Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in preventing and responding to of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.
This month our focus will be on situations that warrant close attention in the coming year. These are contexts we have tracked throughout 2025 and have identified as being at heightened risk of escalation or continued violence in 2026 if urgent measures are not taken to address them. These situations are:
- Risk of increased atrocities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Potential return to fighting in northern Ethiopia
- Deepening multi-faceted insecurity crisis in Nigeria
- Fear of return to civil war in South Sudan
- Mass atrocities in Sudan amid the ongoing war
What to watch in 2026:
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Will negotiations bear fruit or will fighting expand?
Summary: Violence in eastern DRC continues despite diplomatic progress on paper. If the commitments reached through the agreements are not enforced, 2026 could see new M23 advances, renewed fighting between M23 and FARDC and allied militias, and a sharp escalation of mass atrocities. The conflict also risks spreading beyond North and South Kivu, deepening humanitarian crises and regional instability.
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) entered a dangerous new phase in 2025 when 23 March Movement (M23) rebels, backed by Rwandan forces, launched an offensive across North and South Kivu. Within months they were able to seize strategic cities, including Goma the largest city in the east; dominate key supply routes, and several mineral-rich areas. This shift on the ground worsened the already dire humanitarian crisis; it is estimated that there were over four million internally displaced persons in North and South Kivu by June 2025 and about seven million in the eastern regions. Violations included summary executions, sexual violence, forced recruitment of children, and attacks on displacement sites increased across the region. Women and children were particularly affected, facing widespread gender-based violence and psychological harm. These developments intensified long-standing tensions across the region fueling hate speech and inter-communal tensions.
Amid the worsening situation on the ground, Qatar and the United States played a central role in bringing the Congolese government, Rwanda, and M23 representatives to the negotiation table. These efforts produced a joint DRC–M23 declaration in April calling for an immediate halt to hostilities. In June, a US-brokered peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda was concluded, aiming to reduce cross-border tensions and created a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism responsible for overseeing a shared plan to neutralise the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). In July the Doha Declaration of Principles were agreed, with DRC and M23 agreeing on the need for a ceasefire and a more structured political process. By November, the parties had signed the Doha Framework for Peace, a broader roadmap for peace.
Despite this rhetorical progress, the situation on the ground has only worsened. Within weeks of the November framework signing, M23 launched new offensives in South Kivu, fighting FARDC and its allies the Wazalendo and Burundian army and briefly managed to capture the city of Uvira and several towns on their way, leading to the killing of at least 74 civilians and displacing 200,000. The Congolese military responded with attacks in North Kivu in what analysts believe is an effort to slow the group’s advance north. Insecurity also persisted in other areas, including through attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) who have exploited the security vacuum created by M23. The humanitarian situation remains extremely fragile, and civilians continue to face high levels of violence and displacement.
More needs to be done in the new year to translate the agreements from paper to reality in 2026 or they are likely to collapse completely. Kinshasa and M23 are already offering conflicting interpretations of the Doha framework, particularly regarding the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity, which could undermine trust and prevent a signature of a full agreement.
Although M23 has now announced that it will withdraw from the strategic southern town of Uvira to “give peace a chance,” they have shown their capacity to expand their territorial control. Continued M23 advances could provoke retaliation and further fighting between M23 and its allied militias against FARDC and its partners, worsening the humanitarian situation. M23 and Rwandan forces may push south toward Tanganyika province in the Katanga region, continuing to highten tensions with Burundi. Expansion into Katanga, the DRC’s economic heartland and former stronghold of Kabila, could pose a major challenge to President Félix Tshisekedi as Kabila may seek to exploit the situation to weaken Tshisekedi. Without stronger international pressure and enforcement of existing commitments mass atrocities are likely to continue and potentially worsen.
Ethiopia: Will continued currents of instability lead to open conflict?
Summary: There is a growing possibility of renewed large-scale conflict as several crises unfold across the country. Tensions are rising in the north, particularly in Tigray and Amhara, while armed group activity continues in Oromia and climate change deepens humanitarian needs. Simultaneously, the deteriorating relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea raises concerns that these internal situations could merge with regional conflicts. Together, these dynamics are creating a highly unstable environment that, if not addressed, will likely continue to worsen in 2026.
The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, signed in 2022 between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government, is weakening. The agreement had diminished large-scale fighting, but its protections for civilians remained poorly enforced. Monitoring mechanisms failed to adequately address ongoing abuses, and neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea credibly prosecuted those responsible for atrocities committed during the war. At the same time, tensions between the federal government and the TPLF have grown and the risk of returning to fighting increases. In recent months, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed accused the TPLF of diverting public funds for military purposes, while the Ethiopian army chief publicly described the party as a “criminal clique” that should be eliminated. Repeated calls by both sides for international mediation have not brought any concrete effects. In November the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) carried out the first drone strike against the TPLF-affiliated Tigray Defense Forces since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement.
