



**Atrocities Watch Africa Monitor
No 2, March 2022**

Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan, civil society organisation that intends to provide continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa, our strategies and approaches are grounded in the realization that atrocities can be prevented through various interventions, including, but not limited to, early warning mechanisms, diplomatic efforts, use of social media and new technologies, litigation, and advocacy campaigns.

This newsletter builds on our team's continuous monitoring of the region that allows us to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed as well as track ongoing situations of ongoing atrocities to detect increasing tendencies or opportunities for improvement.

This month we begin with a feature on coups d'état and their implications for the risk of mass atrocity.

Countries we were watching in February 2022:

- Cameroon
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Ethiopia
- Libya
- Mozambique
- Nigeria
- Somalia
- South Sudan
- Sudan

An increase of coups d'état in West Africa: what are the potential implications for mass atrocity

In the past two years, there have been a worrying increase in the number of coups in Africa. Between 2000 and 2009 there were four successful coups, between 2010 to 2019 there were eight and since 2020 there seven – four of which have occurred in three west African states: Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso.¹ This proliferation of coups has caused concern, with UN Secretary-

¹ The coups that took place in the African continent since the year 2000 took place in the following countries: Central African Republic in March 2003, Mauritania in August 2005 and Madagascar in March 2009, Niger in February 2010, Guinea-Bissau in March 2012, Mali in March 2012, Central African Republic in March 2013, Mauritania in March 2013, Egypt in July 2013, Burkina Faso in November 2014, Zimbabwe in November 2017 and

General Antonio Guterres referring to an “epidemic of coups”² and the ECOWAS chairman referring to the need to reign in the “contagion.”³

The concern is well founded. Not only are coups inherently a challenge to constitutional systems, they are more likely to entrench authoritarianism than allow for democratisation. They also tend to be associated with an increase in human rights abuses.⁴ The AU has linked coups to political instability and absence of good governance that can undermine socio-economic process.⁵

Coups have also been associated with an increased risk of mass atrocity crimes. The United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes identifies instability as a key risk factor and identifies “abrupt or irregular regime change or transfer of power”⁶ as a key indicator of instability. And indeed, some of the countries where recent coups have occurred (particularly Mali, Guinea and Sudan have been identified as among the 30 countries in the world most at risk of mass killing by the early warning project of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum.⁷

On the basis of this concern, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union have put in place mechanisms for sanctioning those who carry out coups. The AU currently has four members who have been suspended as a result of coups Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan. ECOWAS suspended its members as well, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali.⁸ Further sanctions were introduced against Guinea and Mali for the delay in organising elections. In Guinea, individual coup leaders have been subjected to individual sanctions.⁹ In Mali, ECOWAS imposed stricter sanctions on Mali when the leadership failed to organise new elections in September 2021, including the suspension of all commercial and financial transactions, freezing assets as well as closing land and air borders.¹⁰

Sudan April 2019, Mali on 18 August 2020 and a second one on 24 May 2021, Chad on 2 May 2021, Tunisia on 25 July 2021, Guinea on 5 September 2021, Sudan on 25 October 2021 and Burkina Faso on 23 January 2022.

² Michelle Nichols, “‘An epidemic’ of coups, U.N. chief laments, urging Security Council to act,” *Reuters*, 26 October 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/an-epidemic-coups-un-chief-laments-urging-security-council-act-2021-10-26/>

³ Kent Mensah, “West African Bloc: Coup ‘Contagion’ Must Be Contained Before Region Devastated,” *VOA*, 3 February 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/west-african-bloc-coup-contagion-must-be-contained-before-region-devastated/6425275.html>

⁴ George Derpanopoulos, Erica Frantz, Barbara Geddes and Joseph Wright, “Are coups good for democracy?” *Research and Politics*, January-March 2016, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168016630837>

⁵ Gelmo Dawit, “AU Members Condemn Coup Surge in Africa,” 6 February 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/au-members-condemn-coup-surge-in-africa/6429874.html>

⁶ United Nations, “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A tool for prevention,” 2014, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/about-us/Doc.3_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf

⁷ <https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/map>

⁸ ECOWAS, “Extraordinary Summit Of The ECOWAS Authority Of Heads Of State And Government On The Political Situation In Burkina Faso,” 28 January 2022, <https://ecowas.int/extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-burkina-faso/>

⁹ “West African regional bloc ECOWAS imposes new sanctions on Mali and Guinea,” *France 24*, 8 November 2021, <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211108-west-african-regional-bloc-ecowas-imposes-new-sanctions-on-mali-and-guinea>

¹⁰ ECOWAS, “Final Communiqué ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit on Mali,” 10 January 2022.

It is worth noting, however, that not all coups lead to these dire outcomes, and some have even been associated with increases in democratisation.¹¹ Further, although the coup in Sudan has been met with civilian condemnation and sparked consistent protests that have claimed 87 lives so far,¹² the coups in West Africa have had at least some public support.

In Mali, protests calling for the resignation of the then President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta began in June 2020, prior to the coup.¹³ They were led by a group of organisations known as the 5 June Movement-Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), composed, among others, of Keita's political opposition. Protesters were displeased with the government's management of the ongoing insurgency, aggravated by alleged government corruption and the fragile economic situation. Tensions reached their peak when the ruling party attempted to manipulate the results of the parliamentary elections. The military took advantage of the situation and staged a coup in August 2020.¹⁴ Citizens took to the streets in celebration, with signs reading "This isn't a coup, it's a revolution" and "mission accomplished."¹⁵

In Guinea, President Alpha Conde's pursuit of removal of presidential term-limits through a constitutional referendum triggered a coup. About 50 people were killed in opposition rallies in the lead up to the referendum and legislative elections that took place in March 2020.¹⁶ In the midst of widespread opposition to Conde's rule, socioeconomic crises and infighting among his top military aids, a coup removed him from power on 5 September 2021.¹⁷ People on the street celebrated with members of Guinea's armed forces after Conde's arrest.¹⁸

In Burkina Faso, as well, the coup was preceded by government mismanagement of crises. Increased attacks from militias against members of the security forces¹⁹ and defense volunteers²⁰ during November and December cost the lives of almost 100 officers. Social discontent with the government's inability to tackle the Islamist insurgency, corruption and bad governance

¹¹ George Derpanopoulos, Erica Frantz, Barbara Geddes and Joseph Wright, "Are coups good for democracy?" *Research and Politics*, January-March 2016, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168016630837>

¹² "Two more protesters killed in Sudan's anti-coup demos," *Radio Dabanga*, 11 March 2022, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/two-more-protesters-killed-in-sudan-s-anti-coup-demos>

¹³ New York Times, "Anger at Mali's President Rises After Security Forces Kill Protesters," 16 July 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07116/world/africa/mali-protesters-killed-keita.html>

¹⁴ United States Institute for Peace, "Five Things to Know About Mali's Coup: The current crisis shows the importance of investing in rule of law and governance in times of peace, and during conflict," 27 August 2020, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-a-bout-malis-coup>

¹⁵ The Conversation, "Mali celebrates after president's ouster – but there are few 'good coups'," 8 September 2020, <https://theconversation.com/mali-celebrates-after-presidents-ouster-but-there-are-few-good-coups-144846>

¹⁶ Australian Institute for International Affairs, "2021 in Review: The Coup in Guinea: Causes and Consequences," 28 December 2021, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-coup-in-guinea-causes-and-consequences/>

¹⁷ Al Jazeera, "Why have civilians welcomed the recent coups in West Africa?" 11 February 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/2/11/why-have-civilians-welcomed-the-recent-coups-in-west-africa>

¹⁸ Al Jazeera, "Many Guineans celebrate as soldiers seize power," 6 September 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/9/6/many-guineans-celebrate-as-soldiers-seize-power>

¹⁹ VOA News, "Death Toll From Burkina Faso Attack Rises to 53," 17 November 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/a/death-toll-from-burkina-faso-attack-rises-to-53-/6317271.html>

²⁰ Al Jazeera, "41 killed in attack by armed groups in Burkina Faso," 26 December 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/26/burkina-faso-declares-national-mourning-after-41-killed-in-attack>

increased. People filled the streets calling on Kabore to resign and for French troops to exit the country.²¹

In all four cases, similar justifications were given for the coups – that they were necessary course corrections. In Burkina Faso and Mali the coup leaders cited rising insecurity, while in Guinea they cited political corruption.²²

Civilians support for coups has been seen by some as a “reflection of the masses’ lack of faith in the state of democratic politics in their countries,” and a tendency to portray the military as a better alternative to the prior governments.²³ This could legitimise reintegration of militaries into politics and exercising significant influence in politics.²⁴ Yet this should not be seen as a rejection of democratic governance, but rather frustration with governments’ ability to address the economic hardship, insecurity and deliver essential services.²⁵ It may also be an expression of the hope that coups will bring new elections and democratisation.²⁶

However, initial civilian support does not mean the military will be able to sustain public support over time, especially because, as noted above, they are unlikely to deliver greater democratisation or human rights.²⁷ In addition, it has been argued that they are unlikely to be effective in increasing security. As the military tends to focus on consolidating political power immediately following a coup, this may leave insurgents space to tighten their grip over areas under their control.²⁸

In this context, it has been advocated that regional, continental, and international actors need not to stop condemning coups, but rather take a broader approach to encouraging human rights and democracy. Takyiwaa Manuh, former director of the U.N. Economic Commission, has criticised ECOWAS for condemning coups but not constitutional changes allowing a third term: “When somebody changes the rules and runs for a third term we didn't hear ECOWAS condemning that. Why did ECOWAS not condemn that? Why did the Africa Union not condemn that? Right now, everybody is laughing, when ECOWAS imposes sanctions is like 'There you go again, where were you when this was happening?' And what it does is that it eats into the

²¹ Bloomberg, “Burkina Faso Police Clash With Anti-Kabore Protesters in Capital,” 27 November 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-27/burkina-faso-police-clash-with-anti-kabore-protesters-in-capital>

²² The Guardian, “Contagious coups: what is fuelling military takeovers across west Africa?” 7 February 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/07/contagious-coups-what-is-fuelling-military-takeovers-across-west-africa>

²³ Al Jazeera, “Why have civilians welcomed the recent coups in West Africa?” 11 February 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/2/11/why-have-civilians-welcomed-the-recent-coups-in-west-africa>

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ United States Institute for Peace, “A Sixth Coup in Africa? The West Needs to Up Its Game,” 2 February 2022, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/02/sixth-coup-africa-west-needs-its-game>

²⁶ Politico, “West Africa grapples with wave of military coups,” February 6, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/06/africa-military-coups-00006023>

²⁷ Australian Institute for International Affairs, “2021 in Review: The Coup in Guinea: Causes and Consequences,” 30 September 2021, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-coup-in-guinea-causes-and-consequences/>

²⁸ Ibid.

credibility of ECOWAS and the African Union.”²⁹ Others argue that institutions lose credibility as they “act more on the consequences than on the causes of the sociopolitical crises that lead to coups.”³⁰ In Mali, citizens have protested ECOWAS sanctions, which has arguably increased popular support for the government.³¹ More work needs to be done to better understand, and work around, the limitations of sanctions as a response. Others have pointed to international support to military responses to extremism and argued that greater support to civilian responses are needed to complement this. They have suggested that greater attention is needed to remedy the failings of governance that lead to the coup in the first place.³²

Given that going through a coup d'état can increase a country's risk of undergoing a second one for up to a quarter of a century, and that this can increase the risk of mass atrocity,³³ such broader approaches seem critical.

