Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to detect increasing tendencies or opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers developments in:
- Mozambique
- Nigeria
- Somalia
- Sudan
Mozambique
Mozambique continues to face post-election violence. Protesters took to the streets after the presidential election, in which Mozambique Liberation Front’s (FRELIMO) candidate, Daniel Chapo, was declared the victor and FRELIMO gained an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. FRELIMO, which has been in power since the country’s independence, has lost much of the public support it once enjoyed as citizens demand greater democratic space.
The Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS), an anti-establishment party founded by FRELIMO defectors and led by Venâncio Mondlane, has accused FRELIMO of electoral fraud, claiming to be the rightful winners of the election.
Allegations of a lack of transparency in the tabulation and counting of votes have marred the electoral process for years, and have been present in each election since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1994. The European Union observer mission highlighted irregularities in October’s elections, including the alteration of some results. Just days after the election, Mondlane’s lawyer, Elvino Dias, who was preparing a legal challenge to contest the results, was killed alongside a PODEMOS parliamentary candidate. These events fueled widespread frustration, sparking protests across Mozambique, with several opposition parties including Mondlane calling to protest.
Mozambican security forces were deployed to suppress the protests, using tear gas, live ammunition, and rubber bullets with little regard for the safety of civilians. At least 110 people have been killed since the protests began. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has highlighted the extreme violence inflicted on children caught in demonstrations. According to a report dated 24 November, Mozambican security forces have been implicated in killing at least 10 children and injuring dozens, including some being arbitrarily detained for several days, often without their families being informed in violation of international human rights law.
Unlawful arrests have been ongoing. The Mozambican government admitted to detaining over 400 individuals related to the protests on charges of public disorder, looting, property destruction, and attacking a police station. However, the number is believed to be much higher. In early November, the Mozambican Bar Association (OAM) indicated it had successfully secured the release of 2,700 individuals illegally detained during demonstrations. The ongoing violence is a clear violation of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Civil society has been calling on concerned governments to press Mozambican authorities to stop unnecessary and excessive use of force, especially concerning children and bystanders. HRW urged the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to publicly condemn the Mozambican authorities and establish a fact-finding mission to seek accountability in accordance with international standards.
Protests halted in December after Cyclone “Chido” hit the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Nampula, causing at least 15 deaths, damaging over 5,000 homes, and affecting more than 100,000 people. Mondlane addressed the crisis in a live social media broadcast and offered to pause protests until 22 December, after which they are expected to resume, coinciding with the expected announcement of the final parliamentary election results by the Constitutional Council.
Efforts to resolve the post-election crisis were initiated after serving President Filipe Nyusi (FRELIMO) invited all four candidates from the October 9 presidential election to engage in dialogue. However, the process stalled due to the absence of Venâncio Mondlane, who is currently in exile after arrest warrants were issued against him on charges related to state security.
The current unrest in Mozambique is not just a response to recent electoral outcomes but is deeply rooted in the country’s violent history. After gaining independence, following a 10-year war, the country became a one-party Marxist-Leninist government under FRELIMO which led to a brutal civil war against the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) from 1977 to 1992. The war left hundreds of thousands dead and widespread destruction. A peace accord in 1992 led to multiparty elections in 1994. However, FRELIMO has remained in power since then, and despite espousing democratic ideals, has maintained tight control over state institutions, leaving unresolved grievances that continue to fuel political tension and unrest. These are among the most intense protests Mozambique has seen since adopting multiparty democracy, shedding light on the deep-seated political discontent within the country.
The ongoing protests highlight deep-rooted social tensions and bring to the surface long-standing resentment over past and unresolved grievances. The longer the situation remains unaddressed, the greater the risk of escalating violence, potentially reaching the scale of mass atrocities. The international community must recognise the urgency of the situation and take meaningful action to prevent further harm.
Mozambique also continues to face severe attacks from Al-Shabaab jihadist insurgents in the northern Cabo Delgado province. It is estimated 4,000 civilians have been killed by the insurgency since its beginning in 2017.
