Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers:
- Chad: rising cross-border tensions in a high-risk environment.
- Ethiopia: the risk of return to war.
- Sudan: expanding frontlines and increased risk of atrocities amid limited prospects for peace.
Chad: rising cross-border tensions in a high-risk environment
Summary: Cross-border attacks linked to Sudan’s war killed Chadian soldiers and injured civilians, intensifying the spillover of the Sudanese conflict into an already fragile environment. In a country facing political repression, communal tensions, and large-scale displacement, these developments raise concerns of a widening war.
Chad was already at elevated risk of experiencing mass atrocities. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Early Warning Project ranked Chad the country second most likely to experience new mass killings within the year, with an 8.1% likelihood. This is the second consecutive year that Chad has ranked among the top three countries indicating that risk is not new, but sustained driven by ongoing violence and political instability.
The situation is compounded by cross-border-violence along the shared border with Sudan which intensified in 2026. The Rapid Support Forces, who hold Sudan’s Western Darfur region bordering Chad have long been alleged to be moving weapons and other materiel through Chad, although the government denies this. Fighters reportedly affiliated with RSF have been crossing into Chad in the Wadi Fira province,allegedly recruiting children from the local Tama community and killing civilians. This was followed by attacks on a Chadian army post supposedly in retaliation for support by Zaghawa officers within the Chadian army forSAF-aligned Zaghawa in Darfur, who had reportedly entered Amdjarass in Ennedi-Est province in heavily armed vehicles. Further clashes, apparently between RSF and these SAF aligned armed groups in February resulted in additional military and civilian casualties. In response, the Chadian government announced the closure of its border with Sudan until further notice, allowing only limited humanitarian crossings. In mid-March, the situation escalated further when a drone strike during a funeral in the border town of Al-Tina reportedly killed at least 17 people. In response, Chad’s President Idriss Déby ordered the military to retaliate against attacks originating from Sudan. Since then there has been increased troop deployments along the shared border.
These dynamics and spillover fighting are the more dangerous against the backdrop of the crossborder groups and parallel ethnic and political tensions across Sudan and Chad. The Zaghawa who have been particularly targeted in the RSF’s attack on El Fasher are also not only present in Chad, but play an outsized role in the nation’s power structure. Further, Arab-African tensions have played a key role in conflict in Chad, as they also have in Darfur. This heightens the risk that cross-border confrontations evolve into localised intercommunal tensions or retaliatory violence. Simultaneously, Chad currently hosts more than one million Sudanese refugees which has strained the country’s humanitarian systems and resources, particularly in border provinces. The tension between cross border groups, and their consequences can exacerbate tensions between their compatriots in Chad.
The domestic political environment remains tense. President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, whose family has ruled for more than three decades, consolidated power following a contested 2024 election through constitutional amendments passed in October 2025 extending presidential terms to seven years and removing term limits. These measures, combined with the targeting of political opposition has left little room for dissent. Succès Masra, opposition leader and former prime minister who contested the latest elections, was arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison in August 2025. Reports of intimidation and arrests of activists, party members, and journalists continue to be recorded. When political opposition is silenced and accountability is non-existent, it creates an environment more prone to violence where through abusive or discriminatory security measures.
Intercommunal violence further adds to the risk landscape. Clashes between herders and farming communities, particularly in southern and eastern provinces are ongoing, resulting in fatalities and displacement. The UN recorded 136 conflict deaths in the first half of 2025.
Chad is not currently experiencing nationwide mass atrocities; however, the silencing of political opposition, weak accountability, ongoing communal violence alongside broad communal tensions, large-scale displacement, and spillover from Sudan leave the country in a fragile, multi-pronged crisis where any one of these dynamics could trigger a sharp deterioration.
International response
France and Chad renewed diplomatic engagement in January 2026. A meeting between Macron and Déby took place one year after French troops completed their withdrawal from Chad at N’Djamena’s request. Among the topics discussed were revitalising economic engagement.
In March, experts from the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva, during their review of Chad’s third periodic report, raised concerns about restrictions on civic space, the treatment of political opposition, and persistent impunity for past abuses, despite reported reforms and efforts to strengthen institutions.
Ethiopia: return to full-scale war?
Summary: Renewed fighting in Tigray and rising tensions with Eritrea are pushing Ethiopia back toward full-scale war. Ongoing violence in Amhara and Oromia, the legacy of atrocities during the 2020–2022 conflict and an increase in violence increase the risk of renewed atrocities.
Ethiopia faces a significant risk of renewed war. Clashes erupted in late January among the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) and Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF, federal forces) and Amhara regional militias, marking the first large-scale confrontation in northern Ethiopia since the end of the Tigray war in November 2022. The fighting began when TDF advanced into the disputed area of Tselemti in north-western Tigray. Federal forces responded with ground operations and drone strikes.
