Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in preventing mass atrocities in Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers:
- Ethiopia: warning signs of a return to war intensify
- Mali: Armed groups sustain offensive and the government struggles to address the situation
- Somalia: political tensions take on a military dimension
Ethiopia: warning signs of a return to war intensify
Summary: Political fragmentation and increasing military mobilisation in Tigray continue to threaten peace. Recent fighting in Western Tigray, forced recruitment and shifting alliances increase the risk of return to war. Meanwhile conflict continues in Amhara and Oromia.
The political crisis in Tigray documented in previous months is increasingly taking on a military dimension. After the TPLF’s decision in May to restore the pre-war regional government, the region now has two competing authorities: the TPLF administration under Debretsion Gebremichael and the federally recognised interim administration headed by Tadesse Worede. If not addressed, these increasing political tensions could develop into confrontation not only between Tigray and the federal government, but also between rival Tigrayan factions.
There have also been increased signs of military mobilisation. In July, Human Rights Watch reported that authorities had been forcibly recruiting civilians, including children as young as 15, since April. Former combatants and men and boys who have not previously fought have reportedly been abducted and recruited into the Tigrayan Defence Forces (TDF). This indicates that they are preparing for confrontation.
Fighting took place in early August in Western Tigray, when federal and TPLF-aligned forces fought the federal Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and allied Amhara militias in Shererina in Western Tigray, reportedly using heavy artillery and drones. Hundreds of civilians fled across the border into Sudan. Both the TPLF and ENDF accused the other of initiating the confrontation. The status of the territory, which is claimed by both Tigrayan and Amhara authorities,has remained unresolved since the 2022 peace agreement. This, taken alongside the ongoing recruitment, represents a serious escalation that, if it remains unaddressed, could trigger renewed large-scale war. (Fighting also took place earlier this year, for more information please see our April and May monitors)
Existing tensions with neighbouring countries further complicate the situation. Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain strained, while the war in Sudan is increasingly entangled with Ethiopia’s internal conflicts. In May, Ethiopia accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of supporting TPLF-linked mercenaries, while Sudan accused Ethiopia of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), including by allowing drone strikes to be launched from their territory. Eritrea, meanwhile, has aligned itself with the SAF and reportedly strengthened ties with Tigrayan actors (for further information please see our May monitor).
Elsewhere, conflicts in Amhara and Oromia continue. In Amhara, the 1 June elections produced the most intense day of fighting between the Amhara Fano militia and government forces since the conflict began in 2023. ACLED recorded more than 90 clashes after Fano launched an operation aimed at disrupting the vote. Although the conflict de-escalated, fighting continued throughout June and July, particularly in Gojjam. In Oromia, clashes between government forces and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) also continued. Around election day, OLA fighters attacked civilians, predominantly Orthodox Christians, and reportedly destroyed more than 200 properties in Arsi Zone.
In the June elections, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party secured 438 of 486 seats in the federal parliament, but voting did not take place in Tigray and parts of Amhara and Oromia due to insecurity. The government then launched the National Dialogue in Addis in mid-July, bringing together more than 4,000 participants to discuss issues including constitutional reform, national identity and self-determination. The process provides an opportunity for political dialogue and to reinforce demands for accountability and transitional justice. However, the efficacy of this process remains questioned as major armed and political actors, including the TPLF, OLA and Fano, are not part of it.
Currently, Ethiopia faces not only the possibility of renewed war in Tigray and/or escalation in Amhara or Oromia, but the risk that escalation in one region could interact with the country’s other conflicts. Given the scale of violations committed during the 2020–2022 war and the unaddressed political tensions, renewed large-scale fighting carries a serious risk of mass atrocity crimes.
International response:
The United States announced visa restrictions against high-ranking TPLF members and their immediate families, targeting individuals it considers responsible for undermining efforts to resolve the crisis in Tigray. US Ambassador to Ethiopia Ervin J. Massinga also travelled to Tigray to engage with humanitarian, political and civil society actors and called for dialogue and full implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). Despite these steps, the US response has faced criticism for being largely limited.