Cameroon

Violence and human rights abuses, including mass killings, have continued in the last few months across Cameroon's Anglophone regions and in the Far North region. Intercommunal violence forced tens of thousands across the border into Chad in December 2021, contributing to a total of more than 100,000 refugees.³⁴ Islamic State continues to increase in numbers in the Lake Chad Basin region. Meanwhile, separatist violence in Cameroon's Anglophone regions continues.



²⁹ Kent Mensah, “West African Bloc: Coup ‘Contagion’ Must Be Contained Before Region Devastated,” *VOA*, 3 February 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/west-african-bloc-coup-contagion-must-be-contained-before-region-devastated/6425275.html>

³⁰ VOA News, “Maliens Protest ECOWAS Sanctions,” 14 January 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/maliens-protest-ecowas-sanctions-/6397444.html>

³¹ VOA News, “Maliens Protest ECOWAS Sanctions,” 14 January 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/maliens-protest-ecowas-sanctions-/6397444.html>

³² James Rupert, “Countering Coups: Experts Offer Steps for US Policy,” *US Institute of Peace*, 3 March 2022, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/countering-coups-experts-offer-steps-us-policy>

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ UNHRC, “UNHCR seeks US\$59.6 million for 100,000 displaced by violence in Cameroon's Far North region,” 21 January 2022, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/1/61ea74c34/unhcr-seeks-us596-million-100000-displaced-violence-camerouns-far-north.html>

Anglophone Crisis

The Anglophone crisis continued through 2021 and into 2022. On 10 November, an explosive device was detonated inside a lecture hall at the University of Buea and injured 11 students.³⁵ On 24 November, unidentified gunmen attacked a school in Ekondo Titi in the Southwest region, killing three students and a French language teacher.³⁶ Both attacks are believed to be linked to the separatist movement. Education establishments have been a main point of attack by separatist groups since the beginning of the conflict, in 2016, when they called for a boycott on education to draw attention to the increased use of French in the classroom and reliance on monolingual French-speaking teachers. Schools continue to be attacked despite some separatist leaders overturning the school boycott. Gender-based violence and sexual exploitation is continuing. In 2019, 1,065 cases of sexual and gender-based violence were recorded across the Anglophone regions, in 2020 that number went up to 4,300 and in the first three months of 2021 nearly 500 cases of rape and sexual or physical assault, and more than 500 other cases of gender-based violence were documented.³⁷ Despite this, women have been politically active since the start of the conflict, yet they remain excluded from any political debate. According to a recent report from the International Crisis Group there is evidence that young girls are being forced into labour and sexual exploitation in the francophone regions as well as in neighbouring countries.³⁸ In February 2021, for example, gendarmes arrested two suspected traffickers in Limbe as they travelled with 26 children from a conflict zone in the Southwest. The children were reportedly to work as servants in Francophone Cameroon.³⁹ Attacks on the schools must come to an end and every attack must be toughly investigated, and justice and accountability for the victims must be ensured.

Separatists have been receiving help from armed groups in neighbouring Nigeria according to Cameroonian authorities.⁴⁰ The main separatist group, the Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF) confirmed an alliance with the Indigenous People of Biafra (Ipub), an ethnic Igbo group in south-eastern Nigeria at the end of October, although the details of the collaboration are not clear.⁴¹ Meanwhile, arms traffickers, regular suppliers of weapons to rebel groups in Cameroon, are

³⁵ Reuters, "Explosive attack on Cameroon university lecture hall wounds 11," 11 November 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/explosion-injures-nine-university-students-suspected-cameroon-attack-2021-11-10/>

³⁶ Al Jazeera, "Three children, one teacher killed in Cameroon school attack," 24 November 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/24/three-children-one-teacher-killed-in-cameroon-school-attack>

³⁷ Al Jazeera, "Sexual violence pervasive in Cameroon's Anglophone regions," 29 April 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/29/gender-based-violence-pervasive-in-cameroons-anglophone-regions>

³⁸ International Crisis Group, "Rebels, Victims, Peacebuilders: Women in Cameroon's Anglophone Conflict," 23 February 2022, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/307-women-in-cameroon_0.pdf

³⁹ VOA News, "Cameroonian Rights Groups Helping Children Rescued from Traffickers," 14 March 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/a/africa-cameroonian-rights-groups-helping-children-rescued-traffickers/6203297.html>

⁴⁰ VOA News, "Cameroon, Nigeria Investigate Arms Traffickers Accused of Supplying Weapons to Separatists," 3 September 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/6amero_cameroon-nigeria-investigate-arms-traffickers-accused-supplying-weapons-separatists/6219186.html

⁴¹ BBC News, "Why separatists in Cameroon and Nigeria have united," 21 October 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58726231>

being arrested by the Nigerian Police Force as a product of an agreement between the Cameroonian and Nigerian authorities who met in the Nigerian capital Abuja in September agreed to jointly fight armed separatists in both countries.⁴² Local Nigerian news site GWG, reported inhabitants of Mairogo and Tosso villages in Taraba State identified Cameroonian soldiers trooping many villages and harassing locals under the pretext of searching for runaway Ambazonian separatists.⁴³

Cameroonian armed forces continued to harass and harm civilians, a Human Rights Watch investigation indicated in December 2021.⁴⁴ They killed at least eight people and burned down dozens of homes and shops during three separate military operations in the North-West English-speaking region. The victims were accused of harbouring separatists. The incidents follow previous spates of violence and human rights violations by government forces during the crisis in the Anglophone regions. More than one hundred people including journalists, human rights defenders, activists, and supporters of political opposition have been arrested and jailed for expressing their opinions or peacefully protesting during the past five years. Most of them are still rotting in jail, where some have been subjected to torture and other ill-treatment, according to a recent investigation.⁴⁵

On 7 September 2021, the Military Tribunal in Buea sentenced four men to death after a trial for the massacre of at least seven students during a shooting at a school in the Southwest Region a year prior. This unprecedented response presents a new opportunity for justice and reparations for the victims. However, human rights organisations are concerned that application of the death penalty might increase and, in an already violent context, lead to a further escalation of violence.⁴⁶

On 5 December, the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights issued a resolution on the conflict, especially recognising its effect on women and children, calling for a peaceful solution and on the Government to authorise a Fact-finding Mission into the country, to enable the Commission to document the violations committed.⁴⁷

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Green White Green, "Nigerian Villagers Raise Alarm Over Intimidation From Cameroonian Soldiers," 24 October 2021, <https://gwg.ng/2021/10/24/nigerian-villagers-raise-alarm-over-intimidation-from-cameroonian-soldiers/>

⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Cameroon: Soldiers on Rampage in North-West Region," 3 February 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/03/cameroon-soldiers-rampage-north-west-region>

⁴⁵ Amnesty International, "Cameroon: More than a hundred detainees from Anglophone regions and opposition party languishing in jail for speaking out," 24 January 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/cameroon-more-than-a-hundred-detainees-from-anglophone/>

⁴⁶ OMCT SOS Torture Network, "Cameroon: Death sentence marks a new turn in the Anglophone Crisis," 7 October 2021, <https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/cameroon-death-sentence-marks-a-new-turn-in-the-anglophone-crisis>

⁴⁷ ACHPR/Res. 511 (LXIX)2021, "511 Resolution on the continuing Violation of Human Rights Situation in the Republic of Cameroon," 5 December 2021, <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/resolutions?id=543>

2.2 million people are affected by the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest regions, of which 1.6 are in need of assistance according to UN. In January 2022, non-state armed groups perpetrated 11 attacks with improvised explosive devices, including two in Buea, targeting communities. On 26 February 2022, a nurse was killed and a doctor was injured when medical convoys were attacked with eighteen other personnel on site.⁴⁸

At least 6,000 people have died since the start of the conflict according to the International Crisis Group.⁴⁹ An appeal letter to the UN Security Council signed by over 20 renowned Cameroonian women estimates that there have been well over 10,000 deaths between the Anglophone crisis and the Boko Haram conflict. Over 1,000,000 children have had their schooling disrupted by the conflict. They highlighted the tense political situation of the country and its importance in the region and said that there is a risk of an abrupt change of the head of the nation which would likely result in a sharp increase in violence should this change occur without a consensual national plan in place.⁵⁰

Intercommunal violence

Clashes among farmers, ranchers, and fishers over water scarcity have escalated along Cameroon's northern border with Chad. December saw an increase in violence as clashes broke out again on 5 December 2021 in the village of Ouloumsa, Far North Cameroon, it quickly spread to neighbouring villages before reaching Kousseri on 8 December 2021. The various attacks had, by mid-December, forced more than 85,000 Cameroonians to flee into neighbouring Chad while at least 15,000 were displaced inside the country. Over 40 were killed and at least 111 wounded throughout the 112 villages that were burned down. Women and children continue to be the most affected, of those displaced seeking asylum in Chad the majority were children and 98% of the adults were women.⁵¹ Information recollected by ACLED shows a 400% increase in battles in the month of December 2021 compared to the previous month, and a 20% decrease in January; February shows numbers similar to those prior to the attacks.⁵²

Since the new year, the situation has remained relatively calm, and some return movements to northern Cameroonian villages have been reported. By 10 January, at least 25,000 villagers had

⁴⁸ OCHA, Statement by the Humanitarian Coordinator in Cameroon condemning the killing of a humanitarian health staff in the North-West region, 1 March 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/statement-humanitarian-coordinator-cameroon-condemning-killing-humanitarian-health>

⁴⁹ International Crisis Group, Report 307 "Rebels, Victims, Peacebuilders: Women in Cameroon's Anglophone Conflict," 23 February 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/307-rebels-victims-peacebuilders-women-camerouns-anglophone-conflict>

⁵⁰ Human Rights and Legal Research Centre, "Insecurity Cameroon: 20 Women calls the attention of the UN Security Council on the ongoing armed conflict in Cameroon and the IMF on gross embezzlement of COVID19 funds by the government authorities," 4 June 2021, <https://hrlrc.org/2021/06/04/insecurity-cameroon-20-women-calls-the-attention-of-the-un-security-council-on-the-ongoing-armed-conflict-in-cameroon-and-the-imf-on-gross-embezzlement-of-covid19-funds-by-the-government-authorities/>

⁵¹ UN News, "Cameroon: Intercommunal clashes continue to displace thousands," 17 December 2021, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108242>