Since early February, multiple reports indicate that the federal government has redeployed troops from Amhara and Oromia toward Tigray. Simultaneously, the Eritrean military has reportedly entered Tigray and is working alongside factions of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), signalling readiness for renewed fighting. In anticipation, residents of Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, have begun stockpiling supplies, long queues have formed at banks, and flights to the region have been cancelled.
The current escalation is closely tied to territorial disputes left unresolved by the 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). During the war, Amhara regional forces and allies took areas of Western and Southern Tigray where it was documented that they carried out ethnic cleansing against Tigrayan populations. Although the peace agreement called for the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amhara forces, these provisions were never fully implemented. Contested areas remained under the control of the federal government with Amhara exercising de facto control, preventing the return of more than a million displaced Tigrayans. The return of fighting to these contested areas risks putting survivors at risk once again of such abuses.
Alliances that defined the previous war have changed. Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have deteriorated significantly, particularly following Ethiopia’s pursuit for access to the Red Sea access. This has left Eritrea (who was also left outside of the CoHA) to strengthen ties with TPLF, despite their complicated past. The Tigrayan political landscape has become increasingly fractured, with rival camps competing for influence: one led by TPLF chair Debretsion Gebremichael, and another associated with his former deputy Getachew Reda, now aligned with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
In Amhara, federal efforts to dismantle the regional special forces have fueled a sustained insurgency by Fano militias. The insurgency remains active, with ongoing fighting. In March, reports of clashes between Fano fighters and federal-allied forces left civilians caught in the crossfire. In Oromia, fighting between government troops and the Oromo Liberation Army continued. In March, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission urged federal and regional authorities to take urgent action following renewed attacks in Arsi Zone that reportedly left up to 30 civilians dead between February and March.
These overlapping crises could be rapidly exacerbated by regional tensions. The war in Sudan could influence developments: Eritrea supports the Sudanese army (SAF), while Ethiopia has been accused of backing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allowing the group to use its territory to launch drone attacks at Khartoum, leading SAF to threaten to respond. If war were to break out in Ethiopia it risks involving Sudan as well as international actors heavily involved in the Sudanese war.
The International Crisis Group identified several issues which may be holding parties back from renewed confrontation, including economic constraints and fatigue from the 2020-2022 Tigray war. Ethiopia remains heavily dependent on international financial support, and partners have signaled that renewed war could jeopardize this. The ongoing conflict in Iran is increasing the costs of key commodities, including fuel and fertilizer which are critical to food supplies in the region. This is putting additional pressure on already cash strapped countries with potentially catastrophic impacts. It could also impact on the likelihood that Gulf states could become more engaged, perhaps spurring them to do so to shore up their security and influence, or perhaps diminishing engagement as they could be forced to look more inward.
The risk of mass atrocities if violence escalates is not hypothetical. During the 2020–2022 war, all parties were implicated in serious violations, including acts that may amount to crimes against humanity. Today, many of the same structural risk factors remain unresolved, while new disputes and military preparations increase the likelihood of a broader and more dangerous conflict.
Ethiopian and international civil society organisations have already begun warning of the risk of renewed war and mass atrocities, calling for urgent de-escalation and sustained international engagement. This includes states and multilateral actors to re-engage diplomatically through a comprehensive approach that recognises the interconnected conflicts in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, and to prioritise inclusive, civilian-centered political dialogue. Continued attention at the UN Security Council and Human Rights Council, pressure for the full and verifiable implementation of the 2022 CoHA, expanded independent human rights monitoring, meaningful accountability efforts, and guaranteed humanitarian access and restoration of essential services in Tigray and across conflict-affected areas. Without coordinated pressure along these lines, the risk of wider war and renewed mass atrocity crimes will continue to grow.
Sudan: expanding frontlines and increased risk of atrocities amid limited prospects for peace.
Summary: As the conflict in Sudan approaches its third anniversary, it remains the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. The conflict has entered a new and dangerous phase marked by shifting frontlines and expanded areas of operation, and growing regional entanglement.
In recent months, fighting has intensified across North Darfur, North Kordofan, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Although Kordofan remains the central battleground, hostilities are no longer geographically contained: frontlines are active across multiple states simultaneously, exposing civilian populations nationwide to increasing levels of violence.
Following the October 2025 fall of El Fasher the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) expanded westward toward Um Baru and Kernoi. By late January 2026, RSF and its allies had consolidated near-total control over Darfur and large parts of Kordofan, linking western Sudan to the White Nile, and thus shifting the balance of power on the ground. This has allowed RSF to influence key population centres, agricultural areas and transit routes, while limiting Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to air operations and interventions through their allied militias.
