Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to detect increasing tendencies or opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers developments in:
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Sudan
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) deteriorated significantly when the M23 movement made significant territorial gains in North and South Kivu, leading to increased violence and fierce clashes between M23 and its allies, including the Rwandan army, and the DRC military, supported by its local and regional partners. In the last week of January, the group seized control of Goma, the capital of North Kivu and the third largest city in Congo, housing three million people—including one million internally displaced persons (IDPs). By mid-February the group had also managed to capture Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, where the Burundian army is also present. By the end of February, the Congolese army and its allies, which include Burundian troops, were waiting for M23 in Uvira, the third largest city in the Kivus. M23 faces little resistance from the DRC army, whose soldiers reportedly committed atrocities while retreating, according to residents.
These recent developments came just weeks after the collapse of the Luanda peace process in December 2024. Rwanda had called for direct negotiations between the DRC and M23, but Kinshasa rejected the proposal, viewing M23 as a proxy for Rwanda.
Amid the ongoing violence, Congolese Tutsi communities in the DRC are particularly vulnerable. The Tutsi Banyarwanda, despite having lived in eastern Congo for generations, are due to their use of Kinyarwanda and historical ties to Rwanda, often excluded and associated with Rwandan nationality. Since Congo’s independence they have suffered targeted violence. Some have joined Tutsi rebellions, which has further fuelled accusations of complicity in the violence.
These underlying tensions and violent rhetoric against Tutsi Banyarwanda is further amplified by both Rwandan and Congolese authorities. Discourse instigating hatred, violence and discrimination against Kinyarwanda speakers both Rwandan and Congolese, especially Tutsis calling on them to return to Rwanda, has become more common since the resurfacing of M23. Their situation in eastern Congo remains highly precarious, there is growing concern over the risk of genocide as violence continues to spread.
If the conflict is not addressed, a wider regional conflict may ensue, as it did in the Congo wars of the 1990s and 2000s when various African countries fought on either side. The involvement of Burundian troops in South Kivu and ongoing fighting near the country’s border, increases this risk, analysts suggest. Recent reports indicate Burundian troops have begun to withdraw.
Ugandan forces have also entered the DRC and taken control of Bunia, the capital of Ituri Province, which they justify as an action against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). However, M23’s advances in that direction and Ugandan and Rwandan engagement in the prior war has fueled suspicions of coordination between the M23, Rwanda, and Uganda.
About 2,000 troops from the SADC mission have been confined to their bases in Goma and Sake since the M23 takeover. Analysts fear they may be used as leverage over South Africa and other troop contributing countries, further heightening regional tensions. DRC has also reportedly requested assistance from Chad.
All of these developments have been accompanied by serious abuses. Over 7,000 people have been killed since late January according to DRC’s Prime Minister Judith Suminwa. The situation is deteriorating quickly, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed cases of summary executions of children by M23 forces when overtaking Bukavu, cases of children in possession of weapons, cases of ill treatment, conflict-related gender and sexual violence, child and forced recruitment, among others. Human rights defenders and journalists, fear reprisals for their defense of human rights, and arbitrary arrests and detentions continue to be reported.
International response:
The international community has been calling for a de-escalation of the situation as well as a ceasefire and return to negotiations. The UN Security Council has met four times to discuss the situation. The main dispute among Council Members revolves around external actors’ involvement in the conflict. While countries like France, the UK, and the US have criticized Rwanda’s role, others have been more reserved. Recently, more members condemned Rwanda’s support for M23 and called for troop withdrawal. However, the A3 plus group (comprising Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Guyana) have remained cautious, only once calling on Rwanda to withdraw its troops before returning to a more neutral position.
On 20 February, the US sanctioned two individuals linked to the conflict: James Kabarebe, Rwanda’s Minister of State for Regional Integration, and Lawrence Kanyuka Kingston, a senior M23 member and spokesperson for the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a Congolese rebel coalition of which M23 is the principal member. The DRC supported the sanctions, urging other nations to follow, while Rwanda condemned the move as “unjustified and unfounded.”
The UK announced it would suspend all direct bilateral aid to Rwanda with exception of aid for those most vulnerable as well as suspend future defence training assistance and review their export license for the Rwandan army.
On a continental level, the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) convened to discuss the situation, calling for an immediate ceasefire and convening of humanitarian corridors. The AU Peace and Security Council also held a meeting mid-February at the level of Heads of State and Government calling for an immediate ceasefire and a return to negotiations.
Sudan
Fighting has intensified in Sudan over the last month, with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) making progress in retaking Al Jazira, breaking the RSF siege of El Obeid and in the capital.
Darfur also remains a key conflict zone, with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continuing to attack El Fasher, the last part of Darfur held by the government and their allies, the combined forces of former Darfur rebel groups who signed the 2020 peace agreement known as the Joint Forces.
