Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. Our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realisation that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.
This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the region to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to detect increasing tendencies or opportunities for improvement.
This month’s newsletter covers developments in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Sudan.
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso’s ruling junta reportedly stopped an attempted coup on 16 April. The junta accused two former military officers now based in Ivory Coast of being behind the plot. Around a dozen soldiers were detained for allegedly supporting the effort. This incident highlights growing factionalism within the army.
Civilians continue to bear the brunt of ongoing violence facing attacks not only from Islamist insurgents and other non-state armed groups, but also from Burkinabé security and defence forces and their allies, including the Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (VDP), a self-defence militia that formed in response to increasing jihadist insurgency. In 2024, more than 2,100 civilians were unlawfully killed, many of them in large-scale attacks.
Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist group, has continued to target civilians. In January and February 2025, the group launched a series of coordinated attacks in at least four localities in the northern and eastern regions of the country. These attacks followed months of threats made by the group to strike urban centers in both Mali and Burkina Faso. The Burkinabé cities of Sebba and Pama were particularly hard hit, with the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reporting at least 80 fatalities. This wave of violence highlights a troubling shift in insurgent tactics: a move away from rural ambushes toward direct assaults on urban areas. Such a shift not only amplifies the human toll but also poses significant challenges to national and regional security strategies. JNIM also increased its use of drones, marking a shift to advanced forms of warfare. The group first started using drones in September 2023, but six attacks were carried out in March 2025, a sharp increase.
Ongoing clashes and retaliatory operations between Islamist insurgent groups and government forces, along with their allied militias, continue to inflict significant harm on civilians. These confrontations are frequent and take place throughout the country, civilians suffer both from being caught in the crossfire and deliberate targeting. On March 10 and 11, 2025, Burkinabé security forces, VDP and local militias from Banwa province allegedly massacred dozens of civilians primarily of Fulani ethnicity, in and around the capital city of Solenzo. This was in retaliation for an attack conducted by JNIM militants days earlier. Footage of the attacks circulated widely on social media, showing not only the violence but also perpetrators issuing slurs and hate speech against the Fulani. Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented widespread abuses committed by the Burkinabé armed forces and VDP during counterinsurgency operations, shedding light on the scale of, and impunity for, state-aligned violence in the region. HRW verified 58 killings through video surveillance, but the real number is expected to be much higher. JNIM responded with a series of retaliatory attacks at the end of March.
The Fulani population has been systematically targeted on the presumption that they support Islamist militant groups. These same groups, in turn, exploit the Fulani community’s grievances over government corruption and inequitable access to natural resources to recruit new members.
Bukinabé security forces and their allied militias have been systematically targeting civilians and committing widespread abuses against the civilian population. This militarised approach to counterinsurgency, which targets whole communities, such as the Fulani, as supporters of militants, leaves civilians vulnerable and creates a ripe ground for radicalization. This situation is further compounded by the existing culture of impunity benefitting all warring parties, which enables ongoing violations. These recent trends are evidence of the ethnicization of the conflict with VDP militias recruiting from certain ethnic groups, and targeting communities based on ethnicity regardless of their affiliations with armed groups.
Civic space in Burkina Faso is rapidly shrinking, with journalists and government critics increasingly at risk. Members of the political movement SENS have been targeted, and several have gone missing under suspicious circumstances. Among them is Idrissa Barry, the group’s leader, who was abducted on 18 March by armed men claiming to be police officers, shortly after he publicly condemned the Solenzo killings. In a related crackdown, the president of the Association of Journalists of Burkina Faso was arrested following his criticism of the country’s declining freedom of expression. The Association itself was dissolved just days later, further illustrating the government’s intolerance of dissent.
International response:
Member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) convened to address the withdrawal of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, and to consider the broader impact on the regional bloc. Just three weeks prior, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) had announced a 0.5% import levy on goods from ECOWAS countries, signaling their opposition to the bloc’s goal of preserving a free trade zone with the AES nations.
