoing concerns about long-term financing and sustainability. Moreover it is unclear which ATMIS contingents will remain part of the mission, due to tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia and possible Somali opposition to Ethiopian participation the Somali government may favour contingents from countries it views as more friendly. Ethiopia is responsible for a significant portion of ATMIS operations, Birhanu Jula, chief of staff for the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) admitted that Ethiopian troops were covering 60 percent of Somalia and has been involved in the fight against al-Shabaab since 2007.
The armed extremist group Al-Shabaab continues to cause havoc throughout the country. In June, the federal government reaffirmed its commitment to the counter-insurgency effort after capturing key villages from al-Shabaab in Lower Juba and Middle Shabelle. ACLED analysts indicated, however, that al -Shabaab could be trying to lure security forces into future attacks by handing these territories over without conflict. Clashes in Lower Shabelle, Galgaduud, Lower Juba, Bay, and Bakool are a clear indication of the escalating conflict for territorial control. The Somali government regained control of Run-nirgod along the border with the Ceel Dheer. Fighting over Ceel Dheer has been ongoing since August 2022 as the district provides access to Middle Shabelle but Somalia’s recent territorial gains put it at an advantage in disrupting al-Shabaab movements and cross-border attacks. In Lower Juba, security forces took control over Bula Haji without any resistance from al-Shabaab but soon after fighting began where militants tried. During these operations, four al-Shabaab village leaders surrendered. June’s setbacks represent a loss for the extremist group as both towns had been al-Shabaab strongholds. Despite this progress, Somali forces have yet to demonstrate sufficient capacity to fully eliminate the insurgent group from central and southern Somalia.
Indeed, some analysts believe that al-Shabaab is a greater risk in East Africa than ever before and risks destabilising the region. The group has previously been able to carry out attacks in Kenya and in Uganda and has established links with the Uganda rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Al-Shabaab quietly attempted to establish a unified East African army through its recruits known as Muhajirin, a situation that is especially concerning considering the ongoing changes in peacekeeping in the country.
Ongoing rumours in local media about possible negotiations between the Somali government and al-Shabaab forces were rejected by Somalia’s president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud who said “There are no talks going on today, and there is nothing to talk about yet,” not ruling out future negotiations. Although there appear to be no ongoing negotiations it remains unclear if this is the appropriate time for the federal government to engage in such conversations. Ongoing challenges from the international community regarding Somalia’s constitutional amendments, tensions with neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia and Djibouti, the ongoing withdrawal of the AU Transitional Mission, inter-clan conflicts, and humanitarian crises leave the federal government in a position of weakness.
Inter-clan conflicts have been and continue to be a major source of violence and instability in Somalia, causing the killings and displacement of civilians. In June at least 55 people were killed due to clan violence between the Dir and Marihan clans in central Somalia . A local clan elder said that the fighting was easy to stop, but the government forces were late and 55 people were killed and at least 115 were wounded. Some residents believe that al-Shabaab is involved as both clans are close and previously would engage in combating against the armed group. In July militias from the Saad and Leelakase clans in the Mudug region fought repeatedly which led both the Galmudug and Puntland administrations to announce their intention to deploy military forces. Near Abudwak town, militants clashed with Somali troops over smuggled weapons the government had seized.
The ongoing violence, arising from both armed extremist groups and inter-communal tensions, remains a pivotal factor contributing to pervasive instability across the country, profoundly impacting civilian lives. This situation is further aggravated by the precarious humanitarian conditions. Although the current administration is making significant strides to address the violence, there are uncertainties regarding their ability to effectively contain the situation.
Meanwhile, internal developments continue to foster polarisation. On March 30, 2024, the Parliament approved a set of constitutional amendments which enhance the President’s powers, one significant change stipulates that the president is authorised to appoint and remove the prime minister, eliminating the need for parliamentary approval. The Prime minister role will be substituted with a vice president in the upcoming presidential election. This shift undermines the previously established checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches, concentrating power in the hands of the president. Another key amendment included a shift from the long-standing clan-based indirect voting system to a model of universal suffrage, the former system, referred to as the “4.5 power-sharing model,” guaranteed equal parliamentary representation for the four major clans, while allocating a portion of seats to minority clans. This shift could upset the current balance of clan power, potentially sparking tensions and conflicts among clans vying for influence under the new system and risks increasing violence in areas where inter-clan conflicts are ongoing. The amendments faced criticism from the Puntland administration as well as the states of Jubbaland, South West, Hirshabelle and Galmudug. Two former prime ministers criticised the lack of consultation around the amendments and stressed the necessity for a referendum. The Puntland administration also opposed the changes and on 31 March declared its independence from Somalia until the amended Constitution is approved by referendum. As the Constitutional Amendment process continues there is a need for ongoing monitoring of the situation as the tensions could escalate into violence if not addressed properly.
Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia continued to escalate. After Puntland declared its independence, Ethiopian representatives met with Puntland authorities to discuss cooperation. In response, Somalia expelled the Ethiopian ambassador from Mogadishu and ordered the closure of Ethiopian consulates in Puntland and Somaliland. This was further exacerbated by Somalia’s Ambassador to the United Nations alleging that Ethiopian soldiers illegally crossed the border and engaged in clashes with local security forces. Relations between the countries deteriorated recently due to Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland which would allow Ethiopia to access the Red Sea through Somaliland’s coastline in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence further explained in our February monitor. The internal political instability and escalating tensions between the federal government and Somaliland, exacerbated by Ethiopian engagement, compound the crisis. There is an urgent need to de-escalate these political tensions, as they, coupled with the ongoing security challenges, create a fertile ground for potential atrocities.