Eritrean troops continue to occupy parts of Tigray, despite the peace agreement. This situation is compounded by souring relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopian officials have accused Eritrea of backing proxy militias in Amhara, where the federal government has been fighting since 2023, and factions of the TPLF. The two countries continue to face unresolved border disputes and tensions increased after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed renewed efforts to regain Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea. Tensions remain high, and could lead to either cross border efforts at destabilization or open conflict.
In Amhara and Oromia, clashes continued. In Amhara, Fano militias have been consistently clashing with the ENDF since April 2023, when the government attempted to dissolve the Amhara Special Forces and integrate them into the army. In Oromia, fighting is ongoing between government forces and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). In both cases, this has forced tens of thousands to flee, in Oromia more than 280,000 people were displaced.
The country’s humanitarian situation is in a complicated state, in the coming year this is may be made worse by the La Niña weather pattern which is expected to bring flooding to northern Ethiopia and drought conditions to the south through early 2026, placing additional strain on already vulnerable communities and overstretched humanitarian systems.
Ethiopia is scheduled to hold national elections in June 2026. Civic space has narrowed significantly, with journalists having been detained, civil society organizations restricted, and opposition silenced. With less room for open politics, tensions are more likely to spill over into violence.
These overlapping challenges leave Ethiopia vulnerable to higher levels of violence. The risk of renewed fighting in the north threatens civilians still recovering from the 2020–2022 war. Internal divisions within the TPLF and opposition with the federal government, rising tensions between the federal government and Amhara forces, and the unresolved disputes with Eritrea all undermine the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Continued violence in Oromia is likely to drive further displacement, while climate shocks are expected to deepen hunger and health crises. With weak accountability and little international involvement, Ethiopia is entering 2026 in a fragile position. Without stronger diplomatic pressure and better protection for civilians, the country could return to large-scale conflict with serious regional consequences.
Nigeria: Multiple conflicts and fronts risk overwhelming the center
Summary: Nigeria’s security crisis is worsening, with insurgency, banditry, communal violence, and kidnappings overwhelming the state. Without urgent action to address these threats and the underlying causes such as unemployment, and weak governance, the country risks further violence and potential mass atrocities in the coming year.
Nigeria is experiencing a grave security crisis with multiple factors spanning the whole country. In the north-east, Islamist extremist groups continue a long-running insurgency, in the north-west (particularly in Zamfara and Katsina states), criminal groups raid villages and carry out mass kidnappings for ransom, treating violence as a business. In the country’s central region, especially the Middle Belt, communities clash repeatedly over land, identity, and religion, leading to cycles of revenge attacks and large numbers of civilian deaths. In the South-East, gunmen linked to separatist groups conduct deadly raids, sometimes using kidnapping as a tactic as well, while in the Niger Delta, armed groups periodically attack oil infrastructure to press political and economic demands. These problems are made worse by poverty, high unemployment among young people, climate change, weak state institutions, and limited security capacity, leaving many communities unprotected.
In 2025, these patterns of violence remained prevalent and in some cases increased sharply and expanded geographically. In the first half of 2025 at least 2,266 people were killed by bandits or insurgents, exceeding the total number of such deaths recorded in all of 2024. Islamist extremist groups including Boko Haram and ISWAP have also stepped up attacks in states such as Borno and Yobe targeting military infrastructure as well as civilians and leading to increased military escalation. In May, ISWAP launched its most sophisticated offensive in years, temporarily capturing strategic locations and attacking military installations and transport routes. In the second half of the year, ISWAP continued its offensive conducting major assaults such as the 5 September Darul Jamal massacre killing over 60 civilians. Clashes between ISWAP and Boko Haram escalated towards the end of the year in the Lake Chad area, despite having reached a truce in October. Boko Haram’s attack led to between 50 and 200 reported fatalities across six armed clashes, one of the most deadly since February 2023.
Banditry concentrated mostly in Zamfara State, in the North-West. The Lakurwa, a newly-established armed group (to read more about the Lakurawa check out our June Monitor), integrated banditry with Islamist tactics across parts of Sokoto, Kebbi, and Zamfara.
In the Middle Belt, inter-communal violence surged, with more than 100 people killed in April and at least 150 were killed in an overnight attack on Yelwata village in Benue State in mid-June. About 580,000 people were displaced by early 2025. In the South-East, attacks by “unknown gunmen” linked to separatist and criminal networks continued, alongside rising kidnappings.
In recent years, tensions in the Niger Delta have begun to resurface. In 2024, the Niger Delta Liberation Movement, claimed responsibility for bombings of the Chevron-operated pipelines. These incidents raised concerns of a return to increased attacks and coordinated engagement. While attacks have so far been limited, they signal growing frustration.