Ethiopia
In March, Fano militias launched a coordinated offensive against the Ethiopian federal government in the Amhara region. The move came alongside efforts to merge various armed youth factions that had been operating independently, all united by the goal of defending what they see as ancestral Amhara lands. The federal government responded swiftly, deploying forces to push back against the offensive. The fighting quickly escalated, and ACLED recorded over 150 clashes that month alone, making it the most intense period of violence since the Fano insurgency began in April 2023.
Fano is believed to control 80% of the region, operating mostly outside cities and main roads. Peace talks are ongoing, but progress is slow due to the fragmented nature of Fano, which has at least nine different factions, some of which are in conflict with one another. The conflict in Amhara has disrupted every aspect of daily life, halting farming, trade, and healthcare, and driving food insecurity. It is estimated that over 4.1 million children are out of school.
The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) accused a Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) brigadier general, who was dismissed by the Tigray interim regional administration on 10 March for allegedly inciting violence, of being behind these efforts, suggesting he may be at odds with the region’s current leadership.
Tensions in Tigray remain high, fueled by internal divisions within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). These tensions reached a boiling point with the removal of Tigray’s interim president, Getachew Reda. Getachew was replaced by Lieutenant General Tadesse Worede, the former commander of the TDF. Tadesse appointed a new cabinet, including three senior Tigrayan army members who had been removed by Getachew, and reversed the temporary suspension of three senior army generals, including Migbey. Getachew has since been reassigned as an Advisor for East African Affairs.
Getachew, who led the 2022 peace negotiations with the federal government, is seen by some within the TPLF as being too willing to compromise with Prime Minister Abiy. His removal reflects tensions and mistrust between the TPLF and the federal authorities. The new administration under Debretsion is viewed not so much as a fresh start, but a fragile and temporary arrangement. Despite the change in leadership, there’s little sign that the root causes of the conflict are being seriously addressed.
The humanitarian situation in Tigray remains deeply concerning. The health system continues to face immense challenges in the aftermath of the conflict, leaving civilians without access to essential care. Maternal deaths during childbirth are increasingly common, and widespread food insecurity is contributing to high levels of child hunger. The destruction of ambulance services, the shortage of medical personnel, and the limited availability of health facilities have severely complicated emergency and routine healthcare delivery. Sexual violence remains prevalent, yet support for survivors is minimal. Current services are wholly inadequate to meet the scale and urgency of the needs on the ground.
The peace deal signed in December 2024 between the federal government and an Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) faction, led hundreds of OLA fighters to comply with disarmament and reintegration processes. However, the situation on the ground remains unstable. In late January, the OLA abducted around 50 civilians, and on 17 March, they carried out another abduction, taking 56 more, raising concerns about the group’s commitment to the agreement.
The humanitarian situation across the country remains deeply concerning. In Tigray, communities are still struggling to recover from the war. The UN World Food Programme (WFP) warned that due to funding and supply shortages, 3.6 million people are at immediate risk of losing food aid, including 650,000 women and children receiving life-saving nutrition support.
Concerns over press freedom in Ethiopia continue to grow. Throughout 2024, 43 journalists were detained, imprisoned, or kidnapped, with many facing intimidation and harassment from both state and non-state actors, particularly in conflict-affected areas. At least seven journalists were arrested on terrorism charges after a journalist at the Ethiopian Broadcasting Service (EBS) reported having been abducted and raped by men in military uniforms in 2020. Ethiopia’s standing in the 2024 Global Press Freedom Index fell to 141st out of 180. The situation may worsen, as proposed amendments to the media bill would give the executive power to appoint the Director General of the Media Authority, raising fears of increased government control over the press.
Sudan
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have almost consolidated control over central Khartoum after two years of war, marking a strategic shift in the conflict. In Darfur, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are intensifying their siege of El Fasher, North Darfur’s capital, through indiscriminate shelling and encirclement tactics that have collapsed humanitarian access and displaced tens of thousands. Civilians in both regions face acute mass atrocity risks: in Darfur, the RSF continues to target displacement camps and civilians in a campaign that has been labeled by the US as genocide, while in Khartoum, potential reprisals threaten civilian safety. The risk of mass atrocity is escalating.