⁵² ACLED Data Dashboard, <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

returned. Several hundred of the returnees were left homeless as their homes were destroyed in the conflict and had to stay with relatives or in village mosques or churches.⁵³ As returns take place, reports of the extent of damage and number of affected villages continue to rise. Verifications on numbers are ongoing according to UNHCR.⁵⁴

The presence of the Islamic State in Northern Cameroon

Troops from Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad fighting jihadist groups in the Lake Chad Basin say attacks on military positions have increased since Boko Haram leader Aboubakar Shekau was declared dead in May 2021.⁵⁵ Islamic State is very much present in the region, Valdimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, informed the UN Security Council on 9 February.⁵⁶ Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) appears to have shifted tactics last June directing more attacks against military forces and fewer against civilians. The shift could indicate that the group is taking over territory from Boko Haram, aiming to establish a new social contract with communities and present itself as an alternative to the state.⁵⁷

An analysis from the International Crisis Group indicates the weakness of Cameroon's response against Islamic radicalism is the absence of a policy and measures to combat radicalisation. They have also failed to address poverty and the lowest school enrolment rate in the country, actors which have facilitated recruitment and indoctrination by Boko Haram. ISWAP could exploit the same factors to gain control of the region.⁵⁸

Cameroonian and Nigerian troops continue to combat the jihadists, on 21 February, Nigerian troops killed an unspecified number of ISWAP and Boko Haram insurgents at the Mandara mountains, Cameroon–Nigeria border.⁵⁹

⁵³ VOA News, "Cameroon Authorities: 25,000 Displaced to Chad by Intercommunal Violence Return Homeless," 10 January 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-authorities-25-000-displaced-to-chad-by-intercommunal-violence-return-homeless-/6390415.html>

⁵⁴ UNHCR, External Update - Far North Cameroon Emergency, 18 February 2022 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91059>

⁵⁵ VOA News, "Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad Say New Jihadist Terrorism Threats Warrant Change of Military Response," 19 November 2021, [Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad Say New Jihadist Terrorism Threats Warrant Change of Military Response \(voanews.com\)](https://www.voanews.com/news/cameroon-nigeria-chad-say-new-jihadist-terrorism-threats-warrant-change-of-military-response-20211119)

⁵⁶ UN SC/14789, "Despite Da'esh Leader's Death, Defeating Threat Posed by Terrorist Group, Affiliates Remains 'Long-Term Game', Top Counter-Terrorism Official Warns Security Council," 9 February 2022, [Despite Da'esh Leader's Death, Defeating Threat Posed by Terrorist Group, Affiliates Remains 'Long-Term Game',](https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14789.doc.htm) <https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14789.doc.htm>

⁵⁷ Institute for Security Studies, "ISWAP takes aim at the state in Cameroon," 22 July 2021, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/iswap-takes-aim-at-the-state-in-cameroon>

⁵⁸ International Crisis Group, "Q&A: Boko Haram in Cameroon," 6 April 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/q-boko-haram-cameroon>

⁵⁹ Daily Post, "Troops kill scores of Boko Haram, ISWAP fighters in Mandara mountains, recover bomb, others," 21 February 2022, <https://dailypost.ng/2022/02/21/troops-kill-scores-of-boko-haram-iswap-fighters-in-mandara-mountains-recover-bomb-others/>

For more information on the Islamic State in the Sahel region please see our last monitor.⁶⁰

Context:

The radical Islamist group Boko Haram originated in Nigeria but has reportedly had a presence in Cameroon since 2009 and has launched attacks since 2014. The Cameroonian government's response has focused on militarising the Far North Region and concentrating displaced persons in and around urban centres. The conflict has created one of the largest humanitarian crises in Africa. Last year, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, reportedly died in a confrontation in Nigeria with the splinter faction of ISWAP, opened the space for a reconfiguration of forces in the Lake Chad Basin.

In 2016, a series of peaceful protests by lawyers and teachers who, in order to protect the Anglophone educational and legal systems, requested the creation of a two-state federation were rapidly suppressed by the government. In response, armed separatist groups then formed to fight for an independent nation called Ambazonia, proclaimed an independent republic in October 2017. Authorities in Yaoundé responded, killing and arresting those who they believed sympathised with the secessionists this drove the formation of Anglophone militias. By the end of 2017, the crisis had degenerated into armed conflict.

Moreover, intercommunal violence broke out in the Far North last August when Shao Arab cattle herders accused Mousgoum fishermen of digging holes that resulted in deaths of their animals while the fisherman accused ranchers of allowing their cattle to destroy areas reserved only for fishing. The climate crisis is having a catastrophic effect in the Lake Chad region, with water levels in the far northern region of Cameroon, having decreased by as much as 95 per cent in the past 60 years. Inter-communal clashes occurred in August 2021 and displaced some 23,000 people across Cameroon and Chad. The repatriation of the 8,500 refugees who had remained in Chad was at an advanced stage of discussion between the two countries when the new clashes broke out in December.⁶¹

International response:

Although on 13 May 2019 the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an Arria Formula meeting on the crisis, to this day Cameroon is not a part of the UNSC's agenda. In 2020, Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed concern about violence between government and separatist forces, and indicated allegations of human rights violations and abuses must be promptly investigated and actions taken to combat impunity and prevent reoccurrence. She also reminded armed separatist groups of their responsibilities under international law and call on all parties to refrain from deliberate attacks on civilians.⁶² Last year, UN Secretary General also

⁶⁰ Atrocities Watch Africa, "ATROCITIES WATCH AFRICA MONITOR – January 2022," <http://atrocitieswatch.org/atrocities-watch-africa-monitor/>

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² UN OHCHR, "Cameroon killings: Bachelet urges full accountability," 22 April 2020, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25817&LangID=E>

insisted on justice and accountability for the violations committed. Despite this, Cameroon was re-elected to the UN Human Rights Council for the 2022-2024 term in October last year.

After calling on the government of Cameroon and armed separatist groups to end all violence, on 7 June 2021, the United States imposed visa restrictions on individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Anglophone region.⁶³

In November, the European Parliament adopted a resolution deploring human rights abuses and proposed a UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission. At the same time, they backed the Cameroonian government's efforts to combat Islamic State and called on the international community to support all efforts to combat the armed group and called for urgent humanitarian support from the international community, including the EU and its Member States.⁶⁴

The African Union has remained silent on the crisis. The Norwegian Refugee listed Cameroon on their Neglected Displacement Crises list between 2018 and 2020.⁶⁵ No successful mediation efforts took place and little international pressure was placed on conflict parties to stop attacking civilians. Media attention was also limited, partly due to a lack of access for journalists to affected areas.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

In the last month (February 2022), the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) alongside the Ugandan army continued to clash against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Government forces indicate that the joint military operation is yielding results with four ADF militiamen killed in mid-February;⁶⁶ and another sixteen during the last weekend of the month.⁶⁷ Due to the ongoing attacks on civilians, FARDC and Ugandan troops also deployed in Ituri as part of joint operations mid-February.⁶⁸



⁶³ US Department of State, "Announcement of Visa Restrictions on Those Undermining the Peaceful Resolution of the Crisis in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon," 7 June 2021, <https://www.state.gov/announcement-of-visa-restrictions-on-those-undermining-the-peaceful-resolution-of-the-crisis-in-the-anglophone-regions-of-cameroon/>

⁶⁴ European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2021 on the human rights situation in Cameroon (2021/2983(RSP)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0483_EN.html

⁶⁵ Norwegian Refugee Council, "The world's most neglected displacement crises in 2020," 27 May 2021, <https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/fr/the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crisis-in-2020/index.html>

⁶⁶ Monitor, "UPDF, Congolese army kill 4 ADF rebels," 16 February 2022, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-congolese-army-kill-4-adf-rebels-3718318>

⁶⁷ Nation, "16 ADF terrorists 'killed in eastern DRC'," 1 March 2022, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/16-adf-terrorists-killed-in-eastern-drc--3733804>

⁶⁸ Andalou Agency, "17 civilians killed in Dem. Rep. of Congo, says security monitor," 16 February 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/17-civilians-killed-in-dem-rep-of-congo-says-security-monitor/2503753>

Kivu Security Tracker (KST) shows a decrease in “violent deaths” in the month. For the first time in six months then there were less than 190 violent deaths and 44 clashes, down from a peak of almost 350 deaths and 126 clashes in November 2021, and 320 violent deaths in January.⁶⁹

Despite the ongoing military offensive, Nelleke van de Walle from the International Crisis Group expressed concerns that the FARDC is benefiting from deals with criminal gangs, “FARDC soldiers are underpaid and sometimes worse equipped than the rebel groups.” The government’s failure to protect civilians leads to the creation of Mai-Mai self-defence militias.⁷⁰ UNHCR expressed concern over intercommunal conflicts in South Kivu which displaced at least 10,000 during the first fortnight of February.⁷¹

ADF continued to attack civilians in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. The ADF is suspected of carrying out attacks in North Kivu on 13 February, killing seven⁷² and on 27 February, killing at least 20 civilians.⁷³ In addition, the group is believed to have freed about twenty members from prison during a separate attack in North Kivu, during which at least three people were killed.⁷⁴ ADF also ambushed a convoy of vehicles escorted by MONUSCO in the Irumu territory of Ituri. In the clash, at least eight ADF fighters were killed during the clash and three civilians were injured.⁷⁵

The Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) also continued attacks in February, specifically targeting displaced civilians. In early February, seven displaced people in Masisi territory fled after being physically assaulted for not paying a tax imposed by armed groups, six others were abducted and released only after payment of a ransom.⁷⁶ An attack on the Plaine Savo Camp on 2 February where at least 60 members of the Hema ethnic community, including

⁶⁹ Kivu Security Tracker maps violence by state security forces and armed groups specifically in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. For more information please visit:

<https://kivusecurity.org/>

⁷⁰ The Guardian, “‘Anything to stop the massacres’: peace still eludes DRC as armed groups proliferate,” 11 February 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/11/massacres-peace-democratic-republic-congo-kivu-rebels-uganda>

⁷¹ UNHCR, “UNHCR alarmed by rising violence against displaced civilians in eastern DR Congo,” 18 February 2022, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/2/620f65234/unhcr-alarmed-rising-violence-against-displaced-civilians-eastern-dr-congo.html>.