International response:
On 16-20 November 2024, SADC convened an extraordinary summit in Harare to address the situation in Mozambique. While SADC pledged to collaborate with Mozambique to ensure peace, security, and stability through the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, no mention was made of the unlawful use of force by the Mozambican security forces
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk called for the de-escalation of post-election tensions and urged for the post-election grievances to be resolved peacefully through inclusive dialogue and independent judicial processes, consistent with human rights and the rule of law.
The United Nations called for an investigation into an incident following a social media video circulating online showing a military vehicle driving over a civilian as she stood behind a banner supporting opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane.
Nigeria
Nigerian authorities and media outlets have been sounding the alarm about the existence of a new jihadist group named the Lakurawa. On 6 November, the group reportedly killed 15 people in Kebbi state, prompting the Nigerian Defence Headquarters to officially confirm the existence of the group in the states of Sokoto and Kebbi. Authorities linked the group to neighboring Mali and Niger due to the disruption of military cooperation between Nigeria and Niger following the 2023 military coup in Niger which made it easier for jihadist groups to infiltrate Nigerian territory. However, evidence suggests that Lakurawa is not a new group, but rather has been active for years. Some critics argue that the government’s portrayal of the group as a new threat may be an attempt to avoid the appearance of having neglected the issue. Research conducted by Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, an associate professor of peace and conflict studies at Usmanu Danfodiyo University in Sokoto, documented activity by the group in various communities along the Nigeria-Niger border since 1999.
In 2016 and 2017, the group was recruited by Zamfara local traditional leaders and tasked with protecting local communities from armed bandits. This expansion led to a significant transformation in their structures and forms of operation. Zamfara communities initially welcomed them, but the relationship quickly soured when the group started demanding levies from community members imposing Islamic law, and accusing the leaders of misappropriating funds that belonged to them. These tensions with the local leaders ended with the killing of the district head of Balle.
The group’s repeated attacks on military formations in border towns led to a joint operation between the Nigerian and Nigerien militaries in late 2018, which halted the attacks according to a study conducted by Rufa’i, Barnett, and Abdulaziz. However, some locals reported continued sightings of the group in the area, which could indicate that they had simply shifted their focus away from military formations. Rufa’i, Barnett, and Abdulaziz linked the group with al-Qaeda.
The Lakurawa is one of the few terrorist organizations globally composed of herders, who promote their own interpretation of Islam and aim to establish a caliphate. Their first significant attack took place in August this year, when they targeted a military base in Sokoto, killing three soldiers and setting a vehicle on fire. The group primarily focuses its attacks on government security forces, armed vigilantes, and other armed militants; mostly sparing civilians except those it considers spies. The group has increased its power in the territories it occupies by preaching in public spaces, imposing levies on herders, and punishing civilians for activities they deem un-Islamic, such as playing music or dancing. The group is thought to have around 300 recruits.
Authorities have described this as the first attempt of the Sahelian jihadists to gain a foothold in Nigeria. The government indicated that it is addressing the situation and tracking the group’s activities. In August, Nigeria’s chief of defense staff visited Niger to strengthen military cooperation and security.
The increasing reliance of communities on groups like the Lakurawa for protection highlights a significant gap in the ability of the state to provide protection. The failure to prevent such groups from infiltrating communities only makes them more vulnerable. The growing presence of violent groups in Nigeria’s northwest is complicating counterinsurgency efforts. Many of the region’s attacks have been attributed to bandits, often seen as criminal gangs focused on robbery and kidnapping, however, groups like the Lakurawas challenge the distinction between criminal and terrorist activities. Analysts argue that there is a need for a better understanding of the security challenges in the region, as oversimplifying the violence as mere banditry risks overlooking the rise of more organised, ideologically-driven threats.
While terrorism and banditry continue to destabilize North West Nigeria, MSF warned of “extremely critical” malnutrition levels in the region. In Katsina, malnutrition rose from 22% in 2022 to 30% in 2024, and hospitalizations increased by 50% in 2024 compared to the previous year. Katsina, Jibia, and Mashi local government areas (LGAs) are among those most affected. This worsening crisis reflects broader humanitarian challenges across northern Nigeria that, if unaddressed, could lead to an even deeper crisis. The ongoing hunger crisis is linked to the weakened economy, high inflation, and poor agricultural yields, worsened by ongoing insecurity and climate shocks which have disrupted livelihoods and supply chains.