The African Union renewed diplomatic engagement by AU Horn of Africa envoy Olusegun Obasanjo who travelled to Mekelle and met TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael in June. Discussions focused on preventing a return to war and implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. Obasanjo described the talks as productive and aimed at reducing tensions and creating conditions for lasting peace.
Mali: Armed groups sustain offensive and the government struggles to address the situation
Summary: JNIM and allied forces have sustained their nationwide offensive, launching new coordinated attacks across northern, central and southern Mali while continuing to put pressure on Bamako. The US is considering direct involvement.
The escalation in Mali has continued, with armed groups sustaining pressure across the country following the major coordinated offensive launched in April (for more information please check out our May monitor). On 4 July, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg separatist forces launched another coordinated offensive, attacking military positions in Aguelhok, Anéfis and Gao in northern Mali, Sévaré in central Mali and Kéniéroba in the south. The attacks, occurring more than two months after the groups simultaneously targeted Bamako, Kidal and several other locations, demonstrate their continued ability to coordinate operations across long distances and the government’s inability to contain the threat.
These latest attacks come as JNIM continues its broader campaign to pressure the government, including through the ongoing blockade of Bamako and disruption of key supply routes into the capital. Rather than subsiding following the April attacks, the insurgency has maintained momentum and expanded to areas previously considered to be under stronger government control. At the same time, the security situation in northern Mali has become increasingly fragmented. Russia’s Africa Corps has reportedly withdrawn from several northern areas, including Kidal, Tessalit and Aguelhok, weakening support for the government. As JNIM has continued to expand its operations, the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) has begun exploiting the security vacuum in border areas.
The latest developments reinforce concerns that Mali’s security crisis is becoming increasingly difficult to contain, leaving international leaders questioning if and how to address the situation. The April offensive was not an isolated demonstration of JNIM’s capabilities: the group maintained pressure on Bamako and subsequently participated in other coordinated offensives across the country. The continued expansion of armed group operations leaves civilians increasingly exposed to violence, restrictions on movement and disruption of essential supplies, while the multiplication of armed actors and military responses increases the possibility of further civilian harm.
International response:
The continued attacks have raised questions about the capacity of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, to address the situation. Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu linked insecurity in Nigeria to spillover from AES countries. AES governments rejected the accusation and emphasised that jihadist violence constitutes a shared regional threat.
Mali is also diversifying its international security partnerships. Following Russia’s Africa Corps’ setbacks, Mali has sought support from other partners. Turkey has pledged further drone support, while Mali has also engaged China and Iran on security cooperation. The government has publicly acknowledged support from Russia, China, Turkey, Morocco and Senegal, suggesting the creation of a broader network of security partners.
At the same time, reports surfaced that the United States is considering targeted airstrikes against JNIM, and potentially ISSP. Supporters of possible US intervention argue that JNIM’s growing strength and geographic expansion require a stronger response, particularly following the withdrawal of French forces, MINUSMA and European training missions and the inability of Russian forces to reverse the insurgency. The Malian government has, however, indicated that so far there has been no official confirmation from Washington and assure that it is capable of addressing the situation.
There are also significant questions regarding what additional military intervention could achieve. Abdoulmoumouni Abbas, an expert on preventing radicalisation in the Sahel said that while targeted strikes could weaken JNIM’s leadership and operational structures, they would not address underlying drivers of the conflict, including weak institutions, poverty and intercommunal tensions. Any US intervention would also carry wider geopolitical implications given Russia’s growing role in Mali and across the Sahel. Without either an effective security response or a viable political pathway towards de-escalation, the conflict risks becoming further entrenched, increasing instability and leaving civilians at risk of mass atrocity crimes.