⁷² The Defense Post, “Ethnic Militia Kills 18 in Eastern DR Congo: Official,” 15 February 2022, <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/02/15/codeco-dr-congo-massacre/>

⁷³ New Delhi Times, “20 Dead in Rebel Attack in Eastern Congo,” 1 March 2022, <https://www.newdelhitimes.com/20-dead-in-rebel-attack-in-eastern-congo/>

⁷⁴ Reuters, “Islamist militia frees about 20 prisoners in eastern Congo,” 3 February 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/islamist-militia-frees-about-20-prisoners-eastern-congo-2022-02-03/>

⁷⁵ Defence Web, “SA soldiers come out on top in DRC convoy ambush,” 25 February 2022, <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sa-soldiers-come-out-top-in-drc-convoy-ambush/>

⁷⁶ UNHCR, “UNHCR alarmed by rising violence against displaced civilians in eastern DR Congo,” 18 February 2022, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/2/620f65234/unhcr-alarmed-rising-violence-against-displaced-civilians-eastern-dr-congo.html>

15 children, were killed sparked the displacement of 25,000 people in the area.⁷⁷ On 15 February at least 17 civilians including five children were killed in Djugu territory.⁷⁸ In recent months targeting of internally displaced persons camps has increased, OHCHR has identified that between 19 and 28 November 2021, four sites were attacked by CODECO, including the village of Drodro where at least 58 members of the Hema community were killed. In total, OHCHR documented 10 attacks on IDP sites in 2021 in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, in which at least 106 people were killed, 16 injured and at least seven women subjected to acts of sexual violence.⁷⁹

Felix Tshisekedi had his security advisor, François Beya, arrested on 5 February for reasons related to national security. Public opinion as well as sources close to the government speak of an attempted coup.⁸⁰

Eight negotiators sent by Tshisekedi to Ituri to negotiate a ceasefire with armed groups were taken hostage by CODECO on February 16, among them Thomas Lubanga and Germain Katanga who were previously convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Negotiations on their release are ongoing at the time of writing. CODECO appears to have set demands difficult for the government to meet.⁸¹

Context

Eastern Congo has been plagued by violence for more than two decades. Non-state armed groups and government forces killed at least 1,300 civilians between October 2019 and June 2020. The Congolese security forces conducted simultaneous operations against armed groups in eastern Congo, with mixed results and at times using militia as proxy forces against other groups. More than 120 militias and armed groups are active in eastern DRC. A state of siege was declared in northeastern DRC in response to the violence and continues to this day.

⁷⁷ The Guardian, "Calls for security crackdown as 60 are killed in DRC camp violence," 2 February 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/02/calls-for-security-crackdown-as-60-are-killed-in-drc-camp-violence>

⁷⁸ Andalou Agency, "17 civilians killed in Dem. Rep. of Congo, says security monitor," 16 February 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/17-civilians-killed-in-dem-rep-of-congo-says-security-monitor/2503753>

⁷⁹ OHCHR, Press briefing notes on Democratic Republic of the Congo, 8 February 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=28095&LangID=E>

⁸⁰ Le journal de l'Afrique, "François Beya case: "palace war" or question of national security?," 9 February 2022, <https://lejournaldelafrique.com/en/lafrique-daujourd'hui/affaire-francois-beya-guerre-de-palais-ou-question-de-surete-nationale/>

⁸¹ Africa News, "Two former warlords still held hostage by militia in DR Congo's Ituri," 7 March 2022, <https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/07/two-former-warlords-still-held-hostage-by-militia-in-dr-congo-s-ituri/>

The ADF is believed to be a local affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁸² Since April 2017, they have been responsible for the deaths of at least 2300 people and the abduction of 900, according to KST. Bombings in neighbouring Uganda during October and November 2021 paved the way for a joint Congolese-Ugandan military operation against ADF. Many continue to believe Uganda has ulterior motives for intervention.⁸³

CODECO is a coalition of militia founded in the 1970s, in recent years the group started engaging in armed attacks again with the objective of defending the Lendu population against the Hema. KST deems them responsible for at least 529 violent deaths, over 200 abductions and at least 78 clashes since March 2021.⁸⁴

International Response:

On 4 February, the UNSC issued a press statement condemning the CODECO attack on Savo and calling on the government to conduct a thorough and prompt investigation in order to ensure that those responsible are held accountable.⁸⁵

On 8 February, Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Throssell, issued a statement expressing deep concern at ongoing incidents of “deadly ethnically-motivated attacks” on displaced people’s camps.⁸⁶

UNHCR spokesperson Boris Cheshirkov expressed concern over the rising violence against displaced civilians in the eastern part of the country and over kidnappings and attacks on aid workers, he requested all parties to allow humanitarian organizations to freely provide assistance to those in need.⁸⁷

Rwandan president Paul Kagame called on regional leaders to address militia violence and the security challenges in the DRC and indicated they were ready to play their part, saying “We consider several mechanisms including negotiations, there are times we plead, there are times we ask, but if need be, there are instances when we don’t do neither and instead act on the matter accordingly.”⁸⁸

⁸² Congo Research Group, “Five questions regarding Ugandan intervention in the eastern Congo,” undated, <https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2021/12/01/five-questions-regarding-ugandan-intervention-in-the-eastern-congo/>

⁸³ France 24, “Ugandan mission in DR Congo opens old wounds, sparks new anxieties,” 2 December 2021, <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211202-ugandan-mission-in-dr-congo-opens-old-wounds-sparks-new-anxieties>

⁸⁴ Kivu Security Tracker.

⁸⁵ UNSC, Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo, 4 February 2022, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14787.doc.htm>

⁸⁶ Security Council Report, “Democratic Republic of Congo,” *March 2022 Forecast*, 28 February 2022, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-03/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-16.php>

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ The New Times, “Security problems in DR Congo affect the whole region – Kagame,” 9 February 2022, <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/security-problems-dr-congo-affect-whole-region-kagame>

On 9 February, the International Court of Justice ruled in the historic case on armed activities on the territory of the DRC, ordering Uganda to pay compensation to the DRC, though the amount was less than what had been requested by the DRC.⁸⁹ The compensation order came years after the court ruled that Ugandan intervention in Congo breached international law.

Ethiopia

The security situation in Ethiopia remains volatile, despite a general decrease in levels of violence in February 2022 as compared to November 2021 through January 2022.⁹⁰ Although the situation in Tigray and Amhara are relatively calm, clashes are reportedly continuing in the Barahle and Erebti districts of Afar. 300,000 have reportedly been displaced by fighting in Afar,⁹¹ many of whom are in areas that are hard for humanitarian actors to reach.⁹²



Despite the calm, a humanitarian crisis continues. 9.4 million Ethiopians are estimated to be in need of humanitarian aid.⁹³

Humanitarian access continues to be blocked in Tigray with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reporting continuing insecurity and administrative measures inhibiting their response. Movement of goods along the Semera-Abala-Mekelle Road has not been possible since 15 December. Some medical supplies were airlifted to Mekelle in early February, but unavailability of fuel has inhibited distribution.⁹⁴ UNOCHA reported that there were no food distributions reported in Tigray between 17 – 23 February due to food and fuel in the region being nearly exhausted.⁹⁵ A report released in March by Refugees International, *Nowhere to Run: Eritrean Refugees in Tigray*, highlights the unique vulnerabilities of Eritrean refugees in

⁸⁹ International Court of Justice, *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)*, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/116>

⁹⁰ ACLED, <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

⁹¹ OHCHR, “Oral Update on the situation of human rights in the Tigray region of Ethiopia and on progress made in the context of the Joint Investigation,” 7 March 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/oral-update-situation-human-rights-tigray-region-ethiopia-and-progress-made-context>

⁹² UNHCR, “Ethiopia Emergency Situation,” 28 February 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethiopia%20Emergency%20Situation%20External%20Updates%2028%20February%202022.pdf>

⁹³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Situation Report – Highlights,” 3 March 2022, <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia>

⁹⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Situation Report – Northern Ethiopia – Humanitarian Update,” 17 February 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Northern%20Ethiopia%20-%20Humanitarian%20Update%20-%202017%20Feb%202022.pdf>

⁹⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Situation Report – Highlights,” 3 March 2022, <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia>

the crisis.⁹⁶ On 3 February, 14,000 Eritrean refugees were reportedly re-displaced when Berahle camp in Afar was targeted. A least five refugees were killed.⁹⁷

Ongoing drought is, meanwhile, affecting close to seven million people in the Oromia, Somali, Southwestern and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' (SNNP) regions.⁹⁸

On 16 February, Amnesty International released a report documenting incidents of murder, rape and pillage committed by Tigrayan forces in Amhara. The report focused on atrocities perpetrated in and around the towns of Chenna and Kobo in August and September 2021.⁹⁹

Meanwhile the government in Tigray has established a Commission of Inquiry on the Tigray Genocide which has reportedly begun holding public hearings to documents the ongoing situation.¹⁰⁰

Context

On 4 November 2020, following months of political tensions, the federal government of Ethiopia launched a military offensive in the Tigray region against forces loyal to the governing TPLF. The conflict has drawn in troops from nearby Eritrea and Ethiopia's Amhara region and there have been frequent claims of rapes, massacre, enslavement, and widespread humanitarian abuses. Following the expansion of the conflict to Amhara and other Ethiopian regions, there has been an alarming rise in ethnic-based hate speech particularly against Tigrayans. On 18 October 2021, in response to the TDF advances, the ENDF launched an airstrike campaign on Tigray's capital, Mekelle. Airstrikes continue to hit the Tigray region into 2022.

International response

In February 2022, UN Deputy Secretary-General, Amina Mohammed, visited Ethiopia. She was able to visit Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Somali regions. She reported that the overwhelming message that she received was that there was a need for peace. She also said that "without a shadow of a doubt, justice and accountability have to be had."¹⁰¹

On 2 March, the Human Rights Council named Fatou Bensouda, former prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; Kaari Betty Murungi, former Vice Chairperson of the Kenya Truth,

⁹⁶ Dr. Sarah Miller, *Nowhere to Run: Eritrean Refugees in Tigray*, Refugees International, March 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Eritrea%2BBrief%2B-%2BMarch%2B2022%2B%281%29.pdf>

⁹⁷ ACAPS, "Latest developments," <https://www.acaps.org/country/ethiopia/crisis/complex-crisis>

⁹⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Ethiopia Humanitarian Bulletin," 8 March 2022.