Kidnappings for ransom have become a lucrative business, between July 2024 and June 2025, at least 4,722 people were kidnapped across the country in 997 incidents, with 762 losing their lives. This has generated N2.57 billion paid in ransom. In November, the country saw one of the worst attacks in years when 315 children and school staff were abducted, which led President Bola Tinubu declared a nationwide security emergency due to the increase in mass kidnappings mostly targeting women and school girls, acknowledging the scale of the crisis and the lack of government capacity to respond to the situation.
If the current situation is not addressed effectively, violence in Nigeria is likely to continue escalating in the coming year. The country faces multiple, overlapping security threats, creating conditions in which atrocities could occur. The existing security infrastructure is overstretched and unable to manage these crises. In the North-East and Middle Belt, violence is likely to persist. Kidnap-for-ransom operations, which fund criminal and extremist activities, are likely to expand in both scale and geographic reach. Militancy in the South-East and the Niger Delta is also likely to continue. The fact that multiple crises are unfolding simultaneously is cause for concern as they could feed one another and stretch response capacity. The ongoing rise in violence across the country indicates that the state is struggling to respond effectively to any of these threats. If any of these conflicts escalate sharply, they could create security vacuums that other actors could exploit. Stronger, coordinated security measures are urgently needed as well as efforts to address underlying structural drivers such as poverty, youth unemployment, climate stress, porous borders, and weak governance. Without a comprehensive strategy focused on prevention, civilian protection, and accountability, the risk of mass atrocities remains high.
South Sudan: Will the 2018 Peace Agreement Officially Crumble?
Summary: South Sudan is at high risk of renewed civil war. Internal divisions and weak implementation of the 2018 peace agreement and repeated ceasefire violations have worsened mistrust and increased the risk of mass atrocities unfolding. South Sudan’s entanglement in Sudan’s war threatens to escalate the situation further. Urgent international engagement is needed to restore dialogue, de-escalate militarisation, and revive the peace agreement before the country descends into a broader, more complex crisis.
In 2025, violence in South Sudan increased, risking a full relapse into civil war as clashes between President Salva Kiir’s South Sudan Peoples’ Defense Forces (SSPDF) and Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) intensified across Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states and the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement continued to lose strength. Political reshuffles weakened the agreement’s power-sharing arrangements, opposition leaders, including opposition leader Riek Machar, were detained, and key provisions like unifying the armed forces and preparing for elections stalled.
Tensions escalated sharply in March after a joint SSPDF–SPLM/A‑IO deployment into Nassir (Upper Nile State) provoked clashes with the local Nuer White Army militia. The situation had already been deteriorating since 2024, however clashes reignited in February when SSPDF attacked civilians in a marketplace, sparking confrontations with White Army fighters. These clashes intensified in early March with a joint SSPDF–SPLM/A-IO deployment into Nassir town which provoked fierce resistance from the White Army. Although the White Army, which is composed of Nuer youth militias that operated as SPLA-IO proxies during the 2013–2018 civil war, currently has a weaker, looser relationship with Machar, their involvement ignited recriminations of his involvement. Shortly after the clashes, several of Machar’s allies were arrested and Machar himself was placed under house arrest, a move widely seen as the most severe blow to the trust of the peace agreement to date. The situation intensified again in September, when the government charged Machar and seven of his allies with murder, treason, and crimes against humanity for allegedly orchestrating a White Army’s assault on an SSPDF garrison in Nasir, which killed more than 250 soldiers. Machar’s house arrest, the detention of his allies, and increasing ceasefire violations had already broken the trust behind the peace deal. However, formal charges against Machar and his allies risk creating a deeper crisis that will be even harder to reverse and makes meaningful engagement between both sides far less likely.
Regional pressure from IGAD, the AU, and the UN has so far failed to produce meaningful de-escalation. Simultaneously, the conflict in neighboring Sudan further worsened the situation. Since 2023, more than 1.2 million Sudanese refugees have entered South Sudan, straining local communities and worsening already fragile conditions in a country where 7.7 million people (about 65% of the population) face acute food insecurity. Cross-border fighting has also pulled South Sudan’s factions into regional dynamics: local militias, political actors, and even elements of the army have begun supporting either Sudan’s military (SAF) or the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), this trend is expected to increase in the coming year, raising the risk that South Sudan may become entangled in Sudan’s ongoing conflict.
If these trends continue unaddressed, 2026 could mark a decisive breakdown of the peace process and a slide into multi-front conflict. Kiir is expected to continue with his political reshuffle in an attempt to consolidate power. This move may deepen tensions within Juba’s elite and create incentives for military defections. The trial of Machar has pushed part of the SPLM/A-IO into preparing for war. However, it is unclear whether a guilty verdict would immediately trigger more fighting: Machar’s opposition forces have weakened and are already engaged on multiple fronts and may have limited capacity to respond. That said, this could still fuel anti-government sentiment and push community militias toward the opposition.