It is possible that ongoing tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia may be further exacerbated by Eritrea-Ethiopia dynamics. Since 2019 Eritrea has been responsible for training Somali troops fighting al Shabaab, but this could now play a role in antagonising Ethiopia. Eritrea expressed support for Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity amid tensions with Ethiopia over the MoU with Somaliland and expressed concern over the possibility of an Ethiopian naval base in the region which could threaten Afwerki’s security interests. Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain high with Eritrea’s discontent with its perceived marginalisation from the Ethiopia-TPLF peace agreement, and Ethiopia’s buildup of troops near the Eritrean border raise concerns that there could be a resurgence of fighting. The escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia regarding the port agreement, coupled with the worsening relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, have the potential to precipitate a dangerous escalation in the region.
International response:
Somalia was elected to serve on the UN Security Council for the 2025-2026 term. The country will join other non-permanent members including Algeria and Sierra Leone. It will be interesting to see how the country’s presence on the council may impact the institution’s handling of the crisis.
Amid ongoing political tensions between the federal government and Puntland, the Acting UN Special Representative for Somalia, James Swan, emphasised Somalia’s government to “overcome any outstanding differences” and collaborate on solutions to the country’s challenges.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh and US Secretary of State engaged in bilateral conversations on shared security interests in the Horn, counter-terrorism operations and plans for Somalia after ATMIS.
South Sudan
South Sudan’s Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) passed a bill amending the 2015 National Security Service (NSS) Act by 274 to 114 votes. Under the new legislation, the NSS retains the authority to conduct arrests. This provision risks further strengthening the NSS’ abusive powers and deviates from its originally intended role as a classical intelligence agency. Opposition members, led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In opposition (SPLM-IO), strongly opposed the changes during the deliberations. Despite suggestions of limiting the NSS powers, the bill presented to parliament kept arrest powers but restricted their use to “emergency circumstances” and allowed arrests without a warrant for broad “crimes against the state.” However the bill’s definition of crimes against the state includes any act aimed at “undermining” the government. Such charges have been used to curb freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, particularly targeting political opposition and critics of its policies.
The NSS has a documented history of establishing controls over basic rights and freedoms and the agency has already been implicated in arbitrary arrests and other abusive practices. However, new bill risks exacerbating these actions and leaving civilians even more vulnerable. Africans For the Horn of Africa, a solidarity platform designed to amplify civilian voices, called on president Kiir to reject the law and return it to parliament and to stop the ongoing illegal detentions and prosecutions under the guise of the NSS law, strengthening the existing gaps in the law to guarantee full protection of rights.
By retaining the power to conduct arrests the approved bill risks strengthening the NSS abusive powers and brings it further away from the classical intelligence role that it was conceived to have.
The bill to amend the previous 2014 NSS act was initiated by the revitalised agreement and despite recommendations that the arrest powers should be limited however this is not what happened in the end.
The proposed changes undermine the previously established separation of powers recognised in the Transitional Constitution explained Juol Nhomngek, MP for Cueibet County in the National Legislative Assembly who said “if signed into law, will be a political time bomb, like what happened in Sudan after the establishment of a similar structure” and fears that if passed, it would be a clear signal that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In Government (SPLM-IG) fears handing over power peacefully.
South Sudan’s National Election Commission announced this month that elections would take place on 22 December for the first time in the country’s history. However there are opposing views on whether they should go through with the plan or be once again postponed. Among those requesting the voting be pushed back indicate that free, fair and safe elections can not take place in South Sudan in the current context, but in a survey conducted this year, over 70% of nationals want elections to take place, believe this could be key in addressing the nation’s problems and consider it likely there will be less corruption in the country after elections take place.
However, it remains unclear if logistical preparation can be put in place in time. ISS researcher Moses Chrispus Okello argues that Kiir’s decision to support the elections is a strategic manoeuvre aimed at provoking an opposition boycott, in which case Kiir would effectively be seen as the “winner,” even if no actual election takes place. Meanwhile, the SPLM-IO, with its limited power and resources, faces significant challenges in competing effectively in the polls. This reality may lead them to prefer maintaining the current status quo rather than risking an unfavourable outcome.
Although there is a case to be made that holding the elections in the current conditions risks exacerbating the ongoing security crisis, Okello believes that the ongoing economic crisis, existing structural issues and intercommunal violence remain a concern regardless if the election takes place or not. Moreover, prolonged delays could leave the country in a further state of transition and uncertainty, leaving those in power to exploit the situation. Violence remains a potential outcome whether elections are held or not, and if conducted, there is no assurance that they will be free from conflict, particularly if the process is contested or fails to meet minimum standards. However, careful preparation can help reduce the likelihood of such violence.
The economic situation is extremely worrying and further exacerbates existing tensions. South Sudan depends heavily on Sudan for its oil exports, with more than 90% of its government revenue derived from oil sales. The Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which transports oil from South Sudan to the Bashayer export terminal in Sudan, is essential to this process and due to the ongoing war in Sudan it has experienced frequent disruptions that have exacerbated the already delicate economic situation.
The current export is not enough to cover costs and civil servants have not been paid their salaries in over nine months and the government is currently considering a total shutdown of its exports through Sudan, which would exacerbate existing tensions. Kiir has attempted to maintain a good relationship with both Sudan’s warring parties. South Sudan officials have disclosed that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has proposed depositing oil revenues into an escrow account until the conflict ends, positioning itself as the protector of oil infrastructure and seeking security fees that South Sudan has been paying under the table. Meanwhile, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) continues to collect transit fees and rejects the RSF’s role, asserting itself as the legitimate authority. Addressing the damaged pipeline requires approval from both the SAF and RSF, a process that will likely be time-consuming. This situation may worsen South Sudan’s already strained economy, potentially leading to increased hardship and political instability in a country beset by war, corruption, and climate-induced flooding.