Civilians are caught in the crossfire. The humanitarian crisis in Zamzam, Sudan’s largest camp for internally displaced persons (IDP’s), reached catastrophic levels following RSF attacks on 11 and 12 February. The camp houses approximately half a million people who are survivors of previous atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s. The camp has been experiencing famine conditions since at least August 2024.
RSF forces launched a brutal assault on the camp, resulting in at least 31 deaths, over 80 injuries, and thousands displaced, and widespread damage to property, including the destruction of the main market and looting of vehicles. The RSF also reportedly blocked escape routes and disrupted cellular and internet services, cutting off emergency communications and impeding the documentation of these attacks. The Joint Forces intervened and successfully repelled the assault, but the heightened violence has impeded humanitarian relief.
The destruction of vital resources like the main market has further restricted access to food, water and essential supplies. Healthcare facilities are overwhelmed, and the high cost of medicines has made treatments unaffordable for many, MSF was forced to suspend all their activities in the camp, including the field hospital, due to insecurity, leaving a vulnerable population without basic care. The attack on Zamzam is part of a broader RSF strategy linked to the ongoing siege of El Fasher and the targeting of non-Arab communities, raising grave concerns about escalating ethnic cleansing and the risk of genocide.
SAF has made major advances both in Khartoum. SAF’s recapture of Khartoum would mark a significant victory, but is also unlikely to bring the conflict closer to ending. The International Crisis Group argued that although SAF’s takeover could be welcomed by Khartoum residents and allow for greater access of humanitarian aid, it could also allow RSF to place its full attention on the El Fasher front, increasing risk there. There have also been concerning reports of reprisal attacks on ethnic groups and individuals (including humanitarian volunteers) seen as sympathetic to the RSF in the wake of SAF advances in Al Jazira, and there is concern that such attacks could be replicated in the capital if SAF regains control
SAF also made notorious gains in North Kordofan state where they broke the seige of el-Obeid, a strategic point as it is located at the crossroads of several key routes linking western and southern Sudan to Khartoum. Analysts suggest that SAF aims to use El-Obeid as a launching pad for operations in RSF controlled Darfur. SAF also ramped up operations across Al Jazira and Sennar states, recapturing Wad Madani, the capital of Al Jazira, a key city south of Khartoum located at the crossroads of crucial supply routes.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, warned about ethnically targeted attacks in Al Jazira as RSF and SAF battle for control, indicating that “the situation is now taking a further, even more dangerous turn” with retaliation attacks based on actual or perceived ethnic identities are along with a rise in hate speech and incitement to violence.
Concerns have been raised about a de-facto partition, as the two sides and their supporters become more entrenched in their respective territories. Recent attempts by RSF to establish a parallel government with alleged Kenyan backing and the increasing alignment of Sudan’s civilian politicians and other armed factions with either of the warring parties increases this risk.
A severe cholera outbreak took place in the city of Kosti, Sudan’s White Nile State, where at least 58 people lost their lives in only three days due to contaminated drinking water, after the shutdown of the main water station following the RSF targeting of the electricity station. The situation is worsened by the extensive infrastructure damage and widespread displacement product of the ongoing fighting.
In December 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee confirmed that famine conditions continue in Zamzam camp in North Darfur and have spread to other IDP sites in North Darfur, including Al Salam and Abu Shouk camps, as well as the Western Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan State.
This is worsened by the withdrawal of humanitarian assistance previously provided by USAID, which constitutes an estimated 30% of the total, already underfunded, international humanitarian response. Despite the severity of the situation, the international response has been lacking. Without a strong and decisive intervention, the potential for further atrocities increases.
International response:
In early January 2025, then-US Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared that RSF and allied militias committed genocide in Sudan, this came a month after he had declared that both warring parties had committed war crimes, and that RSF and allied Arab militias had committed crimes against humanity. This was followed by sanctions on RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti), along with seven RSF-owned companies in the UAE and an individual involved in securing weapons for the group.
The US Department of State also sanctioned SAF’s leader Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, as well as a company and one individual involved in weapons procurement for SAF.
On January 24, US President Trump’s executive order halting all USAID funding forced the closure of almost 80% of the emergency food kitchens affecting two million people.
In February, the Security Council was briefed on the situation in Sudan and the Council expressed concern about the ongoing humanitarian crisis and called on the international community to do more to alleviate the suffering. Various delegates called for a ceasefire ahead of the month of Ramadan, including the A3 plus, indicating that “African solutions and African-owned initiatives must continue to play a leading role.”
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also called for a Ramadan ceasefire, yet the government rejected the call, viewing the UAE as an aggressor in the conflict due to its role in supplying military equipment to the RSF.
Sudan is now the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world” according to African Union officials, 12 million people are currently displaced and two thirds of the country’s 47.5 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.
The International Criminal Court indicated that it has made substantial progress in investigating crimes within its remit and indicated it is seeking arrest warrants for people accused of atrocities in Darfur.