The longstanding insecurity in Nigeria has drawn the attention of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which opened a preliminary examination in the country in 2010. After a decade of examination, the then-prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed. Four years on, however, the court has not opened an investigation nor made any move to otherwise close the case, leaving victims frustrated and dismayed. On December 2, 2024, Amnesty International submitted a legal petition urging the ICC to address the delay in launching an investigation. The petition highlights how the ICC has failed to act since concluding the preliminary examination, leaving the situation in legal limbo, with no significant progress made in holding perpetrators accountable. The ICC should ensure timely attention to all cases, and this long-delayed situation must no longer be ignored.
Somalia
Tensions within the Somali government and ongoing clan rivalries have created a fragile environment, undermining effective governance and security. As the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) prepares to withdraw, the uncertainty over military support and succession is worsening the situation. Al-Shabaab is capitalizing on these tensions, and the ongoing electoral reforms could further expose civilians to attacks.
Somalia is undergoing an electoral reform to transition from its clan-based indirect voting system to a direct voting model. In October, members of the National Consultative Council (NCC) met to discuss the implementation of its May 2023 decision to adopt a one-person-one-vote system for the 2026 national and regional elections. As part of the reform, the government proposed a one-year extension for the current presidents of Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, and Southwest states, all members of the NCC. Analysts from ACLED suggest that this extension could impact the election process, allowing state presidents to appoint allies to key positions in, inter alia state election commissions, potentially influencing their re-election chances. The proposal has faced opposition from the states of Jubaland and Puntland.
Somalia’s current clan-based voting system allows clans to play a powerful political role. The proposed changes, although they represent a shift towards a more inclusive and democratic electoral process, risk further exacerbating existing clan rivalries by disrupting the current sharing of political power among the four major clans and “minority” groups. Top positions in the federal government are reserved for the Hawiye and Darod – the two largest Somali clans. If these changes are implemented without political consensus, they could lead to instability and violence in the lead-up to the elections in 2025-2026. In addition, al-Shabaab has consistently targeted clan delegates, election centres, and electoral officials to disrupt the voting process, and adopting a one-person-one-vote system could present additional challenges to security by increasing the number of potential targets, particularly in areas under al-Shabaab’s control and risk excluding those populations or delaying elections.
There was an increase in attacks conducted by al-Shabaab targeting civilian businesses in Mogadishu between October and November, following the Somali government’s mandate for the use of CCTV cameras. This measure aimed to prevent al-Shabaab operatives from extorting money from businesses operating in the capital as a form of tax. In response, the Islamist group ordered businesses not to comply with the government’s directives. The latest attacks have left business owners fearing retaliation.
The Somali government continued to conduct military operations against al-Shabaab. Clashes escalated in October, and ACLED reported a 35% rise in armed battles compared to the previous month, marking the highest levels since September 2022. Military operations took place in the Lower Shabelle, Galgaduud, Lower Juba, and Middle Shabelle regions and targeted senior al-Shabaab leaders. Despite the government’s efforts in regaining territorial control and combating the insurgent group, in 2024 al-Shabab reversed all gains made in central Somalia over the last two years according to US defence officials, although Somalia’s national security advisor Hussein Sheik-Ali disagreed with the assessment.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud continued to strengthen military ties with neighbouring Eritrea and Egypt, both historical rivals of Ethiopia. In October, leaders from Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea met in Asmara, strengthening what analysts view as an emerging “axis against Ethiopia.” This came after Egypt’s first delivery of military aid to Somalia in over four decades, which took place in August. Egypt and Somalia’s relations with Ethiopia have deteriorated in recent years, leading to closer security cooperation between Cairo and Mogadishu. Ethiopia is currently one of the top contributors to the AU’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) whose mandate comes to an end in December 2024 and it is unlikely Egypt will be able to replace Ethiopia’s troop contributions. The growing tensions between Egypt, Somalia, and Ethiopia could affect ongoing efforts to combat al-Shabaab. Currently, Somalia’s push to replace Ethiopian troops with Egyptian forces is complicating plans for the ATMIS’ withdrawal and replacement mission, the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Ethiopia is reluctant to withdraw due to its security interests and if AUSSOM does not materialise it risks creating a security vacuum. This could allow al-Shabaab to expand its control in Somalia and potentially the region. Additionally, Somalia’s call for Ethiopian forces to withdraw caused internal divisions between the federal government and Jubaland and South West states.
Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia deteriorated following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland granting Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s ports in exchange for recognizing its independence in January 2024. Although direct large-scale conflict is unlikely at this stage, proxy battles could intensify instability in the Horn of Africa. President Mohamud also signed a defence cooperation agreement with Uganda which is part of a larger MoU on defence and cooperation between both countries.
Signs of piracy have re-emerged off the Somali coast with a steady build-up of pirate activity since late 2023, signalling a broader security vacuum and raising concerns about the effectiveness of traditional counter-piracy measures. The increase can be attributed in part to local fishermen’s frustration at overfishing by foreign vessels and the lack of regulation by the government. As local frustration grows, pirates may gain increased sympathy, support, and potential recruits from coastal communities in Somalia. At its height, there were up to 200 attacks annually.
Until 2022, the UN Security Council had authorised international naval forces to combat piracy off the Somali coast, including allowing foreign navies to operate in Somali territorial waters. Piracy had significantly declined, and the UNSC shifted responsibility for maritime security to Somalia and its neighbours. However, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) argues that recent piracy may prompt new modes of support in the absence of UNSC mandates and Somalia’s 2025-2026 seat at the UN Security Council could be used to push for capacity building and sustainable solutions to piracy in the region rather than solely relying on foreign military intervention.
Elections were held in Jubaland in late November, resulting in the re-election of State President Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe. Mogadishu opposed the election process, which was conducted indirectly rather than through a one-person, one-vote system. After the elections, Mogadishu accused Madobe of treason and collaborating with foreign powers to destabilize Somalia. In response, Jubaland’s court issued an arrest warrant for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, charging him with treason and inciting rebellion. Federal forces were deployed to the region and clashed with those of Jubaland. These latest developments further intensified the already strained relationship between the Jubaland administration and Somalia’s federal government and shed light on a deepening political crisis.
In Somaliland, opposition leader “Irro”, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi,of the Wadani Party took almost 64% of the votes in the general election. The election was originally supposed to take place in 2022, but was delayed for two years. President Muse Bihi Abdi of the ruling Kulmiye Party had aimed for a second term in office following seven years in power.
During the campaign, Irro stated that his party would reassess the MoU signed with Ethiopia in January this year through which Somaliland would grant Ethiopia access to a stretch of coastline in exchange for recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state. The MoU prompted significant pushback from Mogadishu. Although Irro has never outright rejected the deal, his use of diplomatic language when discussing it could suggest he may be considering a change.
Bihi and Irro expressed hope that the incoming Trump administration in the US will reassess its policy towards Somaliland.
International response:
The UN Security Council authorised the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to the UN Country Team over a two-year period, after terminating its mandate in October 2026. The new United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia will provide support for state-building, including the constitutional review and conducting free and fair elections. The Transitional Mission shall deliver the first phase of the transition until 31 October 2025.
The new African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) is set to begin in January 2025, following the expiration of ATMIS’ mandate at the end of this year. AUSSOM’s priority will be to strengthen the Somali Security Forces and focus on capacity building, with the mission expected to conclude by 2029. However, there is a risk that if coordination between AUSSOM and ATMIS is not properly managed, a security vacuum could emerge, which al-Shabaab may exploit. This risk is further complicated by the ongoing disputes between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Egypt.
Sudan
The dynamics of the Sudanese conflict shifted notably with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launching a major offensive, regaining control of several strategic areas that had been under the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Simultaneously, now-former RSF commander Abu Aqla Keikel, defected with troops from Gezira state to join SAF on 20 October. In response, the RSF initiated a violent reprisal campaign in Gezira state, where according to ACLED, political violence more than doubled in October compared to the previous month and over 75% of the incidents involved the targeting of civilians. According to Gezira residents, RSF branded civilians in the area as supporters of Keikel and punished them for his defection. The violence resulted in over 260 reported civilian deaths and forced more than 47,000 people to flee their homes.