⁹⁹ Amnesty International, "Ethiopia: Summary killings, rape and looting by Tigrayan forces in Amhar," 16 February 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-summary-killings-rape-and-looting-tigrayan-forces-amhar>

¹⁰⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X0N9cINGLFE>

¹⁰¹ UN, "Press Conference by Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed at United Nations Headquarters," 11 February 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/press-conference-deputy-secretary-general-amina-mohammed-united-nations-headquarters>

Justice and Reconciliation Commission and Steven Ratner, an American Law Professor to the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia.¹⁰²

The Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet in early March 2022. Bachelet's presentation highlighted civilian deaths and injuries as a result of air strikes carried out by the Ethiopian air force, with 304 documented killed and 373 injured as a result. She also reported that the office documented 306 incidents of rape committed by Tigrayan forces in Amhara between 1 November and 5 December 2021.¹⁰³

Libya

On 8 March Libya's parliament rejected UN "interference" rebuffing an offer of mediation in the elections process from United Nations envoy Stephanie Williams.¹⁰⁴ Tensions have risen as parliament appointed a new premier, Fathi Bashaga, to replace Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Parliament argues that it has the authority to name Basahaga because Dbeibah's mandate officially ended December 24, 2021. However, Dbeibah says that he will only hand over power to a government emanating from a newly elected parliament.¹⁰⁵ Civilians protested in Tripoli, Misrata, and Sirte requesting plans for a new transitional stage and rejecting the Parliament-approved parallel government.¹⁰⁶ Dbeibah announced plans for presidential elections in June, an exact date has not been set.¹⁰⁷



Hours prior to Bashaga's appointment, Dbeibah was attacked by gunmen, it was not confirmed if this was an assassination attempt, an investigation has been launched.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² United Nations Human Rights Council, "President of Human Rights Council appoints members of investigative body in Ethiopia," 2 March 2022,

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=28186&LangID=E>

¹⁰³ OHCHR, "Oral Update on the situation of human rights in the Tigray region of Ethiopia and on progress made in the context of the Joint Investigation," 7 March 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/oral-update-situation-human-rights-tigray-region-ethiopia-and-progress-made-context>

¹⁰⁴ Daily Sabah, "Libyan parliament rejects UN 'interference' after mediation offer," 8 March 2022, <https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/libyan-parliament-rejects-un-interference-after-mediation-offer>

¹⁰⁵ The Arab Weekly, "Dbeibah said to reject Turkish mediation bid in Libya," 8 March 2022, <https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-libya/dbeibah-said-reject-turkish-mediation-bid-libya>

¹⁰⁶ The Libya Observer, "Mass protests demand end of transitional stage," 5 March 2022, <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/mass-protests-demand-end-transitional-stage>

¹⁰⁷ Daily Sabah, "PM Dbeibah pushes summer election in Libya amid bid to oust him," 22 February 2022, <https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/pm-dbeibah-pushes-summer-election-in-libya-amid-bid-to-oust-him>

¹⁰⁸ Al Jazeera, "Libya: Gunmen attack Dbeibah's car ahead of vote to replace him," 10 February 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/10/libya-gunmen-attack-dbeibahs-car-ahead-of-vote-to-replace-him>

Fears the country will split into two warring administrations increase, Bashaga has reportedly said that he intends to take over the capital, raising the spectre of a new round of fighting,¹⁰⁹ on March 10 an armed convoy tried to make its way through to the capital, yet it was unable to find a route without meeting opposition from factions having to return.¹¹⁰ Days prior the foreign affairs and culture ministers were taken by unidentified gunmen while en route to Tobruk, Bashaga accused Dbeibah to be behind it.¹¹¹ At the same time, two major oil fields were shut down by groups demanding attention to, and services for, local populations. The closure is estimated to cost Libya \$34.6 million a day.¹¹²

Context

Since the fall of the Qadhafi regime in 2011 following an armed rebellion assisted by Western military intervention, the fragmentation of the State and the proliferation of weapons and militias have divided the country.

By 2014, following a controversial election, with parts of the country split between the Tobruk and Tripoli-based governments as well as various tribal and Islamist militias, a second war erupted. A ceasefire was signed in October 2020.

In March 2021, the transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) began preparing the nation for presidential elections in December but has struggled to maintain control. Libya remains without a permanent constitution, with only the 2011 constituent covenant in force.

International response

As mentioned above, the UN has offered mediation. The UN Secretary General called to “continue to preserve stability in Libya as a top priority.”¹¹³ In addition, the US has called for calm and de-escalation.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ Reuters, “U.N. Libya adviser aims for elections agreement this month,” 9 March 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/un-libya-adviser-aims-elections-agreement-this-month-2022-03-09/>

¹¹⁰ Reuters, “Libyan armed convoy turns back from Tripoli after clashes feared,” 10 March 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-crisis/libyan-armed-convoy-turns-back-from-tripoli-after-clashes-feared-idUSKCN2L72CF?rpc=401&>

¹¹¹ Independent.ie, “Blow to new Libya cabinet as two ministers are seized by gunmen,” 4 March 2022, <https://www.independent.ie/world-news/africa/blow-to-new-libya-cabinet-as-two-ministers-are-seized-by-gunmen-41409444.html>

¹¹² The Associated Press, “UN, US call for ending blockade of oil fields in Libya,” 7 March 2022, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/official-calls-ending-blockade-oil-fields-libya-83292508>

¹¹³ UN, SG/SM/21140 Press Release Secretary-General Takes Note of Vote in Libya to Adopt Constitutional Amendment, 11 February 2022, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sgsm21140.doc.htm>

¹¹⁴ Abdullah Ben Ibrahim, “US calls for calm as Bashaga challenges Libyan premier Dbeibah,” 9 March 2022, <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/us-calls-calm-bashaga-challenges-libyan-premier-dbeibah>

Mozambique

There has been a major cabinet reshuffle in the last month, with Adriano Afonso Maleiane named the new Prime Minister.¹¹⁵ It is unclear as yet how the change in leadership may impact on management of the crisis in the north of the country.

Rwandan and SADC troops deployed in Mozambique are reportedly contributing to some decreases in violence. According to ACLED, the number of battles in the country reduced in January and February 2022 as compared to late 2021. In early February, Rwandan military operations carried out clearing operations in Palma district, two insurgents were killed, two were captured and 17 civilians previously held by insurgents were taken into government custody. Rwandan authorities claimed that 80% of their area of responsibility had been cleared.¹¹⁶ Primary schools in the Palma district of Cabo Delgado re-opened on 31 January 2022, following improvements in the security situation there.¹¹⁷



Violence continues, however. Many civil servants and aid workers still describe the situation as fragile. ACLED reports that incidents of violence against civilians have increased in early 2022 compared to late 2021.¹¹⁸ On 7 February, the village of Namuembe was attacked and one civilian was killed. Although some have begun to return, 735,000 remain displaced (roughly a third of the province's population).¹¹⁹ It is reported that the insurgents are splitting into smaller cells, retreating and attacking once again – prolonging the violence.¹²⁰ On 18 February, insurgents reportedly entered Nangande district from bases in Palma, attacking a number of villages in the areas in the following days. Despite the presence of SAMIM in the region, there was reportedly little response¹²¹ until 22 February when military operations against the insurgents reportedly began.¹²² Another round of attacks targeted villages around Nangande during the week of 28 February – 6 March, further undermining confidence in SAMIM.¹²³ This suggests that Rwandan efforts may be displacing rather than resolving the issue and also raises questions about their

¹¹⁵ AlJazeera, "Mozambique announces new prime minister after cabinet reshuffle," 4 March 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/4/mozambique-announces-new-prime-minister-and-finance-minister>

¹¹⁶ Cabo Ligado Weekly: 7-13 February, 16 February 2022, <https://www.cabologado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-7-13-february-2022>

¹¹⁷ Taarifa, "Schools Re-Open in Cabo Delgado of Mozambique After Years," 1 February 2022, <https://taarifa.rw/schools-re-open-in-cabo-delgado-of-mozambique-after-years/>

¹¹⁸ ACLED

¹¹⁹ UNHCR, "Northern Mozambique Situation," January 2022

¹²⁰ Kate Bartlett, "Mozambique's Displaced Recount Brutality of Cabo Delgado Insurgents," 4 March 2022, <https://allafrica.com/stories/202203060158.html>

¹²¹ Cabo Ligado Weekly: 14-20 February 2022, <https://www.cabologado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-14-20-february-2022>

¹²² Cabo Ligado Weekly: 21-27 February 2022, <https://www.cabologado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-21-27-february-2022>

¹²³ Cabo Ligado Weekly: 28 February – 6 March, 8 March, <https://www.cabologado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-28-february-6-march-2022>

coordination with SAMIM. On 23 February, three attacks were carried out in the Macomia region, one of them on an elite police unit.

Some fear that insurgents are simply lying low during the current rainy season.¹²⁴ Some have moved into Niassa province of Tanzania and more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are being deployed. The International Crisis Group has noted that although the military campaign has made progress and donor assistance has improved conditions for local populations on the ground, more needs to be done to address the root causes of the conflict and dismantle ISIS cells across the region.¹²⁵ There are currently no amnesty provisions or deradicalisation programmes in place.¹²⁶ Corruption and economic exclusion have been cited as key drivers of this violence.¹²⁷

Context

In October 2017, attacks by a group known locally as “Al-Shabaab,” linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant began in Cabo Delgado. The group has perpetrated indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including beheadings, sexual and gender-based violence, sexual slavery, abductions, recruitment of child soldiers and destroying civilian infrastructure. Reportedly more than 3,100 people have been killed¹²⁸ and over 890,662 have been displaced,¹²⁹ including 735,00 in Cabo Delgado.¹³⁰

International response

South African extended its commitment of military forces to Operation Vikela in February through 15 April 2022, extending South Africa’s support to the regional force fighting extremism in Mozambique’s north.¹³¹ However, the Southern African force, SAMIM, has not been able to

¹²⁴ Obi Anyandike, Tavares Cebola, “Military intervention hasn’t stopped Mozambique’s jihadist conflict,” 8 March 2022, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/03/08/military-intervention-has-not-stopped-mozambique-jihadist-conflict>

¹²⁵ International Crisis Group, “Winning Peace in Mozambique’s Embattled North,” 10 February 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/b178-winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north>

¹²⁶ Obi Anyandike, Tavares Cebola, “Military intervention hasn’t stopped Mozambique’s jihadist conflict,” 8 March 2022, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/03/08/military-intervention-has-not-stopped-mozambique-jihadist-conflict>

¹²⁷ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, *Insurgency, Illicit Markets and Corruption*, 24 February 2022, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/mozambique-cabo-delgado-conflict/>

¹²⁸ Ramos Miguel, Andre Baptista, “Officials Say Insurgency in Northern Mozambique is Spreading,” *Voice of America*, 17 December 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/a/officials-say-insurgency-in-northern-mozambique-is-spreading/6359526.html>

¹²⁹ UNHCR data portal, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/moz>

¹³⁰ UNHCR, “Northern Mozambique Situation,” January 2022.

¹³¹ DefenceWeb, “SA soldiers to stay in Mozambique until at least mid-April,” 7 March 2022, <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sa-soldiers-to-stay-in-mozambique-until-at-least-mid-april/>

reach its planned strength of 3,000 fighters and helicopter gunships, armoured vehicles and a naval component, remaining at about 1,000 lightly armed fighters.¹³²

Nigeria

The 2022 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report indicated attacks by the Boko Haram group appear to have declined in the country since 2021 after their leader, Abubakar Shekau, allegedly died in May 2021. In addition, the group's attacks now appear focused on neighbouring West African countries.¹³³ Nigeria is currently the 6th country most impacted by terrorism and has been in the top 5 since 2012. The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) passed Boko Haram as the deadliest terror group in Nigeria. Responsible for almost 40% of all terrorist attacks in the region, it presents a substantial threat to the Sahel.¹³⁴ Both Boko Haram and ISWA have gained popularity among local communities by providing basic services and security in exchange for controlling trade and imposing taxes. ISWA have also secured trade routes and revived farming and fishing activities.¹³⁵ At the same time, it has been consolidating its grip in locations around Lake Chad, despite pockets of resistance from residual Boko Haram faction fighters.