Somalia: political tensions take on a military dimension
Summary: Armed clashes between government and opposition-aligned forces in Mogadishu and an escalating standoff between the federal government and Puntland risk creating new focus points of crisis while the broader conflict with Al-Shabaab continues. In this context there is increased uncertainty around the future of AUSSOM, which if not properly addressed, risks creating further security gaps.
In March, the Somali parliament approved constitutional amendments that replace the existing indirect electoral system (where clan elders and political delegates select members of parliament and, indirectly, the president) with direct elections, at least for some offices. They also extend the mandates of the president and parliament from four to five years, thus postponing national elections for a year. Opposition leaders rejected the changes calling them unconstitutional, arguing that they were adopted without broad consensus and in violation of the existing transitional constitution, and accused President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (known as Farmaajo) of using the reform to consolidate power and shape the next elections to his advantage. Puntland and Jubbaland are part of the opposition Somali Future Council (SFC), which has threatened to establish parallel governance structures if the federal government proceeds with its current agenda.
These tensions have already resulted in violence. On 3 June, clashes broke out in Mogadishu between federal security forces and militias aligned with the opposition. Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, both opponents of the constitutional changes, said that government forces targeted their homes.
The political crisis is also exacerbating tensions between the federal government and Puntland. Tensions erupted in mid-June when the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) appointed a new commander of the Somali National Army’s (SNA’s) 54th Division, based in Garowe (the capital of Puntland). The appointment was reportedly the first time under the current federal framework that the FGS had unilaterally appointed an SNA divisional commander in Puntland. Puntland rejected the appointment and ordered its security forces to restrict the movement of SNA and other federal-aligned forces in the state. Also, the FGS has reportedly sought to recruit SNA personnel within Puntland and establish a new SNA unit in Bosaso outside Puntland’s command structures. Puntland has responded by arresting SNA officers involved in recruitment and deploying additional forces around Galkayo and Bosaso.
The dispute is rooted in broader disagreements over the balance of power between the federal government and states. Puntland considers the government’s current electoral and constitutional changes an attempt to centralise power and undermine its autonomy. The situation in Puntland is not an isolated dispute, other states have also been having similar issues with the FGS. In South West State, the federal government was involved in replacing the state president earlier this year. Similarly in Galmudug and Hirshabelle it deployed forces to the state capitals to pressure the regional presidents.
These divisions come as Somali forces remain engaged in conflict with Al-Shabaab, however, these increasing areas of contention are creating a multi-pronged crisis where continued political and military confrontation could cut resources from the fight against Al-Shabaab and provide the group with opportunities to exploit these internal political divisions.
International response:
Türkiye is playing a key role in mediating the ongoing conflict between the FGS and the opposition, relaunching talks withWestern diplomatic missions, the European Union, and the United Nations also taking part. Both parties have agreed to continue the talks, however, it is unclear if the conversations will progress as Türkiye is viewed as close to the federal government and thus not impartial.
Also, there is grave uncertainty over the future of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). On 1 July, the United States said it would not provide funding for AUSSOM beyond this year and that, although it would not prevent the renewal of the mission’s mandate, it would oppose the continuation of UN logistical support. The loss of this support would make the continuation of AUSSOM in its current form effectively untenable unless an alternative arrangement is found.
AUSSOM was expected to progressively transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces, and withdraw at the end of 2029, however, such transfers have already been repeatedly delayed on the argument that Somali forces are not ready. This move could force the transition. The AU now has limited options including maintaining a reduced mission, replacing parts of AUSSOM with regional or bilateral security arrangements, or organising a withdrawal and transition to full Somali responsibility. However, the crisis also creates an opportunity to reconsider the nature of AU engagement in Somalia. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) argues that a predominantly military approach has reached the limits of what it can achieve and should be replaced by a specialised political mission focused on long-term stabilisation. That said, a withdrawal without adequate alternative security arrangements could create an opening for Al-Shabaab and other armed groups. It is clear that any choice will require an orderly transition to avoid deepening the existing insecurity.