SAF’s major offensives targeted Khartoum, Sennar and Gezira, for the first time seizing control of several RSF positions, forcing the paramilitary group to go on the defensive. In greater Khartoum, RSF counterattacked.
The siege on El Fasher continued, SAF and its allied Joint Forces pushed back RSF positions, clashes took place throughout the city and refugee camps such as Abu Shouk, Naivasha and Zamzam all experienced shellings, leaving no safe space for civilians in North Darfur. Zamzam is the largest displacement camp in the country which harbours about half a million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Since late November, attacks targeting the camp have been ongoing with civilians and some civil society blaming RSF. RSF has denied responsibility for attacking the camp. However, RSF proxies have defended their involvement in clashes near Zamzam, claiming that their actions were directed against armed groups operating alongside Sudan’s army. The ongoing acts could amount to war crimes. By 20 December at least 80 people had been killed in Zamzam and the camp is currently experiencing famine.
Sexual and gender based violence has been rampant since fighting erupted. Human Rights Watch has documented extensive abuses in and around Habila and Fayu in South Kordofan, including large-scale killings, abductions, civilian injuries, widespread looting, and arson. These atrocities, along with pervasive sexual violence, highlight the RSF’s systematic attacks on civilians in the state. Harrowing accounts of sexual violence have emerged, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Numerous cases of rape, including instances of sexual slavery perpetrated by the RSF and allied militias have been documented. These acts, which constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity, highlight the pressing need for decisive international action to protect civilians and ensure justice for the victims.
In late October, a new militia called the “Eastern Corps” emerged in Kassala State, raising concerns about the potential regional expansion of the conflict. The group is largely composed of members from the Beni Amir community and aligned with the Popular Front for Liberation and Justice. It is also believed to have backing from Eritrea. This development heightened tensions among local communities and raised fears that violence could spread to one of the few remaining relatively peaceful regions in Sudan.
The escalating hunger crisis in Sudan continues to claim lives daily. It has been 19 months of relentless conflict, an estimated 24 million people, half of the country’s population, are in urgent need of food, with some parts of the country experiencing famine. Humanitarian access remains obstructed by the warring factions, exacerbating this man-made catastrophe and leaving countless communities on the verge of starvation.
More than 27,120 people have been reported killed across Sudan and over 11 million people have been forcibly displaced, with more than 8.1 million remaining within Sudan’s borders. This represents the largest displacement crisis globally.
International response:
In October, the AU Peace and Security Council convened to discuss a report from a field mission to Egypt and Port Sudan. They condemned the grave humanitarian crisis and called for the mobilisation of humanitarian assistance to Sudan. They also demanded RSF lift the siege on El Fasher and called for a Sudanese-owned solution to the conflict.
On 18 November, the UN Security Council was unable to adopt a draft resolution co-authored by the UK and Sierra Leone, which sought to implement measures for protecting civilians in Sudan. Although 14 Council members supported the resolution, Russia vetoed it, expressing concerns that it could undermine Sudan’s sovereignty and emphasizing the importance of consulting with the Sudanese government before taking any on-the-ground actions.
Russia’s veto shed light on the internal Council divisions. Russia justified using its veto power by arguing the resolution misrepresented responsibility for civilian protection and border security and warned that deploying foreign forces without Sudan’s consent could harm trust in the UN. It also rejected external accountability mechanisms like the ICC, insisting that justice should be Sudan’s sovereign responsibility. Russia further accused some countries of applying “double standards” by advocating for ceasefires in Sudan while ignoring violations in Gaza.
In response, the US condemned Russia for obstructing efforts in the Security Council and advancing its own political agenda by playing both sides of the conflict and accused it of inconsistency, noting its opposition to a resolution backed by African nations, and its own violations of Ukrainian sovereignty.
The lack of implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, coupled with the failure of mediation initiatives to achieve meaningful breakthroughs, has left Sudan trapped in an ongoing cycle of violence with no clear path to resolution.
Both the EU and the US imposed additional sanctions. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Mirghani Idris Suleiman (Idris) for leading SAF efforts to procure weapons for use in its ongoing conflict with the RSF. On the other hand, on 16 December, the European Union (EU) announced sanctions against four senior officials from the SAF and RSF, citing their roles in actions undermining peace, stability, and Sudan’s political transition.