The conflict has triggered the world’s largest displacement crisis, with over 15 million people uprooted; more than 11 million within Sudan, many at risk of being displaced again, and 3.5 million forced to flee across borders. About 150,000 lives have been lost. Nearly half the population faces hunger, and famine has already been declared and is killing children in camps like Zamzam and the Nuba Mountains. Disease is spreading rapidly, worsened by widespread malnutrition and the collapse of nearly three-quarters of health facilities. Civilians continue to endure attacks, sexual violence, and ethnic cleansing, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan.
Starting on 10 April, RSF launched a coordinated, multi-day offensive in North Darfur, targeting El Fasher and the nearby Zamzam and Abu Shouk displacement camps which ended with the group taking control of Zamzam. More than 400 civilians were killed in the attacks, including at least 20 children and 12 aid workers. Local sources suggest the real toll could be much higher. These attacks follow a February attack on Zamzam, and mark a sharp escalation after months of warnings from human rights groups. The RSF now controls most of Darfur, with El Fasher standing as the last major stronghold resisting their advance.
RSF announced the creation of a rival government in territories under their control on 15 April. The announcement was accompanied by the signing of a transitional constitution with allied civilian groups, outlining a roadmap for governance. This move directly challenges the army-led government of al-Burhan and raises concerns that Sudan could be on the path to a permanent split.
Since 26 March 2025, the SAF has reasserted control over Khartoum and key southern transport corridors, as well as making progress in adjacent areas like parts of Gezira State, securing a strategic advantage in central Sudan and marking a significant new phase in the conflict. However, these military gains have been accompanied by troubling reports of retaliatory violence. A report from Ayin indicates that in areas retaken by the SAF, individuals have been targeted as suspected RSF collaborators, including humanitarian workers and civilians with no clear political affiliation. A few months ago, it was reported that the Islamic Movement was preparing reprisals against 6,000 perceived RSF sympathisers in Gezira state. Indeed some retributory violence has occurred. In January, the Sudan Shield militia, aligned with the SAF, reportedly killed 26 people in Tayba village near Wad Medani, Al Gezira State. The UN Human Rights Office has also verified the deaths of at least 18 Darfuri or Kordofani people at the hands of SAF forces in the Jaili oil refinery area and Khartoum North, following the army’s takeover. These patterns of targeting, ethnic profiling, and reprisal killings are consistent with early warning indicators of mass atrocities. Reprisal attacks have already occurred in the capital and more are likely to occur.
Far from pursuing peace, the army has intensified its military campaign, bolstered by allied militias and substantial external backing, particularly from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the RSF, supported by the United Arab Emirates, are regrouping through new alliances-including with the SPLM-North and expanding the war to additional fronts, including South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and northern Sudan. The conflict’s deepening regional entanglements amplify the risks of escalation and national fragmentation, with Sudan increasingly serving as a proxy battleground for competing Arab and African powers vying for influence in the Red Sea.
Some civilians began returning to their homes, only to find them destroyed or looted. Many face dire living conditions with no access to water, electricity, or healthcare. Residents describe severe hardship, even after escaping RSF-controlled zones, as basic services remain largely unavailable and most hospitals are still non-functional.
International response:
The London Sudan Conference, a high-level diplomatic meeting co-hosted by the UK, France, Germany, the African Union (AU), and the EU, took place amid the war’s second anniversary. The summit aimed to address the humanitarian crisis, promote negotiations between the warring parties, emphasising the importance of preserving Sudan’s unity. 22 countries took part, including regional actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and major international organisations. SAF and RSF were not present. The summit ended without a joint agreement due to divisions among Arab states, particularly a dispute between Egypt (backing SAF) and the UAE (backing RSF). In response, the UK, France, Germany, the AU, and the EU issued a separate co-chairs’ statement.
Peace talks remain stalled as the Sudanese army refuses to engage with the RSF, fearing it would legitimise them. No direct negotiations have occurred since late 2023. No single country or institution appears capable of bridging the divisions, while influential states like the US could play a role, they have not prioritised the conflict—and previous attempts, such as the US-backed talks in Geneva, have failed. The International Crisis Group suggests de-escalation is only likely if the UAE and the Sudanese army reach some form of reconciliation. Though past backchannel efforts have faltered, continued engagement is essential.