Local communal violence is also likely to intensify as armed groups, ethnic militias, and political proxies compete for influence, resources, and territory amid worsening climate shocks and severe food insecurity.
The war in Sudan further complicates the situation. If the Sudanese army believes Juba is helping the RSF, it could again shut down the oil pipeline that South Sudan depends on for government revenue. Or fighting could damage or disable the pipeline. At the same time, politicians and militias in South Sudan are already aligning with either SAF or RSF, this may turn South Sudan border areas into proxy battlegrounds. Regional powers like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, key backers of both sides of the conflict in Sudan, may also take sides in Juba, pulling South Sudan directly into Sudan’s war.
Urgent international engagement is needed to bring the parties back to the negotiating table, de-escalate ongoing militarization, and restore the full implementation of the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement. Without these efforts, the risk of nationwide conflict and regional spillover will continue to grow.
Sudan: Will the de facto partition harden?
Summary: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are controlling the east, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) the west, frontlines have shifted to Kordofan where clashes and new sieges risk repeating the atrocities seen in El Geneina and El Fasher. Both sides continue to commit widespread violations, with support from foreign backers. Without renewed political engagement mindful of the participation of international sponsors, mass atrocities are likely to continue or worsen in the coming year.
In 2025, the ongoing war in Sudan pushed the country closer to de facto partition and deepened the humanitarian situation. In the first months of the year, the SAF launched a major counteroffensive and managed to recapture Khartoum after 18 months of RSF occupation. Meanwhile, the RSF tightened its siege of El Fasher in North Darfur. By October, after a 17-month siege, El Fasher finally fell to the RSF, consolidating their control over the majority of the western region, although some areas remain under the control of Abdelwahid Al Nur, a Darfur rebel leader who has so far remained neutral in the RSF-SAF conflict. Both SAF and RSF and their allied militias have carried out mass atrocities, large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, many of which likely amount to war crimes and, for RSF conduct in Darfur, possibly crimes against humanity.
During the capture of El Fasher intense violence took place, civilians and soldiers were executed, ethnic targeting, widespread rape was reported, hospitals were attacked, and bodies were left in mass graves. An estimated 100,000 people fled the city, but only around 10,000 managed to reach Tawila; the vast majority remain trapped, detained, or otherwise unable to reach safety. (To read more about the fall of El Fasher please read our November monitor)
Towards the end of 2025, the conflict focused on the Kordofan region, where fighting between SAF and RSF mirrored the intensity and humanitarian impact seen in Darfur. SAF continues to hold the strategic city of El-Obeid in North Kordofan, but it is under siege by RSF forces. The city is crucial for SAF to prevent RSF advances toward central Sudan and to maintain the possibility of retaking Darfur. In South Kordofan, RSF has imposed sieges on Dilling and Kadugli, leaving civilians without access to food and basic supplies and creating a hunger emergency comparable to that prior to the fall of El Fasher. If RSF captures these key cities, atrocities similar to those in El Fasher are likely to follow.
Sudan’s effective partition was reinforced through the formation of two parallel governments. SAF runs an administration from Port Sudan, with Kamil Idris as prime minister, while the RSF created its own government in Nyala with its own civilian prime minister, Taishi. Both present themselves as civilian authorities, but in practice each is deeply dependent on its sponsoring armed group, deepening the country’s political and territorial divisions.
Despite ongoing international efforts, diplomacy made little headway in 2025. The U.S.-led Quad, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, sought to negotiate a three-month humanitarian truce followed by a permanent ceasefire and political negotiations. RSF accepted the proposal, but SAF rejected it because it excluded SAF-aligned Islamist groups such as the al-Baraa ibn Malik Brigade, which represent a key component of SAF’s fighting capacity, even as they sought to deny Islamist influence. Meanwhile, foreign support for both sides continues to sustain the war: the UAE backs the RSF, which also relies on a network spanning CAR, Chad, Libya, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda, while Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey support SAF. These external actors are both fueling the war and trying to mediate it, creating a confusing situation that makes the warring parties even less willing to compromise.
Prospects for peace in the near future are unlikely. SAF is expected to consolidate its control in the east, RSF in the west, and both sides will likely attempt to expand their territory, especially in Kordofan. Atrocities, which have defined the conflict since fighting began in 2026, are likely to persist unless urgent action is taken to protect civilians. Displacement is projected to rise by an additional 2.1 million people, on top of the 12 million already uprooted, making this the world’s largest displacement crisis. Without sustained international pressure, meaningful political engagement, and an end to external military support, atrocities in Sudan are likely to continue throughout the coming year.