While the Boko Haram insurgency was traditionally concentrated in the northeast, particularly in Borno state, northeast Nigeria, it appears that ISWA militants are overrunning communities in Niger state. Per data collected by ACLED, in 2021, communal militia activity constituted nearly one-third of all organised political violence, and more than 2,600 civilian killings were recorded which represents an increase of over 250% compared with 2020. Most prominently, these militias carried out multiple mass abductions of school students.¹³⁶

Ongoing confrontation between the state and suspected supporters of the militant groups; as well as confrontation between Boko Haram and ISWA against supporters of the Nigerian state continue to claim victims. At the end of February, ISWA perpetrated a series of attacks in the southern part of Borno State, where at least 25 people were killed in separate attacks in two days

¹³² Obi Anyandike, Tavares Cebola, "Military intervention hasn't stopped Mozambique's jihadist conflict," 8 March 2022, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/03/08/military-intervention-has-not-stopped-mozambique-jihadist-conflict>

¹³³ Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2022, March 2022, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web.pdf?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=released_global_terrorism_index_2022_ukraine_russia_crisis_terrorism_briefing&utm_term=2022-03-03

¹³⁴ 36 per cent of attacks were claimed by ISWA, Boko Haram being responsible for eight per cent and 44 per cent not attributed to any group.

¹³⁵ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, "Atrocity Alert No. 290: Ukraine, Myanmar (Burma) and Nigeria," 2 March 2022, <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/atrocity-alert-no-290/>

¹³⁶ ACLED, "10 conflicts to worry about in 2022: Nigeria, multiple security threats persist across the country," <https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/nigeria/>

for allegedly assisting government troops in their search for armed extremists.¹³⁷ At the end of January, footage of child militants executing military officers was released by ISWA.¹³⁸

On the other hand, according to the state, the security situation has improved and, during the last months of 2021, thousands of fighters from Boko Haram and ISWA had surrendered.¹³⁹ In October the Nigerian military announced the death of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the head of the ISWA, though this has not been confirmed by the militant group.¹⁴⁰ At least 180 fighters have been reportedly killed since January and 446 fighters surrendered between the 10 to the 24 of February due to ongoing land and air raids.¹⁴¹ On 8 February an additional 104 ISWA fighters surrendered.¹⁴²

Since 2011, inter-communal violence, rooted in competition over scarce resources, has escalated in central and north-west Nigeria between herding and farming communities. More than 5,000 people have been killed in the north-west by such groups commonly referred to as bandits since 2018.¹⁴³ Although some of these bandit groups are driven by criminal motives, many are ethnic Fulani and prey on settled farming communities, increasing ethnic tensions.¹⁴⁴ At the end of December 2021 suspected Fulani herdsman killed 20 farmers and displaced over 5,000 people.¹⁴⁵ In Niger State, more than 300 were killed and 200 abducted in over 50 reported attacks by terrorists during the first two weeks of 2022.¹⁴⁶ On 9 January, an estimated 200 people were killed and 10,000 displaced in attacks by armed bandits in the north-western state of Zamfara.¹⁴⁷ Nigeria is one of many countries whose population is suffering the direct consequences from climate change, which disproportionately impacts rural communities and can easily intensify existing tensions among communities over access to scarce resources. Such competition can increase the risk of mass atrocities.

¹³⁷ Daily Trust, "25 Killed As ISWAP Attacks 4 Villages In Borno," 28 February 2022, <https://dailytrust.com/25-killed-as-iswap-attacks-4-villages-in-borno>

¹³⁸ VOA, "Video of Child Militants Executing Nigerian Soldiers Raises Concerns," 21 January 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/video-of-child-militants-executing-nigerian-soldiers-raises-concerns-/6407395.html>

¹³⁹ The Guardian, "More than 15,000 Boko Haram terrorists have surrendered NSA," 12 November 2021, <https://guardian.ng/news/more-than-15000-boko-haram-terrorists-have-surrendered-nsa/>

¹⁴⁰ BBC, "Nigeria says Iswap leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi is dead," 14 October 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58576635>

¹⁴¹ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, "Atrocity Alert No. 290: Ukraine, Myanmar (Burma) and Nigeria," 2 March 2022, <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/atrocity-alert-no-290/>

¹⁴² Daily Trust, "Why 104 More ISWAP Fighters Surrendered," 8 February 2022, <https://dailytrust.com/why-104-more-iswap-fi-ghters-surrendered>

¹⁴³ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Nigeria, 1 March 2022, <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/nigeria/>

¹⁴⁴ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, "Atrocity Alert No. 283: Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria and Kazakhstan," 12 January 2022, <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/atrocity-alert-no-283/>

¹⁴⁵ Punch, "20 farmers killed, 5,000 displaced as herders attack Nasarawa communities," 20 December 2021, <https://punchng.com/20-farmers-killed-5000-displaced-as-herders-attack-nasarawa-communities/>

¹⁴⁶ The Nation, "Bandits killed 300, abducted 200 in Niger State within two weeks, says governor," 19 January 2022, <https://thenationonlineng.net/bandits-killed-300-abducted-200-in-niger-state-within-two-weeks-says-governor/>

¹⁴⁷ Al Jazeera, "At least 200 dead in bandit attacks in northwest Nigeria," 9 January 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/9/about-200-dead-in-bandit-attacks-in-northwest-nigeria-residents>

Insecurity also intensified in the southeast, where political violence involving the separatist Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) and the Eastern Security Network (ESN), grew significantly. Following a government directive against the ESN formations, clashes between the government and the IPOB increased, especially since the extradition and trial of IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, in June 2021.¹⁴⁸ 138 violent, often fatal, attacks perpetrated by “unknown gunmen,” whom have been linked to the ESN, were recorded between January and November 2021, with 253 casualties.¹⁴⁹

From January to August 2021, over 1,000 children were abducted in Nigeria and between 2015-2019, there were 100 reported attacks on schools. These attacks have been on the increase between 2020 and 2021, leading to the closure of many schools.¹⁵⁰ Of the 12.8 million people in need, 5.6 million are in the northwest, and 2 million are in the Middle Belt. An estimated 4.4 million, 2.3 million children and youth, including some 700,000 children under five, are going hungry in North-East Nigeria.¹⁵¹

There was a 22% increase in the number of organised political violence events in Nigeria throughout 2021, resulting in over 9,900 reported fatalities, nearly a 30% increase, compared to the previous year according to data obtained by ACLED. They estimate Islamist militants are linked to more than 18% of all organised political violence incidents in the country, meanwhile, in Nigeria’s north-central and northwest regions, communal militia activity constituted nearly one-third of all organized political violence events recorded across the country in 2021.¹⁵²

Context:

Nigeria faces multiple security challenges, including ongoing violence related to the Islamic State in the north, increasing intercommunal violence in the North-Central Zone, and separatist movements in the Niger Delta and South-East Zone.

Armed groups known locally as bandits carry out widespread killings, kidnappings, and looting across several states in the northwest region. Responding to the violent attacks, the government launched renewed campaigns in the north-west to curb armed banditry in September.¹⁵³ In January 2022, under the Terrorism Prevention Act, the government of Nigeria designated bandit groups as “terrorists.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ Al Jazeera, “Nigeria: Separatist leader to appear in court for treason trial,” 9 November 2021,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/9/nigeria-ipob-leader-nnamdi-kanu-appear-court>

¹⁴⁹ Nextier SPD, “Peace without guns,” 8 December 2021, <https://nextierspd.com/peace-without-guns/>

¹⁵⁰ Vanguard, “Over 1,000 children abducted in Nigeria since January,” 11 September

2021, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/09/over-1000-children-abducted-in-nigeria-since-january/>

¹⁵¹ UN World Food Programme, Hunger Hotspots, FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity August to November 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP-0000130653.pdf>

¹⁵² ACLED, “10 conflicts to worry about in 2022: Nigeria, multiple security threats persist across the country,” <https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/nigeria/>

¹⁵³ The Defense Post, “Nigeria’s Military Crackdown Puts Squeeze on Bandit Gangs,” 21 september 2021, <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/09/21/nigeria-military-crackdown-bandits/>

¹⁵⁴ The Guardian, “FG declares bandits as terrorists,” 5 January 2022, <https://guardian.ng/news/fg-declares-bandits-as-terrorists/>

IPOB members say the region has been economically and politically marginalised since the end of the civil war in 1970. In recent years, the group has begun to amass foot soldiers culminating in the launch of its paramilitary arm, the ESN in December 2020.

International response:

There have been numerous attempts from the international community to combat Boko Haram and ISWA. During the first days of February an agreement was signed between the United Kingdom and Nigeria, to combat terrorism in the north-east.¹⁵⁵ The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established in 2015 brings together units, mostly military, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, to end to armed extremism.¹⁵⁶

In 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) launched a preliminary examination of the situation in Nigeria. This examination concluded in December 2020 with the determination that there was a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed. The next step would be to request authorisation from the pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation, but this has not yet happened.¹⁵⁷

The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism expressed concern over the expansion of ISIL to central and west Africa, especially in Nigeria among other countries.¹⁵⁸ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs expressed concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the threat to the Lake Chad Basin from extremist groups.¹⁵⁹

On 10 January 2022, UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued a statement condemning bandit attacks in Zamfara State and urged the Nigerian authorities to bring those responsible to justice.¹⁶⁰

The African Union Peace and Security Council expressed deep concern over the worsening scourge of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa on 21 October 2021.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁵ The Guardian, "UK, Nigeria strengthen security, defence partnership to tackle terrorism," 4 February 2022, <https://guardian.ng/news/nigeria/uk-nigeria-strengthen-security-defence-partnership-to-tackle-terrorism/>

¹⁵⁶ The Multinational Joint Task Force, <https://mnjtfmm.org/>

¹⁵⁷ International Criminal Court, Nigeria Case, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201211-prosecutor-statement>

¹⁵⁸ UN News, "Battle against Da'esh, a 'long-term game', Voronkov tells Security Council," 9 February 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1111602>

¹⁵⁹ UN News, "UN relief chief pledges support for Nigeria," 21 January 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110362>

¹⁶⁰ Antonio Guterres Tweet, 10 January 2022, https://twitter.com/antonioguterres/status/1480630775309639689?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweteembed%7Ctwterm%5E1480630775309639689%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fnews.un.org%2Fen%2Fstory%2F2022%2F01%2F1109482

¹⁶¹ AU Communiqué of the 1040th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU held on 22 October 2021, on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Continental Efforts in Preventing and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, 5 November 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/communique-1040th-meeting-peace-and-security-council-au-held-22-october-2021-report>

Somalia

Somalia was slated to hold elections on 25 February 2022, following several rounds of delays. However, the elections have been further delayed to 15 March.¹⁶²

As noted in the previous edition of the Monitor,¹⁶³ the delays in the election process have created significant political instability in Somalia as political factions have jostled over the contours of the process. This instability has allowed Al Shabaab to reassert itself.