At the same time, SAF has attempted to reverse RSF territorial gains in Kordofan. In January, SAF reportedly lifted the siege on Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, and retook Dilling after both cities had been under siege for two years. SAF continues to hold El-Obeid in North Kordofan which remains under RSF siege. While SAF advances disrupted RSF control and reopened access routes, it did not lead to stable or coordinated governance on the ground. RSF forces continue to control much of the surrounding territory and key access routes around Dilling, leaving control fragmented and the area exposed to renewed fighting.
The situation in Blue Nile has also deteriorated, with RSF reportedly seeking to open a new front to access central Sudan. In late March, the RSF took Kurmuk, an important town in Blue Nile. An advance towards Al Kaili was reportedly repelled by SAF forces. The ongoing fighting has caused significant displacement and civilian protection concerns. Border areas in Ethiopia are reportedly facilitating RSF movement and allied activity, raising the risk of broader regional instability.
As more neighbouring actors become involved, and with neighbouring countries already facing their own internal crises, the conflict is becoming increasingly prone to spill across borders. This dynamic is already visible along the Chad–Sudan border. Fighting near the border with Chad led the Chadian government to close its border with Sudan, allowing only limited humanitarian crossings. Tensions escalated in mid-March when a drone strike killed at least 17 civilians, prompting Chadian President Idriss Déby to order retaliatory measures against further attacks originating from Sudan. Since then, Chadian armed forces have been deployed along the shared border. These developments point to a growing risk that Sudan’s conflict could spill across borders and draw neighbouring states more directly into the crisis.
The conflict in Sudan is also likely to be significantly impacted by the conflict in Iran. The conflict could, as noted in the section on Ethiopia, cause the Gulf backers on both sides to re-focus on internal dynamics. At the same time, it could reframe the US response in terms of the Iranian conflict. For example, the US in early March named the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, specifically citing alleged support from Iran.
These developments are unfolding amid ongoing de facto territorial partition with SAF consolidated in the capital and east and RSF in Darfur and western Kordofan, and with both warring parties implementing parallel systems of governance. However, neither offer a credible option accepted by the majority of Sudanese, leaving civilians trapped between competing armed actors.
Violence against civilians continued. Both RSF advances and SAF recaptures have been accompanied by grave human rights violations against perceived opponents and such patterns are likely to continue as each side makes territorial gains. A recent report by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) shows that sexual violence in Darfur is widespread and systematic but, it is not only happening during active fighting, but also in everyday situations, often targeting specific ethnic communities. Women and girls are frequently attacked while carrying out basic tasks like collecting water or food, and those responsible are often identified as RSF members or allied groups. A focus group comprising 56 women and survivors called for an end to the violence, better access to medical and psychological support, and greater protection.
Sudan is the largest humanitarian crisis, nearly two-thirds of the population require assistance, over 15 million people are displaced, famine has been declared in parts of Darfur and Kordofan, and access constraints due to ongoing insecurity and the warring parties continue to limit aid delivery.
International response
International involvement in the war is becoming more direct. Regional actors are increasingly involved, backing different sides and, in some cases, directly enabling military operations. Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker reported that in January Turkish-supplied Akinci drones used by SAF were launched from an Egyptian airbase, suggesting a shift from general diplomatic or political backing to concrete logistical and military enablement, significantly expanding SAF’s strike capacity.
A reinvigorated US-led, Quad-backed, peace plan gained little traction. Days after the announcement General Burhan and SAF rejected the proposal, reiterating that the war will only end with RSF defeat or surrender. In early April, the naming of hardliner Yasser Atta as Chief of Staff indicated that the SAF side is only moving further from negotiations. On the other hand, RSF has signalled verbal openness to talks before, however their conduct on the ground remained the same.
The countries with the most influence over the warring parties (including the Quad: UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt) have not yet applied enough coordinated pressure to limit the violence and they continue to provide support to the warring parties allowing them to keep fighting rather than engage in dialogue. As the conflict continues to affect and involve more of Sudan’s neighbours, in a context in which these countries are already facing high levels of violence and political instability, increases the risk that the war could spread across borders, or further destabilise the Horn.
In February, the UN Security Council announced sanctions against four RSF leaders for atrocities committed in El Fasher. Those targeted are Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, Brigadier General Al-Fateh Abdullah Idris, deputy commander Gedo Hamdan Ahmed, and field commander Tijani Ibrahim. The move followed US sanctions imposed just a week earlier against the latter three commanders. In early March, the US designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group.