This pattern is likely to be exacerbated by the further delay in the electoral process. Indeed, ACLED has reported a slight increase of explosions/remote violence in February.¹⁶⁴ Some examples of this increase include on 10 February, a suicide bomber targeted delegates involved in the parliamentary elections, killing at least six people in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.¹⁶⁵ On 16 February, attacks on police points and checkpoints outside Mogadishu reportedly killed five.¹⁶⁶ On 19 February, a suicide bomber killed 14 people in a popular restaurant in Beledweyne.¹⁶⁷

On 3 March 2022, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General Adam Abdelmoula, expressed concern about hostilities in Diinsoor, Southwest State which displaced more than 17,000 people.¹⁶⁸

At the same time, the worst drought in decades continues, driving many from their homes. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimated that as of 7 February 2022 4.3 million had been affected and 271,000 displaced by drought,¹⁶⁹ an increase from 3.8 million and 169,000 displaced in December 2021.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶² AlJazeera, "US announced sanctions for Somali officials after election delays," 26 February 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/26/us-announces-sanctions-for-somali-officials-after-election-delays>

¹⁶³ Atrocities Watch Africa, Monitor No. 1, February 2022, <http://atrocitieswatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NewsletterIssueNo1.pdf>

¹⁶⁴ ACLED reported 49 incidents in February, as compared to 39 in January and 38 in December 2021, <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

¹⁶⁵ AlJazeera, "Several killed in attack targeting Somalia election delegates," 10 February 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/10/car-bomb-targeting-somalia-election-delegates-kills-six>

¹⁶⁶ The Associated Press, "Somalia says al-Shabab attack kills 5 outside capital," 16 February 2022, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/somalia-al-shabab-attack-kills-capital-82922166>

¹⁶⁷ Agence France Presse, "Suicide bombing kills 14 in Somali restaurant," 19 February 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/19/suicide-bombing-kills-in-somali-restaurant>

¹⁶⁸ United Nations, "Statement by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General," 3 March 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HC%20Statement%20on%20Diinsoor.pdf>

¹⁶⁹ UN OCHA, "Somalia: Drought Snapshot," 7 February 2022, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia_Drought_Snapshot_February%206_V5.pdf

¹⁷⁰ UN OCHA, "Somalia: Humanitarian Bulletin," December 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia_%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin_December_%202021_FINAL.pdf

Context

After suffering through a near constant state of crisis since the fall of former dictator Siad Barre in 1991 and widespread violence under Al-Shabaab militants, the country managed to put in place a Federal Government through limited, indirect elections in 2012. In 2016, legislation passed allowing political parties for the first time since 1969. There was a peaceful transition of power in 2017 to the current president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, better known as Farmaajo, who was again elected indirectly. At the same time, the country made progress in reforming the security forces, judiciary and other key state institutions. This progress is now being undermined by the electoral crisis.

International response

In response to electoral delays, the United States announced sanctions against key Somali leaders who “plays a role in procedural irregularities that have undermined the democratic process in Somalia.”¹⁷¹ The US also carried out the first drone attack on Al Shabaab, in support of Somali government forces, since August 2021 in February.¹⁷² The International Monetary Fund also warned that it might stop funding in Somalia if the election timetable was not adhered to.¹⁷³

At the same time, the African Union, international partners and the government of Somalia are in negotiations to replace the current African Union Mission in Somalia with a new AU Transition Mission, intended to operate in line with the Somalia Transition Plan.¹⁷⁴ While the name change appears intended to highlight progress towards AMISOM drawdown and handover to Somali national authorities, international observers are divided over whether this will lead to substantive change on the ground.¹⁷⁵

South Sudan

¹⁷¹ US Department of State, “Promoting Sustainable Peace and Responsible Governance in Somalia,” 8 February 2022, <https://www.state.gov/promoting-sustainable-peace-and-responsive-governance-in-somalia/>

¹⁷² Eric Schmitt, “US Carries Out First Airstrike in Somalia Since August,” *The New York Times*, 24 February 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/us/politics/somalia-shabab-us-airstrike.html>

¹⁷³ AlJazeera, “IMF says Somalia funding at risk over election delays,” 22 February 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/22/imf-says-somalia-funding-at-risk-over-election-delays>

¹⁷⁴ AMISOM, “African Union, Federal Government of Somalia, international partners conclude discussions on new AU Mission,” 9 February 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/african-union-federal-government-somalia-international-partners-conclude-discussions>

¹⁷⁵ Colin Robinson, “New Name, but Little Sign of Change: The Revised Agreement on the African Union Mission in Somalia,” *IPI Global Observatory*, 27 January 2022, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/>

There has been a surge of attacks against aid workers and aid operations across South Sudan in clear violation of international law. On 10 February, a *Médecins Sans Frontières* nurse and at least 20 civilians were killed in Agok; on 28 February unidentified gunmen attacked seven staff members of MSF in Yei and armed men attacked a convoy of World Food Program in Jonglei state. Human Rights Watch indicated at least 130 humanitarian aid workers have been killed since 2013.¹⁷⁶



Scores of people were killed during the last week of February in clashes between Gawaar Nuer and Lou Nuer militias in Ayod county in Jonglei state.¹⁷⁷ Fighting in Unity State between the Sudan People's Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) and armed youths during the month of February has led to the death of civilians, many displaced, property destroyed, and humanitarian supplies looted. Between 22 and 23 of February nine women were raped according to reports from local health facilities.¹⁷⁸ This represents a 136% increase in violence observed in Unity State last month relative to the past year according to monitoring by ACLED.¹⁷⁹

There has been an increase in political violence and polarisation between communities, elections are supposed to take place in South Sudan for the first time in 2023, yet it is feared this won't happen. For elections to take place, key provisions in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (Revitalised agreement or R-ARCSS) must be implemented.¹⁸⁰ These include the drafting of a permanent constitution upon which the future political system will be based, the unification of formerly warring forces and the repatriation of refugees, among others. All are unlikely to take place before the next year and have South Sudanese doubting the possibility of an election.¹⁸¹ Both carrying out an election under imperfect conditions and extensive delays could exacerbate tensions that have already led to widespread violence in the country.

At the end of last month, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan expressed concern over the lack of progress in implementing key provisions of the 2018 peace deal and reflected on how the current state of political instability contributes to the ongoing insecurity and impunity

¹⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Surge in Attacks on Aid Workers in South Sudan," 4 March 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/04/surge-attacks-aid-workers-south-sudan>

¹⁷⁷ ACLED Data, Regional Overview Africa 19-25 February 2022, 3 March 2022, <https://acleddata.com/2022/03/03/regional-overview-africa-19-25-february-2022/>

¹⁷⁸ UNMISS Statement on Escalating Violence in Unity State and Appeals for Calm, 25 February 2022, <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-statement-escalating-violence-unity-state-and-appeals-calm>

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Signed Revitalized Agreement On The Resolution Of The Conflict In South Sudan, 12 September 2018, <https://igad.int/programs/115-south-sudan-office/1950-signed-revitalized-agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-south-sudan>

¹⁸¹ Andalou Agency, "South Sudanese cast doubt on country's elections in 2023," 26 January 2022, [South Sudanese cast doubt on country's elections in 2023 \(aa.com.tr\)](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/south-sudan/south-sudanese-cast-doubt-on-country-s-elections-in-2023)

which allows human rights violations to occur.¹⁸² The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum has warned that there is an immediate risk of mass atrocities and fears how in the leadup to the 2023 elections, President Salva Kiir, could lead violent crackdowns on organised gatherings in an effort to silence the opposition.¹⁸³

On 16 January 2022, President Salva Kiir concluded agreements with two commanders who had broken away from the First Vice President and main opposition leader, Riek Machar, in August last year.¹⁸⁴ The main agreement centred on army unification with the parties committing the national army to absorb fighters loyal to both opposition signatories within the next few months.¹⁸⁵ Such deals weaken Machar, yet they could also continue to fuel the ongoing political instability in the country making the 2018 agreement less likely to be implemented.

As political leaders wrangle for position, violence continues on the ground. On 23 January, armed youth from the Murle community carried out attacks and cattle raids in two villages in Baidit, Jonglei State, where at least 32 people from the Dinka Bor community were killed, at least five houses were burned, and other property was looted. The assaults in Jonglei State are not isolated incidents, but part of a broader pattern of inter-communal violence and attacks against civilian populations that impact several parts of the country. An overwhelming majority of casualties that took place in 2021, in Jonglei and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area, are attributed to community-based militias from Nuer and Murle communities, and to a lesser extent, Dinka communities.¹⁸⁶ While cattle-raiding, a predominant form of localised violence, is historically rooted, information provided by UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) suggests the violence documented in recent years differs in that it involved civil defence groups and/or community-based militias with a level of organization, capable of conducting planned and coordinated military-style attacks.¹⁸⁷

In Western Equatoria State, violence broke out between June and September 2021 between the SPLA-IO and South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPF), formerly the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The fighting led to at least 440 civilians killed, at least 64 individuals subjected to sexual

¹⁸² UN OHCHR, "UN Human Rights Experts warn of increased political violence and polarisation in South Sudan, at conclusion of visit to the country," 11 February 2022, [OHCHR | UN Human Rights Experts warn of increased political violence and polarisation in South Sudan, at conclusion of visit to the country](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/02/un-human-rights-experts-warn-of-increased-political-violence-and-polarisation-in-south-sudan-at-conclusion-of-visit-to-the-country)

¹⁸³ The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Immediate risk of mass atrocities in South Sudan," February 2022, [Immediate Risk of Mass Atrocities in South Sudan \(ushmm.org\)](https://www.us-hmm.org/2022/02/02/immediate-risk-of-mass-atrocities-in-south-sudan/)

¹⁸⁴ Ghanaian Times, "South Sudan Signs Peace Deal With Splinter Opposition," 19 January 2022, <https://allafrica.com/stories/202201200176.html>

¹⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's Splintered Opposition: Preventing More Conflict," 25 February 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/b179-south-sudans-splintered-opposition-preventing-more-conflict>

¹⁸⁶ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, "Atrocity Alert No. 286: China, Afghanistan and South Sudan," 2 February 2022 <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/atrocity-alert-no-286/>

¹⁸⁷ UNMISS HRD, "Annual briefing on violence affecting civilians," undated, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unmiss_hrd_annual_brief_2021.pdf

violence and at least 90,000 forcibly displaced from the areas affected by the violence.¹⁸⁸ According to several victims and eyewitnesses, mixed Azande-Balanda armed militias were seen operating alongside SPLM-IO forces. The slow implementation of the peace agreement, as well as the mobilisation of forces along ethnic lines and destructive power struggles within the government, have led to a sharp increase in localised and inter-communal violence in various parts of the country.¹⁸⁹ Recent disputes have been exacerbated by resource pressures caused by climate change and arms proliferation.¹⁹⁰

South Sudan has nearly 4 million people forcibly displaced out of a total population of 11 million, making it the African country with the highest proportion of its population displaced.¹⁹¹ Ten years after its independence and despite the 2018 agreement, armed violence in South Sudan remains persistently high with violence and trauma having caused estimated 400,000 fatalities.¹⁹² The pace of violent events has remained steady, averaging 733 reported incidents annually since 2017 yet violence in 2021 exceeds that of 2019 and 2020.¹⁹³

To make matters worse, the country is facing its highest levels of food insecurity and malnutrition since independence 10 years ago, some 8.3 million people are estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021.¹⁹⁴ These include 8 million nationals and 310,000 refugees and asylum seekers. This is an 800,000 increase since 2020. Sudan was ranked the 16th highest risk country for experiencing a new mass killing in 2021 or 2022, according to the US Holocaust Memorial Museum's Early Warning Project and has ranked at least that high every year since the project began in 2014.¹⁹⁵

In 2021, the UNMISS reported 982 violent incidents were recorded, indicating at least 3,414 civilians were subject to killing, injury, abduction, and conflict-related sexual violence, yet this represents a 42% decrease compared to 2020, intercommunal violence accounted for 87% of the killings.¹⁹⁶

¹⁸⁸ UNICEF, "Tambura Conflict Displacement Key highlights, the UNICEF response and Displacement Dashboard," February 2022, <https://www.unicef.org/southsudan/reports/tambura-conflict-displacement>

¹⁸⁹ UN news, "South Sudan: Political violence on the rise, UN rights experts warn," 11 February 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1111752>

¹⁹⁰ UN OHCHR, "Human rights violations and related economic crimes in the Republic of South Sudan, Conference room paper of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan," 13 September–08 October 2021, <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoHRSouthSudan/A-HRC-48-CRP.3.pdf>

¹⁹¹ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "32 Million Africans Forcibly Displaced by Conflict and Repression," June 17 2021, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/32-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-by-conflict-and-repression/>

¹⁹² New York Times, "383,000: Estimated Death Toll in South Sudan's War," 16 September 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/africa/south-sudan-civil-war-deaths.html>

¹⁹³ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "10 Years after Independence South Sudan Faces Persistent Crisis," 13 September 2021, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/10-years-after-independence-south-sudan-faces-persistent-crisis/>

¹⁹⁴ The World Bank, "The World Bank in South Sudan," 11 October 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview#1>

¹⁹⁵ USHMM Early Warning Project, "South Sudan, 2021-22 Statistical Risk Assessment for Mass Killing," <https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/countries/south-sudan>

¹⁹⁶ UNMISS HRD, "Annual briefing on violence affecting civilians," undated, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unmiss_hrd_annual_brief_2021.pdf

Context

South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan in 2011. Two years after a political crisis erupted and turned into a civil war that took on an ethnic tone, the conflict quickly spread throughout the country, civilians were targeted on the basis of their ethnicity or perceived political affiliation, almost 400,000 people lost their lives during that time. Armed groups, parties to the conflict, committed rape and sexual violence, destroyed property and looted villages, and recruited children into their ranks. A mediation conducted by Uganda and Sudan in 2018 led the two main belligerents, Kiir and Machar reach a peace deal to end the war.

Violence has fuelled famine and food insecurity in the country and caused large-scale displacement of civilians inside and outside its borders. In February 2020, 2 years after signing President Salva Kiir Mayardit and former Vice President Riek Machar agreed on implementing the 2018 Revitalized Agreement, yet they have been slow to implement many of its provisions.

International Response

The UN Security Council (UNSC) has imposed targeted sanctions since 2015 and an arms embargo since 2018.¹⁹⁷ On 12 March 2021, the UNSC extended the mandate of UNMISS, emphasising that, “South Sudan’s government bears the primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”¹⁹⁸ UNMISS has been providing protection to civilians and is mandated to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitor and report on human rights violations, and support local and political solutions to conflict.¹⁹⁹ The UNSC is expected to convene again in March to discuss renewal of UNMISS’ mandate prior to its expiry on March 15, 2022.²⁰⁰

The Human Rights Council established the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan for a one-year term on 23 March 2016, its mandate was renewed annually ever since.²⁰¹ Last month,

It is important to note that COVID-19-related prevention and mitigation measures, as well as other challenges hindered UNMISS Human Rights Division’s capacity to verify and document all incidents, which may have led to under-reporting of the number of victims

¹⁹⁷ UN Security Council, Resolution 2577, 28 May 2021,

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2577.pdf

¹⁹⁸ UN Security Council, Resolution 2567, 12 March 2021,

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2567.pdf

¹⁹⁹ UN Mission in South Sudan <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/>

²⁰⁰ Security Council Report, “Programme of Work for March 2022,” 1 March 2022,

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/03/programme-of-work-for-march-2022.php>

²⁰¹ UN OHCHR Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan,

[https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/cohsouthsudan/pages/index.aspx#:~:text=The%20Human%20Rights%20Council%20established,%2F19\)%2C%20and%202020%20](https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/cohsouthsudan/pages/index.aspx#:~:text=The%20Human%20Rights%20Council%20established,%2F19)%2C%20and%202020%20)

the Commission expressed alarm over the escalation of inter-communal and localised conflict as well as the increased political violence and polarisation in the country.²⁰²

After the conflict erupted in 2013, the African Union established a Commission of Inquiry in South Sudan (AUCISS) to report on human rights violations and other abuses committed during the conflict. In October 2014 the AUCISS' final report found that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that war crimes and crimes against humanity had occurred.²⁰³

Sudan

In the last month, the stalemate between protesters, who refuse any accommodation with the military and the military, which refuses to step down, has continued. Widespread protests against the military authorities continue. This political instability appears to be creating fertile conditions for local conflicts to emerge or be re-contested as parties try to assess the impact of national instability on their contexts.



In February, the resistance committees which have been leading the protest movement released a political charter, the “Charter for the Establishment of the People’s Authority.” The Charter hopes to unify political opposition and consolidate a clear vision of the way forward for the country.²⁰⁴

The government has continued to use repressive tactics in an effort to put an end to the protests. At least 83 have been killed in the protests so far.²⁰⁵ High profile activists such as Amira Osman have been detained in what appears to be a widening wave of detentions. The exact number of detainees is unclear, but the Darfur Bar Association says that it is aware of at least 200 detentions.²⁰⁶ In February, Amnesty International called for the release of two teenagers detained in connection with the killing of a police officer during the protests citing “concerns the

²⁰² UN OHCHR, “UN Human Rights Experts warn of increased political violence and polarisation in South Sudan, at conclusion of visit to the country,” 11 February 2022,

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=28109&LangID=E>

²⁰³ AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 15 October 2014, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/auciss.final_report.pdf

²⁰⁴ Reuters, “Sudan’s main protest groups lay out political vision,” 28 February 2022,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sudans-main-protest-groups-lay-out-political-vision-2022-02-27/>

²⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, “Sudan doctors: ‘83 dead since October 25 coup crackdown,” 27 February 2022,

<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-doctors-83-dead-since-october-25-coup-crackdown>

²⁰⁶ Samy Magdy, “Sudan’s military rulers step up crackdown, arrest activists,” AP News, 11 February 2022,

<https://apnews.com/article/omar-al-bashir-africa-sudan-middle-east-khartoum-fbf4d02c6c4600b4b4c60cebd004afab>

youths were abducted and held without charge, in violation of their due process rights and subjected to torture in detention.”²⁰⁷

Violence continues in Darfur. In early March 2022, two villages in North Darfur were burned. These burnings appear intended to ensure that those who were displaced from these areas several months ago do not return. Joint forces reportedly did not intervene.²⁰⁸

Meanwhile economic disintegration continues. The Sudanese pound has plummeted to under 600 to the dollar, as compared to 450 in October. Exports plummeted 85% in January. International aid has been largely cut off in response to the coup. Rising prices are causing significant suffering among the population.²⁰⁹

Context

Sudan has been the site of numerous atrocities. The north-south civil war raged from 1955-2001 with a brief respite following the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972. An estimated four million were displaced.²¹⁰ The war was characterised by brutal attacks on civilians and ethnically charged rhetoric. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2001, eventually leading to the secession of South Sudan in 2011.

Shortly after the signing of the CPA, violence broke out in Darfur, with rebels taking up arms in response to the marginalisation of the region. Once again, ethnically charged rhetoric was deployed and groups associated with the rebels were subjected to massive human rights violations. Whole villages were razed, and women were systematically raped. A series of peace agreements signed in 2006, 2011 and 2020 have failed to end the violence.

International response

In February, UN independent expert on Sudan, Adama Dieng, visited the country for the first time since the 25 October 2021 coup. Dieng was able to meet with both government officials and the Sudanese Professionals Association, a key opposition group.²¹¹ Addressing the 49th Session of the

²⁰⁷ Zeinab Mohammed Salih, “Teenagers detained and allegedly tortured in Sudan must be released, says Amnesty,” *The Guardian*, 3 March 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/mar/03/teenagers-detained-and-allegedly-tortured-in-sudan-must-be-released-says-amnesty>

²⁰⁸ Radio Dabanga, “Sudan: Gunmen Wreak Havoc in North and Central Darfur,” 4 March 2022, https://allafrica.com/stories/202203050223.html?utm_campaign=daily-headlines&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_content=aans-view-link

²⁰⁹ Khalid Abdelaziz, Nafisa Eltahir and Aidan Lewis, “Sudan’s economy tumbles in post-coup deadlock,” *Reuters*, 2 March 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-economy-tumbles-post-coup-deadlock-2022-03-02/>

²¹⁰ US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “At Four Million, Sudan Leads the World in Internally Displaced Persons,” 13 July 1998, <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/four-million-sudan-leads-world-internally-displaced-persons>

²¹¹ Radio Dabanga, “Sudan: UN Expert Calls on International Authorities to Intervene in Sudan,” 24 February 2022, https://allafrica.com/stories/202202250083.html?utm_campaign=daily-headlines&utm_medium=email&utm_sour

UN Human Rights Council in Geneva on March 8 in response to a briefing by Dieng, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern about the “reversal of human rights achievements” since the coup, noting that “a wide range of human rights violations have been documented since the coup, in a context of total impunity.”²¹²

In addition, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan carried out consultations with over 800 Sudanese and reviewed 80 written submissions to produce a paper “Consultations on a Political Process for Sudan: An inclusive intra-Sudanese process on the way forward for democracy and peace.” The paper is intended to map out key areas of contention and agreement with a view to facilitating a political process.²¹³

ce=newsletter&utm_content=aans-view-link

²¹² Radio Dabanga, “Sudan: UN Human Rights Commissioner Strongly Condemns Abuses,” 8 March 2022, https://allafrica.com/stories/202203090441.html?utm_campaign=daily-headlines&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_content=aans-view-link

²¹³ UNITAMS, “Summary Paper: Consultations on a Political Process for Sudan: An inclusive intra-Sudanese process on the way forward for democracy and peace,” 28 February 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/summary-paper-consultations-political-process-sudan-inclusive-intra-sudanese-process>